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INTRODUCTION 
Medically unexplained (physical) symptoms (MUS, or MUPS) are symptoms that cannot 
be attributed to organic pathology and they represent a common category of com-
plaints in health care (Brown, 2004). The most common unexplained symptoms in 
primary or ambulatory care are: back pain, feeling bloated, pain in limbs, dizziness, 
diarrhea, abdominal pain, chest pain, fatigue, headache, ear, nose and throat prob-
lems and nausea (Kirmayer, Groleau, Looper, & Dao, 2004; Kroenke & Mangelsdorff, 
1989; Peveler, Kilkenny, & Kinmonth, 1997). MUS form a common problem in both 
primary care and specialist care. However, the symptoms mentioned above are also 
extremely common, albeit it in less severe form, in the healthy population, that is, in 
people that have not consulted a doctor for these symptoms. These medically undiag-
nosed minor symptoms are often also disabling and are frequently referred to as 
‘subjective health complaints’ (SHC; Ursin, 1997).  
Since decades there is an ongoing discussion of whether and how psychological fac-
tors play a role in health complaints, and in MUS in particular. Although it is clear that 
MUS are not “just between the ears” and MUS patients experience a lot of pain and 
suffer greatly from these complaints, several models of MUS include psychological 
factors and attribute a causal role to them. This thesis is focused on testing the most 
prevailing model, which proposes a causal role of illness-related cognitive schemata, 
or implicit memory, in the increased reporting of health complaints without a clear 
medical explanation. In this thesis, crucial assumptions of this model are tested which 
will provide more insight into the role of illness memory in the reporting of SHC, MUS, 
and in particular the most common complaint (pain).  
In this chapter, I will first provide background information on MUS and SHC. Next, I 
will provide an overview of several previous and recent theoretical models that pro-
vide a link between cognitive processes such as memory and attention, and increased 
symptom reporting. In addition, I will present the current evidence for these theoreti-
cal models. Finally, I will provide the aim and outline of this thesis.  
Prevalence 
Subjective health complaints in the general population 
In an often cited Norwegian survey in healthy people, 96% of the responding individuals 
reported to have experienced at least one health complaint in the last 30 days, with 
musculoskeletal pain, pseudoneurological and gastrointestinal problems as the most 
reported complaints (Ihlebaek, Eriksen, & Ursin, 2002). Despite this high prevalence, 
many of these complaints were not perceived as detrimental and most people had not 
sought medical help for them. Still, the proportion of these symptoms that actually 
lead to seeking medical help appears to be substantially enough to account for the 
most frequent reason for doctor visits (Eriksen, Svendsrød, Ursin, & Ursin, 1998; 
Eriksen & Ursin, 2004). Furthermore, these health complaints also do account for a 
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substantial part of long-term sickness compensation and permanent inability to work 
(Eriksen et al., 1998).  
Prevalence and lifetime occurrence of MUS in primary care 
When people eventually seek help and consult their general practitioner for their 
health complaints, at least one third of these complaints remains medically unex-
plained (60.6% in Fink, Sørensen, Engberg, Holm, & Munk-Jørgensen, 1999; 37% in 
Khan, Khan, Harezlak, Tu, & Kroenke, 2003; 32% in Marple, Kroenke, Lucey, Wilder, & 
Lucas, 1997; 35% in Peveler et al., 1997). One study found that the amount of somatic 
complaints without an organic cause ranged from 16% for back pain and 33% for faint-
ing and menstrual problems (Kroenke et al., 1994). MUS are significantly more common 
in women than in men. About 18% of men in primary care had a lifetime occurrence of 
at least four unexplained symptoms whereas 25% of women in primary care had a 
lifetime occurrence of at least six unexplained symptoms (Escobar, Waitzkin, Silver, 
Gara, & Holman, 1998). A smaller number of patients (8.2%) have more than three 
unexplained symptoms for two years or longer, measured in a data set of 1000 patients 
of four primary care clinics (PRIME-MD Study; Kroenke et al., 1997).  
Prevalence of MUS in specialist care 
MUS are not only a common problem in primary care but also in specialist care. MUS 
are reported in a large group of internal medical outpatients (74% in Kroenke & 
Mangelsdorff, 1989; 30%-50% in van Hemert, Hengeveld, Bolk, Rooijmans, & 
Vandenbroucke, 1993). However, the percentage of MUS differs among the specializa-
tions. One study estimated the prevalence of MUS among seven specialties in two 
general hospitals (Nimnuan, Hotopf, & Wessely, 2001). They found that overall 52% of 
the patients fit the diagnosis of MUS, with the highest prevalence of 62% among the 
gynaecology department. The health care specializations have different names for the 
presented unexplained symptoms in their field. For example, physicians working in 
gastroenterology departments often classify MUS at their departments as irritable 
bowel syndrome (IBS) and rheumatologists classify MUS at their department as fibrom-
yalgia (Wessely & Nimnuan, 1999). Table 1-1 provides an overview of these different 
classifications among the different medical specialties. There is still a debate going on 
whether these specific functional symptoms are manifestations of one and the same 
syndrome, with their different labels only depending on the medical specialty the 
patients initially presented their symptoms to (lumper view), or whether these symp-
toms are truly part of distinct syndromes (splitter view) (Wessely & Nimnuan, 1999; 
Wessely & White, 2004). It is likely that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. For 
example, one study found that a great amount of variance among the different labeled 
somatic syndromes in outpatients is accounted for by one underlying factor, while the 
rest of the variance is explained by the specific syndromes (Nimnuan, Rabe-Hesketh, 
Wessely, & Hotopf, 2001). Furthermore, a more recent study that used different 
statistical techniques found that among patients with MUS, different subgroups could 
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be best discriminated from each other based on their total symptom score (high versus 
low), which is in favor of a lumper view (Lacourt, Houtveen, & Van Doornen, 2013). On 
the other hand, when the symptoms were forced in to more than two groups, it was 
found that there were cluster-specific symptom patterns that defined the groups, 
which is evidence for the splitter view. Although, it was found that the model of the 
symptoms clustered in two groups only showed the best fit (Lacourt et al., 2013). 
 Medically unexplained symptoms do not only refer to somatic symptoms without a 
known medical cause but can also refer to symptoms in some people with medically 
Table 1-1. Diagnostic labels for common functional symptoms used among medical specialties (modified 
from Hall, 2011) 
Specialty  Diagnostic labels  Functional symptoms  
Allergy/ 
toxicology  
Multiple chemical sensitivity/ idiopathic 
environmental intolerance  
Chemical intolerance  
Odor hypersensitivity to common chemical 
agents  
Headache  
Cardiology  Non-cardiac chest pain/ atypical chest 
pain  
Persistent chest pain often exacerbated by 
ingestion or exercise; heartburn; muscle and 
joint aches  
Dentistry  Temporomandibular joint disorder  Pain, clicking, grating in the jaw joint; 
headache; restricted movement of the jaw  
Gastroenterolo-
gy  
Irritable bowel syndrome  
Non-ulcer dyspepsia  
Interstitial cystitis  
Abdominal bloating and pain lessened by 
defecation; constipation and /or diarrhea; 
change in frequency and/ or consistency of 
stools  
Gynaecology  Chronic pelvic pain  
Interstitial cystitis/ painful bladder 
syndrome  
Pain during sex; abdominal and pelvic pain; 
dysmenorrhea; detrusor instability; change in 
bladder capacity, frequency and urgency  
Infectious 
disease  
Chronic fatigue syndrome/ myalgic 
encephalomyelitis/ post-viral fatigue 
syndrome  
Widespread muscle and joint pain; persistent 




Gulf war syndrome  Fatigue, headaches, muscle pains, neurological 
symptoms, poor concentration  
Neurology  Conversion disorder (formerly known as 
hysteria)  
Non-epileptic attack disorder  
Loss or alteration of motor or sensory function; 
motor weakness and tremor, paralysis, 
impaired vision or hearing  
Seizures  
Orthopedics (Lower) back pain and other musculoskel-
etal pain symptoms 
Muscle pains 
Otolaryngology  Functional dysphonia  Hoarseness  
Psychiatry  Somatization disorder/ Somatoform 
disorder (e.g., conversion disorder, pain 
disorder, undifferentiated somatoform 
disorder, or somatoform disorder not 
otherwise specified)  
Depends on classification  
Rheumatology Fibromyalgia Chronic widespread pain and tenderness; sleep 
disturbance  
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“explained” conditions, if the complaints are more severe than regarded as reasonable 
(Eriksen et al., 1998). 
Somatoform Disorders 
In mental health care, somatic health complaints are not uncommon. The psychiatric 
diagnosis of somatoform disorders are a specific subgroup within the broad defined 
medically unexplained symptoms (Creed, Barsky, & Leiknes, 2011). When people with 
MUS visit psychologists or psychiatrists, these professionals can classify the MUS as one 
of the somatoform disorders described in the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental 
Disorders fourth edition (DSM-IV). Yet, of patients that are already suffering from MUS 
only few patients with the syndromes mentioned in Table 1-1 are eventually diagnosed 
with a somatoform disorder. For example, one study demonstrated in 206 distressed, 
high-utilizing MUS patients that only 4.4% classified as any DSM-IV Somatoform Disor-
ders (4.4%). However, 60.2% had non-somatoform (“psychiatric”) diagnoses, which 
were primarily anxiety and depression (R. C. Smith et al., 2005). A systematic review 
found that the 12-month prevalence of somatoform disorders among 7 population-
based studies with a total of 18.894 combined participants ranged from 1.1% to 11%, 
with the median of 6.3% (Wittchen & Jacobi, 2005). 
In summary, patients that are diagnosed with a somatoform disorder seem to be 
only the “tip of the iceberg”. One could see the somatoform disorder as the one end of 
a continuum, with the lowest prevalence. The different functional syndromes per 
specialization seem to belong in the middle of the continuum and subjective health 
complaints at the opposite side of the continuum with the highest prevalence (See 
Figure 1-1).  
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Costs and negative impact of SHC and MUS 
Most health complaints disappear quickly, however still a considerable part persists 
over time and these symptoms cause long term distress and disability. For example, it 
has been found in a large sample of five hundred patients presenting to a medicine 
clinic with physical symptoms, that by 3 months, 37% of patients in primary care 
experienced complete symptom resolution, 43% were feeling better although the 
symptom remained, 12% were unchanged, and 8% were worse (Jackson & Passamonti, 
2005). These outcomes were not influenced by whether the symptom was medically 
explained or not. Furthermore, of the patients without a medical explanation for their 
symptom, 28% of them reported that their symptom remained medically unexplained 
at 5 years follow up (Jackson & Passamonti, 2005). In extreme cases, symptoms can 
last many years. In a study among people suffering from DSM-IV diagnosed somatiza-
tion disorder, it was found that the average symptom duration at the time of diagnosis 
was 29.8 years. Thus, symptoms can persist for a long time and the repeated consulta-
tions and examinations that are associated with such symptoms form a major burden 
on the health care system. For example, the patients suffering from somatization 
disorder had health care costs that were nine times the average (G. R. Smith, Monson, 
& Ray, 1986). One systematic review found that the excess health care costs of MUS 
patients in the US ranged from 432 to 5353 US dollars per person per year (Konnopka 
et al., 2012). In addition, one study looked at the impact of somatoform disorders 
(which is a smaller subgroup within MUS) on disease-related work disability (Hiller, 
Fichter, & Rief, 2003). Compared to the direct health-care costs, the number of 
workdays lost due to MUS is an indirect cost. In this study it was found that patients 
with a somatoform disorder had on average 121.3 sick days in the two previous years 
(SD = 158.3). Not only somatoform disorders impact our health-care costs and work-
related disability, but SHC such as back pain as well. Recently, a Dutch cost of illness 
study examined back pain (Lambeek et al., 2011). The researchers found that the total 
costs of back pain decreased from €4.3 billion in 2002 to €3.5 billion in 2007. This 
corresponded to 0.9% of the gross national product (GNP) in 2002 and 0.6% of GNP in 
2007. About 88% of the costs were due to indirect costs, such as governmental disabil-
ity and sickness support and production losses (Lambeek et al., 2011). However, this 
study did not look at whether the back pain was due to a medical cause or not. 
Not only do MUS impact society and our health care system, it of course impacts 
the quality of life of the patient as well. MUS cause decreased activities of daily living, 
social life, work and has an effect on mood (Nezu, Nezu, & Lombardo, 2001). One 
study examined a large random sample of patients in Dutch general practices and 
looked at differences in self-reported social isolation, and coping in patients with 
persistent MUS (meaning at least four consultations without a medical diagnosis) versus 
patients with a medical diagnosis and a group of remaining patients (i.e. who had less 
than four consultations for their MUS) (Dirkzwager & Verhaak, 2007). Patients with 
persistent MUS showed higher psychological distress, less quality of life, and more 
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social isolation compared to the other groups of patients. This difference was not 
caused by an unhealthy lifestyle, since the different patients groups did not differ in 
respect to this (Dirkzwager & Verhaak, 2007). 
In conclusion, health complaints contribute considerably to sickness leave costs, 
health care costs and are associated with great personal suffering (Brown, 2004; 
Eriksen et al., 1998).  
THEORETICAL MODELS PROVIDING POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR SYMPTOM 
REPORTING 
Although health complaints, SHC and MUS, are a common problem, still not much is 
known about the factors causing people to report physical symptoms, especially not 
when there is no clear medical basis. Clearly, in order to reduce the burden associated 
with SHC and MUS, it is necessary to increase our understanding about the underlying 
causes of these complaints. 
Historically, theoretical models on symptom reporting have focused on symptom 
reporting in its most severe form, i.e. MUS, and have attributed MUS to dissociation, 
conversion and somatization (Brown, 2004). A serious problem with these models so far 
is that there is no evidence for their major assumption that psychological distress, like 
anxiety or depression, is the cause of the unexplained symptoms (Brown, 2004). 
Although depression and anxiety are frequently found in MUS patients, it generally has 
turned out not to be the cause of their symptoms (as discussed in Brown, 2004).  
Theories of symptom perception based on cognitive psychology principles 
Instead of assuming that depression or anxiety is the cause for MUS, some have sug-
gested that distorted cognitive processes, such as biases in memory and attention, can 
cause normal bodily signals to be perceived as symptoms of an illness (Brosschot, 2002; 
Brown, 2004; Pennebaker, 1982a). Normally, we remain unaware of most bodily 
processes and signals. However, sporadically some bodily signals and sensations are 
brought to our awareness due to changes in these cognitive processes (Deary, Chalder, 
& Sharpe, 2007; Pennebaker, 1982a). The next few paragraphs will present an over-
view of earlier theoretical models on cognitive processes such as memory and atten-
tion causing increased symptom reporting. 
Increased attention to bodily signals causes increased symptom perception 
Pennebaker’s hypothesis of competing cues 
Attention plays a role in shaping the contents of our conscious thought, and it controls 
our thought and action (Brown, 2004). The most important task of our attention 
system is to make a selection of potentially relevant information for further processing 
and to control our actions. One of the most influential models to examine the effect of 
attention on symptom perception is Pennebaker’s ‘hypothesis of competing cues’ 
(1982b). This hypothesis states that with increasing external cues demanding atten-
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tion, less attention resources are available for internal stimuli, or bodily signals. In this 
way, people will notice less bodily signals and thus report fewer symptoms. However, 
if people are in a deprived or boring environment with no external cues, people will 
notice more internal signals, and thus report more symptoms. Generally, when internal 
cues or bodily signals get more attention compared to external cues, people tend to 
report more symptoms. In the past decades, several studies have confirmed this effect 
of attention on symptom perception (Cioffi & Holloway, 1993; Cioffi, 1991; Kolk, 
Hanewald, Schagen, & Gijsbers van Wijk, 2002; L. C. Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981; 
Pennebaker, 1982a). 
Research that tested this hypothesis of competing cues has often focused on people 
with high negative affect (NA) personality trait. People with a high NA personality trait 
are characterized as individuals that tend to experience more distressing negative 
emotions like anxiety and depression compared to people low on this trait. People 
with this trait, have been hypothesized to pay more attention to internal cues in 
general (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989) and also to have increased scanning of their 
body for symptoms. Watson and Pennebaker have indeed shown - in a cross-sectional 
study- that high NA is related to increased symptom reporting (Watson & Pennebaker, 
1989). Other studies have also shown a positive correlation between NA and symptom 
reporting (Filipkowski et al., 2010; Vassend & Skrondal, 1999; P. G. Williams & Wiebe, 
2000). In conclusion, NA seems to be an important factor in symptom reporting and 
should thus be taken into account when examining subjective health reports. 
The somatosensory amplification model 
Another influential model that examined the effect of attention on symptom percep-
tion is the somatosensory amplification model by Barsky & Wyshak (1990). Somatosen-
sory amplification is the tendency to perceive normal somatic and visceral sensations 
as being relatively intense, disturbing and noxious. This model suggests that when 
people “amplify” benign somatic sensations, and misattribute those to a serious 
disease, they will, as a consequence, direct their attention to bodily sensations, and 
experience more somatic sensations, thus forming a vicious cycle. So, increased 
attention for bodily sensations, or hypervigilance, and misattribution are core ele-
ments of the model of somatosensory amplification (Barsky, Goodson, Lane, & Cleary, 
1988). Other core elements of amplification are the tendency to focus on weak and 
infrequent bodily sensations and the tendency to react to bodily sensations with 
certain emotions or cognitions that intensify the sensations (Barsky et al., 1988). 
Somatosensory amplification, measured by a self-report questionnaire, in patients with 
upper-respiratory tract infections was a significant predictor of physical symptoms, 
while controlling for medical comorbidity (Barsky et al., 1988). Although this model 
was originally intended to explain hypochondria, it was later suggested that soma-
tosensory amplification might play a more general role in symptom reporting (Barsky, 
Cleary, & Klerman, 1992). While several studies provided support for this hypothesis, 
other studies have shown that amplification does not correlate with one of the other 
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core elements of the model, i.e. hypervigilance which was measured as the ability to 
detect heart rate changes and other measures of interoceptive sensitivity (for a review 
see Duddu, Isaac, & Chaturvedi, 2006). It has been suggested that somatosensory 
amplification plays a partial role in symptom reporting, but other factors may also be 
important (Duddu et al., 2006). Since somatosensory amplification seems to be partial 
involved in symptom reporting, it is important to control for this tendency when 
exploring the subjective health reports. 
Illness memory causing increased bodily attention 
Some theoretical models have expanded on the role of attention in symptom reporting 
by adding the potential role of cognitive schema networks related to illness, or in short 
“illness memory”, in guiding attention and misinterpretation of bodily signals. These 
models have been developed independently of each other, and they all have a slightly 
different focus. However, as will be shown below, all these models share the common 
idea that illness-related memory or schemata corresponding to increased accessibility 
of illness-related information, play an important causal role in symptom reporting by 
either directing attention towards bodily signals, guiding interpretation of these 
signals, or by influencing the process of information retrieval from memory during the 
reporting of somatic complaints. A few of these models will briefly be discussed, 
followed by empirical evidence for this common notion. 
Cognitive activation model by Skelton & Strohmetz (1990) 
One of the earliest models on the role of cognitive schemata in symptom reporting was 
the cognitive activation model by Skelton & Strohmetz (1990). They state that the 
mere cognitive activation of health related thoughts or memory may increase the 
subjects’ awareness of physical symptoms, which results in reporting more symptoms. 
They also suggest that increased symptom reporting in an environment or setting that 
increases health related cognitions, such as hospitals or waiting rooms, is a normal 
reaction or response (Skelton & Strohmetz, 1990). Thus, the core of this model is that 
increased accessibility of memory related to illness can cause increased self-reports of 
somatic complaints.  
Leventhal’s common sense model 
The common sense model (CSM) suggests that people create mental representations of 
their illness, and these representations help them (or not) to manage their illness 
(Leventhal, Diefenbach, & Leventhal, 1992; Leventhal, Leventhal, & Contrada, 1998). 
Individuals create a mental representation of their illness, based on different sources 
in a two-level process. Individuals make links between information stored at an ab-
stract level - for example labels and diagnoses stored in memory- and information 
stored at a concrete level - for example the perception of a bodily signal. This infor-
mation then causes a person to create a schematic representation of the illness, which 
stimulates a search for more concrete body symptoms related to the diagnosed condi-
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tion. The core element of this model is that the interpretation of bodily information is 
decisive in whether someone acts upon it, and not the bodily information itself. Thus, 
this model incorporates the view that a higher cognitive schematic representation- or 
schemata- of illness first guides attention toward bodily signals and then influences the 
interpretation of these signals. This implies that our subjective awareness is not based 
on an objective reality but on the interpretation of the world (Brown, 2004). Thus, this 
model also suggests that cognitive schemata-related to illness play a role in signal 
interpretation, and therefore symptom reporting. 
Symptom perception model by Brown (2004) 
In a model that combines several of elements of the earlier models discussed above, 
Brown (2004) describes in great detail how chronic involuntarily (unconsciously) acti-
vated illness memory can lead to reporting of symptoms. It states that illness memory 
causes increased selective attention towards bodily signals, which - as described above 
- causes increased detection of these signals and increased interpretation and report-
ing of these signals as symptoms (Brown, 2004). The more trained and consolidated 
this memory network becomes, the easier and more frequently it will be triggered by 
associated stimuli (Brown, 2004), and the more likely it becomes that bodily sensations 
are misinterpreted as signs of illness, resulting in an increasingly reflexive and subjec-
tively convincing symptom experience (Brown, 2004). I will describe this model in 
more detail, since it is one of the basic models that the studies of this dissertation are 
testing. 
Interaction of memory and attention. Before our attentional system makes a selection 
of potentially relevant new information for further cognitive processing, a spread of 
activation in associative memory networks occurs, which is triggered by input from our 
sensory system. This spread of activation in both perception and memory systems 
analyzing information of previous experiences then generates several perceptual 
hypotheses to interpret this new information (Brown, 2004; Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
Brown (2004) describes two different attentional systems that guide or control our 
behavior in general: the primary attentional system (PAS; which is similar to the 
contention scheduling of the model of Norman & Shallice, 1986) and secondary atten-
tional system (SAS; which is similar to the “supervisory attentional system” of Norman 
& Shallice, 1986). The PAS selects the most strongly activated perceptual hypothesis to 
organize the sensory information into primary representations (Brown, 2004). The 
primary representations are then used to guide our behavior, by activating thought and 
motor schemata. This can be divided into two basic routes. Procedural representations 
or schemata control routine behaviors (for example, driving a car), specifying the 
attentional, cognitive and motoric responses involved in these routine behaviors 
(Norman & Shallice, 1986). The activation of these schemata is automatic and uncon-
scious which causes rapid, efficient control of cognition and action, and uses few 
processing resources. If there are no appropriate schemata based on previous experi-
ences, then novel actions are controlled by a secondary, or supervisory, attentional 
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system. This secondary attentional system (SAS) controls action indirectly by changing 
the activation levels of schemata in the PAS. The processes controlled by the SAS are 
cognitively demanding, conscious and need self-awareness (see Brown, 2004).  
This PAS/SAS model has several important implications: 1) control of behavior is 
mostly unconscious, 2) subjective awareness is not based on an objective reality but 
on the interpretation of the world (similar view of Leventhal; Brown, 2004). Examples 
of comparable perceptual or sensory experiences that are determined by prior infor-
mation or memory are; hallucinations, misperceptions, hypnotic and placebo effects 
(see Brown, 2004). The result with respect to MUS is a misinterpretation of the sensory 
world that causes subjectively “real” symptoms (Brown, 2004).  
Brown used the term “rogue representations” to describe the inappropriate hy-
potheses selected by the PAS (Brown, 2004). Brown provides a couple of examples of 
these hypotheses in relation to somatoform disorders: “For example, in the case of 
unexplained sensory loss, an inappropriate hypothesis would be one instructing the PAS 
to inhibit attention either to a particular sensory modality (as in blindness or deaf-
ness), a part of the body (as in focal sensory loss), or an aspect of the external phe-
nomenal world (as in tunnel vision)” (as cited in Brown, 2004). Another example could 
be that a trigger of the memory of a specific episode of fatigue (perhaps someone who 
previously had an infection of mononucleosis) which would lead to the inappropriate 
hypothesis of feeling exhaustion, could cause someone to actually feel the fatigue 
associated with this previous episode, which could be an explanation for chronic 
fatigue syndrome. These rogue representations can be acquired by lots of different 
experiences and sources, many of which were recognized already by the earlier models 
(Leventhal et al., 1992; Pennebaker, 1982b), such as physical states of oneself (i.e. 
history of physical illness, symptoms that occur in response to traumatic events) but 
also of others (observing illnesses in others), sociocultural information about health 
(general health information transmitted through the media and society) and verbal 
suggestions (hypnotism) (Brown, 2004). Everybody possesses information or material 
that could feed rogue representations (Brown, 2004). However, not everyone develops 
MUS or a somatoform condition. Symptoms become chronic when the SAS directs high-
level attention towards the symptoms, which also boosts the rogue representations 
and lowers the selection threshold by the PAS (Brown, 2004). Thus, it is a self-
perpetuating process, which is facilitated by the attention focus of the SAS on health 
related information that is relevant to the individual (cognitive bias). This is also what 
Deary et al. (2007) describe as a “self-producing” process, which is an important 
aspect in MUS. Every time the memory networks are triggered, the further the net-
works are strengthened (see also Brosschot, 2002, below). Or alternatively, by classical 
conditioning, some emotions could get coupled with certain physiological states like 
pain (Brosschot, 2002). The same model could be applied to less severe symptom 
reporting (SHC) in the non-clinical population and in a magnified form in the clinical 
population.  
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As I will argue below, crucial aspects of this recent model have not been tested, 
such as the assumption that the activation of thought or motor schemata by the PAS 
based on inappropriate hypotheses (rogue representations) can cause people to expe-
rience subjective real symptoms, while no somatic explanation exists for these symp-
toms. 
Cognitive bias and sensitization 
The theoretical models discussed previously all share the common notion that symp-
tom reporting is influenced by cognitive processes such as attention, memory and 
interpretation. The models suggest that MUS patients show an attentional bias toward 
bodily signals and an interpretation bias by interpreting those signals as symptoms of 
an illness, and finally a memory bias for these interpretations, together called cogni-
tive biases. Whereas the models discussed above solely focus on cognitive biases, 
Brosschot (2002) proposed that these biases are not the sole factor explaining symp-
toms, but that these biases interact with alterations in neural activity that are ob-
served in patients with MUS. That is, these patients show signs of "physiological sensi-
tization", together with sensitization at the cognitive level (i.e. cognitive biases). 
Sensitization or physiological sensitization is a process that causes sensations resulting 
of normal physiological processes, to become intolerable (Eriksen & Ursin, 2004). A 
previous experience of certain stimuli can cause a heightened response to those 
stimuli or even far less potent stimuli later on. This is referred to as sensitization, and 
has been linked to MUS (Brosschot, 2002; Eriksen & Ursin, 2004). At the cognitive level, 
sensitization is manifested as selective processing of information that is of high rele-
vance, such as feared situations, including illness and pain, and is called cognitive 
sensitization. It is also known as cognitive bias, especially in the field of experimental 
psychopathology (Brosschot, 2002). Potentially, cognitive biases, such as having in-
creased attention towards bodily sensations, could then result in increased symptom 
reporting (Brosschot, 2002). Brosschot suggests that sensitisation at one level can 
cause sensitization at another level. I will first describe physiological sensitization, 
before I describe the evidence of cognitive sensitization, i.e. cognitive bias, in symp-
tom reporting (see section below).  
One very basic sensitization mechanism is called long term potentiation (LTP), 
which can be induced in the neural pain pathways (see Deary et al., 2007). Long-term 
potentiation is the enhancement of the signal strength between two synapses, caused 
by the simultaneous signaling. Prior pain experiences can cause this sensitization in 
the pain pathway, which results in lower pain thresholds for later pain experiences. 
Certain cognitive or emotional factors, such as anxiety, attention, and stress may 
lower the pain threshold even further (see Rygh et al., 2005). The result is that nor-
mal, non-painful bodily sensation could be experienced as pain, which in turn leads to 
increased attention and further sensitization. It has been suggested that pain in 
muscles, like in fibromyalgia patients, starts with sensitization of peripheral nocicep-
tors and then leads to sensitization of the central nociceptive systems (see Eriksen & 
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Ursin, 2004). This form of sensitization has not only been suggested to play a role in 
fibromyalgia, but also in other MUS, such as IBS, functional dyspepsia, and chemical 
intolerance. For example, patients with IBS and functional dyspepsia have a lower 
tolerance for sensations for the gut (see Eriksen & Ursin, 2004). Furthermore, 'higher 
up' in the nervous system, kindling or sensitization of limbic brain structures may also 
play a role. It has been suggested to be a shared underlying etiological factor in 
medically unexplained pain and certain psychiatric disorders like major depression, 
panic disorder and anxiety (see Eriksen & Ursin, 2004). For example, Rome & Rome 
(2000) proposed the limbically augmented pain syndrome (LAPS) in which they suggest 
that depression and other affective disorder can cause the corticolimbic system to 
become sensitized for noxious stimuli, such as pain. It also has been found that spinal 
cord sensitization is influenced by cognitive factors (Matre, Casey, & Knardahl, 2006). 
Finally, at the highest level cognitive sensitization can occur, which is similar to 
cognitive bias, which includes the enhanced attention for health information, interpre-
tation of ambiguous signals as symptoms and above all, activated illness memory which 
guides attention and interpretation.  
In conclusion, cognitive biases, such as increased attention towards illness-related 
information and increased memory for symptom-related information, are possibly a 
causal factor in MUS. Furthermore, these cognitive biases might be related to physical 
sensitization, for example to pain, which may be a perpetuating factor in MUS. Now 
that the theory of illness memory in MUS has been laid out, I will turn to examining 
available evidence for the common overlapping notion of these models, namely that 
illness-related memory or schemata might play a causal role in the reporting of MUS.  
SUPPORTING EVIDENCE SO FAR FOR THE CAUSAL ROLE OF COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN 
SYMPTOM PERCEPTION 
Thus, several symptom-perception models suggest that symptoms become represented 
in memory. Later experiences that share similarities to this memory representation, 
can automatically and unconsciously re-activate and strengthen this memory, nega-
tively influencing the interpretation and perception of the actual bodily experience in 
a feed forward, vicious circle-like manner. Despite the high number of studies on the 
link between symptom reports and selective attention towards illness and innocuous 
bodily information, few studies have yet tested the crucial notion of the cognitive 
theory of MUS that activation of illness or pain memory causes symptoms. Next, I will 
give an overview of the cross-sectional evidence for this idea and then I will discuss 
the experimental evidence found so far. 
Supporting cross-sectional evidence 
Several studies have examined whether patients with MUS indeed show selective 
attention towards health related information as is suggested by the theoretical models 
discussed above. Many of these studies have used a so-called' modified Stroop task' or 
'visual-probe task' to measure attention towards health-related stimuli, typically 
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comparing a patient group with MUS to a control group of healthy participants or 
participants with another (mental) health problem such as depression. Many studies 
found evidence for attentional biases in somatoform patients and chronic pain patients 
(Asmundson, Kuperos, & Norton, 1997; Crombez, Hermans, & Adriaensen, 2000; Pearce 
& Morley, 1989; Snider, Asmundson, & Wiese, 2000). Although some studies did not 
find evidence for an attentional bias (Pincus, Fraser, & Pearce, 1998). One study of 
Idiopathic Environmental Intolerance (IEI) and Somatoform Disorder patient groups 
found that in a modified Stroop task, attention was biased toward symptom words such 
as ‘dizziness’ and ‘nausea’ but not toward IEI-trigger words such as ‘radioactivity’ and 
‘paint smell’ (Witthöft, Gerlach, & Bailer, 2006). A recent meta-analysis found that 
individuals with chronic pain, compared to controls, showed a significantly greater 
attentional bias towards pain-related information on a visual-probe task (Schoth, 
Delgado Nunes, & Liossi, 2012). Furthermore, patients with irritable bowel syndrome 
have been found to show selective attention towards gastrointestinal symptom-related 
words compared to neutral words, but only when the words were presented sublimi-
nally and not when they were presented supraliminally (Afzal, Potokar, Probert, & 
Munafò, 2006).  
Other studies have focused on memory bias and examined whether patients with 
MUS have increased implicit memory for illness or health. Better memory for pain-
related words was found in chronic pain patients (Pincus, Pearce, McClelland, & 
Isenberg, 1995). Pain patients remember more pain-related words than neutral words, 
but only before surgery. Six months after surgery, neutral words were remembered 
better instead (L. C. Edwards, Pearce, & Beard, 1995). One study found that patients 
with somatoform disorders showed decreased explicit but increased preconscious or 
implicit memory (as measured with the lexical decision task) for health-related stimuli 
compared to depressive patients (Dohrenbusch, Scholz, & Ott, 2006). A study by 
Martin, Buech, Schwenk & Rief also found that a participant group with somatoform 
disorders showed an implicit memory bias for illness-related stimuli (measured with a 
word-stem completion task), but did not show an explicit memory bias (2007). This 
implicit memory bias was not found in a control group of depressed patients, which 
suggests that this effect could not be explained by comorbid depression. In contrast, 
another study found that somatoform patients did not show an implicit memory bias 
measured by a tachistoscopic word identification, but an explicit memory bias for 
physical threat words on a free recall task (Lim & Kim, 2005). Similarly, a study found 
that patients with irritable bowel syndrome recalled words related to gastrointestinal 
sensations better than other categories in a free recall task (Gibbs-Gallagher et al., 
2001). Cognitive biases have not only been found in patients with MUS, but also in 
people with SHC. One study has found that healthy female participants with higher 
severity of SHC in the previous month had a bigger or stronger memory bias for health-
related words compared to females with less severe SHC (Verkuil, Brosschot, & Thayer, 
2007). 
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Although many studies have found a cross-sectional link between attentional bias 
and different patient groups with MUS, the cross-sectional evidence of these memory 
biases remains questionable due to differences in study findings. Furthermore, the 
above mentioned studies all have the limitation of being a cross-sectional study, which 
makes it unclear whether increased attention or implicit memory for illness-related 
information is the cause or the effect of having MUS. Prospective and experimental 
studies are warranted to address the causality in the relationship between cognitive 
biases and symptom reporting. 
Worry and catastrophizing 
There is some indirect evidence of illness memory causing increased symptom report-
ing, since illness worry or catastrophizing have been thought to increase illness 
memory and are found to be related to increased symptom reporting. This will be 
further explained by using an example specifically related to pain. Pain catastrophizing 
is a concept specific to pain, that has been thought to increase the accessibility of 
pain related thoughts or pain schema (Sullivan, Rouse, Bishop, & Johnston, 1997; 
Sullivan, Stanish, Waite, Sullivan, & Tripp, 1998). Catastrophizers are hypothesized to 
have pain schemata that contain excessive negative information (Sullivan et al., 2001; 
Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995; Turk & Rudy, 1992). If these pain schemata become 
activated they may cause an abnormality in cognitive functioning that could lead to an 
enhanced pain experience (Sullivan et al., 2001). Several studies have shown that pain 
catastrophizing is associated with a greater pain experience (Sullivan et al., 1995, 
1998). However, the relation between pain catastrophizing and pain is not completely 
clear in cross-sectional research; do people have more pain or distress because they 
have catastrophic thoughts about their pain or do people have more catastrophic 
thoughts because they have more pain? Prospective studies, however, did find a 
relation between catastrophizing and pain. In a longitudinal study, a predictive effect 
of catastrophizing on pain intensity ratings after controlling for initial scores on the 
dependent variables, demographic variables -like age, sex, socioeconomic status-, 
duration of pain, and disability support status was found (Keefe, Brown, Wallston, & 
Caldwell, 1989). A similar study found that catastrophizing predicted pain during 
dental hygiene treatment, even when controlling for gender and oral hygiene status 
(Sullivan & Neish, 1998). Kabat-Zinn (1982) suggests that mindfulness applied by 
chronic pain patients could lead to a desensitization process because of the absence of 
catastrophic thoughts during exposure to pain. 
In conclusion, studies focused on pain catastrophizing show additional support for 
the idea that illness-schemata could play a causal factor in symptom reporting. How-
ever, again more prospective studies are necessary. Furthermore, the assumption that 
pain catastrophizers have increased accessibility of pain-related schemata needs to be 
addressed, and future studies should examine whether this increased accessibility is 
the cause of increased pain reporting in high pain catastrophizers.  
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(Experimental) manipulations of illness memory 
It is unclear from the above mentioned evidence resulting from cross-sectional studies 
whether activated illness memory –or schemata- can lead to increased symptom 
reporting, or whether actually experiencing symptoms causes increased accessibility of 
illness memory - which admitted, is not unlikely. Therefore, studies in which the 
activation of memory is manipulated to examine its effect on symptom reporting are 
needed to answer this question. Several such studies have been reported, that used 
different types of experimental manipulations of cognitive schemata or memory, and 
these studies will be discussed next. 
Experimental priming studies with words or pictures 
Several studies have investigated the effect of increased cognitive accessibility of 
illness memory on reporting of symptoms by priming participants with illness or pain-
related information. Priming is the effect in which exposure to a stimulus influences a 
subsequent response and is an implicit memory process. Priming causes the increased 
cognitive accessibility or activation of the memory network and is believed to be due 
to a mechanism called ‘spreading-of–activation’. That is, knowledge is stored in a 
network of interconnected semantic and associative concepts, with more closely 
related concepts located closer together within the network (Collins & Loftus, 1975). 
Proof for the principle underlying priming comes from studies showing that priming of 
a word increases the recognition speed of a semantically related word. For example, 
the response latencies are faster when the words “nurse” and “doctor” are both 
displayed on the screen compared to “nurse” and ”butter” (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 
1971).  
One study showed that participants showed lower pain tolerance by keeping their 
hand less long in ice cold water while watching pictures of painful events compared to 
patients who watched pictures of other negative events. The pictures of painful events 
presumably activate a memory network related to pain- compared to other negative 
pictures- and thus is supportive for the notion that pain or illness-related memory 
networks causes increased symptom reporting (De Wied & Verbaten, 2001). However, 
many of these pain-related pictures were disgusting, thus it is unclear whether the 
lower pain tolerance is actually due to activation of pain-related memory networks or 
due to disgust-related memory networks. Another study showed that pain intensity 
reports significantly increased when painful stimuli were simultaneous administered 
with images showing human pain, while pictures with identical emotional values but no 
somatic content did not increase pain intensity (Godinho, Magnin, Frot, Perchet, & 
Garcia-Larrea, 2006).  
In MUS patients there is experimental evidence of pain-related pictures on pain 
symptom reporting as well. A study by Arnold et al. (2008) examined the effect of 
pain-related pictures on pressure pain intensity ratings in different MUS-groups: 
fibromyalgia patients, back pain patients, and somatoform patients, compared to 
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healthy individuals as control groups. Overall, it was found that pain intensity ratings 
were higher during the viewing of the pain-related pictures compared to negative 
pictures. Although there was no interaction effect of complaint-specific picture con-
tent and patient group, the fibromyalgia patients and the somatoform patients rated 
the pain-related pictures as more negative in valence and arousal compared to other 
negative pictures (Arnold et al., 2008). This makes it unclear whether the effect of the 
pain-related pictures is due to their content or due to their valence. 
Another study found that not only symptom-related pictures but also generally 
negative pictures, compared to positive pictures, increased symptom reporting (en-
hanced breathlessness/dyspnea) in (non-clinical) high but not in low symptom report-
ers (Bogaerts, Janssens, De Peuter, Van Diest, & Van den Bergh, 2010). This is clearly 
not in line with the hypothesis that illness memory-activation causes increased symp-
tom reporting. However, since the participants were told that physiological (i.e. 
respiratory) measures would be taken while viewing pictures, it might have occurred 
to the participants that the experimenters were looking for increased symptom reports 
viewing negative pictures, whether symptom related or not. In addition, it cannot be 
excluded that the extensive and rather invasive respiratory recordings (in which a 
participant's mouth was covered by a respiratory measuring device) acted as a clearly 
health related context, that could easily have primed illness memory, which means 
that all negative pictures, not only the illness-related ones, could have acquired an 
illness-related meaning.  
Several studies used words as stimuli instead of pictures. One study found that 
pain-related words that were shown to pain patients caused higher brain potentials in 
areas that may corresponded to higher implicit memory and selective attention for 
pain, and also increased pain perception (Flor, Knost, & Birbaumer, 1997). Another 
study also examined the effect of pain-related stimuli on pain intensity ratings. They 
used words of three semantic categories, namely somatosensory pain-related, affec-
tive pain-related and neutral words in combination with a pain-inducing heat stimulus 
(Dillmann, Miltner, & Weiss, 2000b). Although they did not find any difference in pain 
intensity ratings between the different prime groups, they did find an increase in brain 
activity during pain caused by laser stimulation while reading the pain somatosensory 
or affective words compared to neutral words. The authors suggest that pain words 
might pre-activate neural networks that are responsible for pain memory and pro-
cessing (Dillmann, Miltner, & Weiss, 2000a; Dillmann et al., 2000b). Still, this activa-
tion was not sufficient to actually increase the pain reports.  
In conclusion, most of the above mentioned studies provide support for the cogni-
tive model of symptom reporting by showing that pain or illness-related stimuli (which 
presumably activate the associated memory networks) decrease pain tolerance or 
increase pain intensity. However, the studies show several important limitations, 
which makes the support for the model inconclusive.  
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Other priming methods 
The previously described studies all used words or pictures as priming stimuli. Howev-
er, other priming methods exist which will be described next. For example, one study 
(Wooley, Blackwell, & Winget, 1978) measured tolerance of pain produced by immer-
sion of the hand in ice water under two experimental conditions. In one condition, the 
experimenter wore a white coat and gave verbal comments to the participants at 15 
second intervals. This 'medical' condition presumably activates pain memory, which 
presumably makes participants expecting feeling pain. In the other condition, the 
experimenter was wearing normal street clothes and remained silent. The participants 
indeed showed lower pain tolerance if the experimenter wore a white coat.  
One study had participants either run in place for 2 min or walk for 2 min. A few 
minutes later they were brought to another room and asked to fill in a symptom 
checklist. To half of the participants the experimenter added that it was of the flu 
season that they wanted them to fill in the symptom checklist (as discussed in 
Pennebaker, 1982b). Participants reported the greatest amount of symptoms if they 
had been running and if they had received the comment of the flu. 
Research has demonstrated that when people are simply asked to fill in a self-
report mood questionnaire, it can prime mood-related cognitive contents and infor-
mation-processing strategies (as discussed in Skelton & Strohmetz, 1990). One study 
showed that participants indeed report more somatic symptoms on a questionnaire 
after they had performed a task in which they had to make comparative judgments 
about the meaning of health related words. This result was controlled for individual’s 
symptom-reporting dispositions, mood, arousal and task-related pressure (Skelton & 
Strohmetz, 1990).  
In conclusion, the above mentioned studies also show support for the cognitive 
model of symptom reporting, however, it is not conclusive evidence since the partici-
pants might have been aware of the goal of the experiment.  
Supraliminal versus subliminal priming 
The previously described studies all have used health-related stimuli that were pre-
sented in a supraliminal manner to the participants, meaning that the participants 
were consciously aware of seeing these stimuli. A limitation of presenting stimuli 
supraliminally is that participants might figure out the underlying goal of the experi-
ment and behave in a socially desirable manner. A way to circumvent this problem, is 
by showing the stimuli under the awareness threshold of the participants, which is 
referred to as subliminal priming. With this technique words or pictures are shown for 
a very short time duration, so that the participant remains unaware of seeing any-
thing. While several studies testing symptom reporting effects of health memory used 
supraliminal priming technique, as discussed above, no studies thus far have used the 
subliminal priming technique.  
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Indirect priming of previous symptoms 
Implicit memory or associations can be created by classical conditioning, and classical 
conditioning has been used to examine symptom reporting. It has been hypothesized 
that cues of previous illness (‘conditioned cues’ or cues that people have learned to 
associate with illness) can also prime the individual to express the symptoms of the 
illness. This type of priming is based on associations and is thus indirect priming 
memory of illness or pain, compared to directly priming of illness or pain memory 
described in the previous paragraphs. Indeed, a series of symptom conditioning studies 
by van den Bergh and colleagues has shown that it is possible by showing associative 
cues to indirectly prime memory of previous symptoms that cause increases in current 
symptom reporting (Van den Bergh, Winters, Devriese, & Van Diest, 2002). Presenta-
tion of cues that were previously associated with experimentally induced symptom 
episodes of breathlessness triggered increased reports of breathlessness while there 
was no physiological cause. It was found that only stimuli with negative valence (foul 
smelling cue compared to neutral or positive smelling cue) could cause conditioning of 
symptoms, furthermore, symptom learning is more likely to occur in participants with 
high NA, and/or high levels of symptom reporting in daily life, in psychosomatic pa-
tients (Bogaerts et al., 2010; Van den Bergh et al., 2002). Although these studies do 
show support for the idea that the indirect priming of illness memory of a specific 
symptom previously experienced by presenting associative cues, can cause increased 
symptom reporting, it does not support the idea or hypothesis that priming illness 
memory directly can cause increased symptom reporting.  
AIM AND OUTLINE OF THESIS 
In summary, several studies have found that increased accessibility of illness memory 
seems to be related to increased symptom reporting. However, a large part of these 
studies show only cross-sectional evidence for this evidence and thus do not address 
the causality aspect. Most studies that did use experimental manipulations to investi-
gate the causal effect of illness memory, used techniques to manipulate the accessibil-
ity of memory that might have been noticeable to the participants, which may have 
caused them to behave unnaturally during the experiments because they may have 
guessed the experiment's purpose. Thus, the crucial assumption of the cognitive model 
of SHC and MUS, that activated illness memory causes symptom reporting has not been 
rigorously tested. The aim of the current thesis is therefore to test whether the 
activation of illness memory networks causes increased symptom reporting.  
To circumvent the problem of the participants possibly behaving in a socially desir-
able way, we used stimuli that participants were not consciously aware of. Further-
more, previous experimental studies examining the effect of illness memory have not 
always controlled for important factors that influence symptom reporting as well, such 
as negative affect. In addition, several studies used methods that seem to indirectly 
prime illness memory (such as classical conditioning of symptom reports) but only few 
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studies have used the standard procedure to manipulate illness memory, which is 
priming. In the present thesis, we have addressed these limitations of previous studies. 
In the first part, we have used manipulation techniques that allow testing of the 
hypothesis whether increased cognitive accessibility illness memory causes increased 
symptom reporting while the participants remain unaware of the study’s aim. Fur-
thermore, we tried to manipulate illness memory more directly by using priming 
methods in the laboratory while controlling for several moderators. In addition, we 
conducted the first study that examines the effect of illness memory on symptom 
reporting prospectively. The dissertation is organized in two parts. Part I examines 
whether unconsciously manipulated illness-related memory causes increased symptom 
reporting. Part II examines the prospective association between illness-related memory 
and symptom reporting using consciously perceived techniques. In the first part of this 
thesis, the hypothesized effect of implicit illness-related memory on symptom report-
ing was examined in the laboratory. The implicit illness memory networks were manip-
ulated by using subliminal priming techniques. With this technique stimuli (“primes”) 
are presented under the awareness threshold, and are believed to activate the implicit 
memory of the category that fits with the used stimuli. We then tested whether 
activated illness memory would indeed cause more symptom reporting. Importantly, 
we controlled for possible confounders of illness priming, such as negative valence of 
illness information and the sensory aspect of illness information by comparing the 
result of illness priming to control groups with either neutral words, negative words or 
sensory words. In this case we used low pain tolerance as a measure of symptom 
reporting since pain is the most common MUS. In addition, we examined the effects of 
self-focused attention, self-priming, negative affect, health worry on symptom report-
ing. The first part of this thesis consists of four studies. In Chapter 2, we examined 
whether we could manipulate illness memory unconsciously, and whether this caused 
an increase in symptom reporting, as measured with a pain task. We also explored 
whether negative affectivity (NA), health worry, and common HCs interacted with the 
hypothesized effect of illness-related memory on symptom reporting (Kolk et al., 2002; 
Petrie et al., 2005; Verkuil et al., 2007; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). In Chapter 3, 
we replicated the previous study by making slight modifications to the research design, 
in order to measure the effect of unconsciously manipulated illness memory on symp-
tom reporting even better. Illness-related memory is more likely to influence reporting 
of complaints when its activation is enmeshed with that of self-related memory. 
Therefore, in Chapter 4, the relationship between unconscious illness-related memory 
and self-schemata were experimentally manipulated to be stronger associated with 
each other. We then examined the effect of this manipulation on symptom reporting. 
In addition, we examined the effect of self-priming on symptom reporting and whether 
self-focused attention (SFA) acted as a moderator of this effect. Although subliminal 
priming is an often used procedure to activate concepts in memory, its effectiveness is 
seldom tested. Therefore, in the final chapter of Part I (Chapter 5), we examined the 
subliminal priming techniques that were used, where indeed increasing the cognitive 
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accessibility of illness memory. Because evidence from these studies remained incon-
sistent for the hypothesized role of illness memory in causing an increase in symptom 
reporting, we concluded that this could mean two things: 1) the hypothesized effect of 
illness memory on symptom reporting does not exist, or 2) the methods used in Part I 
were not adequate in manipulating illness memory in the way that we wanted to. 
Chapter 5 present the results of the study in which we looked at whether the sublimi-
nal priming technique in the first two studies actually did increase the accessibility of 
illness memory. 
Part II consists of two studies. These studies addressed the problem of inadequacy 
in manipulating illness memory by using different priming techniques that do not use 
unconscious stimuli (Chapter 6) and measuring the association between symptom 
reporting and illness-related memory prospectively without trying to manipulate it 
(Chapter 7). In Chapter 6, the effects of a randomized controlled trial using an online 
intervention focused on activating positive health memory was examined on symptom 
reporting in healthy students. Again we examined the effect of important possible 
moderators, such as negative affect and somatosensory amplification. Chapter 7 
presents the results of a study that examined the relation in time between implicit 
illness-related memory and symptom reporting among patients with fibromyalgia, 
irritable bowel syndrome and chronic fatigue syndrome in comparison with healthy 
controls. This is the first study that we know of that examined the activation of illness 
memory repeatedly over time in MUS patients and examines the effect on symptom 
reporting prospectively. Chapter 8 provides a summary of the main findings, methodo-
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ABSTRACT 
Objective Medically unexplained symptoms (MUSs) are a humanitarian and economic 
burden. Among them, pain complaints without organic pathology are the most preva-
lent. Theoretically, activated illness-related memory may cause reporting of symptoms 
by changing perception and interpretation of bodily signals to the extent that they are 
not tolerated and become complaints. We tested whether activating illness-related 
memory without conscious awareness leads to decreased pain tolerance (PT). 
Methods Activation of illness-related memory without conscious awareness was manip-
ulated by a subliminal priming technique. Eighty participants were randomly assigned 
to four conditions, with prime words describing either (a) health complaints (HCs), to 
activate an illness-related memory, or three control categories: (b) neutral content, 
(c) general bodily sensations, and (d) negative valence. The latter two conditions were 
added to test the alternative hypotheses that reduced PT could be observed with the 
semantic activation of these two components of HCs. We measured PT using a cold 
pressor task. 
Results Participants who were subliminally primed with HC words reported lower PT 
compared with participants who were primed with neutral words. Priming with the 
other words did not lead to significantly different effects relative to priming with 
neutral words. 
Conclusions The findings suggest that PT can be involuntarily decreased by activating 
illness-related memory. This implies partial evidence for a crucial element of a cogni-
tive model of medically unexplained symptoms, which holds that chronically activated 
illness-related memory causes the development of somatic complaints without observ-
able bodily pathology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Approximately one-third of health complaints (HCs) presented to primary care profes-
sionals cannot be attributed to organic pathology and are called medically unexplained 
symptoms (MUSs) (Khan et al., 2003; Kroenke & Mangelsdorff, 1989; Peveler et al., 
1997). Most MUSs involve pain, and they form a major burden on the health care 
system (Brown, 2004; Khan et al., 2003). How can innocuous bodily signals become 
intolerable and turn into HCs? It is assumed that there is no one-to-one correspond-
ence between physiological changes and the perception of physical symptoms but that 
the latter is modulated by cognitive top–down processes (Pennebaker, 1982b). Recent 
additions to this symptom perception model state that a chronic involuntarily (uncon-
sciously) activated memory network of illness can lead to increased selective attention 
toward innocuous bodily signals, which causes increased detection of these signals and 
increased interpretation and reporting of these signals as symptoms (Brosschot, 2002; 
Brown, 2004; Rief & Barsky, 2005). Brown (2004) hypothesized that activation of such 
an illness- or pain-related memory network produces a vicious cycle by increasing 
attention toward bodily sensations (SEN) and increasing the inappropriate perception 
of these signals as symptoms, which in turn reactivates this memory network. The 
more trained and consolidated this memory becomes, the easier and more frequently 
it will be triggered by associated stimuli (Brown, 2004; Pincus & Morley, 2001) and the 
more likely it becomes that SEN are misinterpreted as signs of illness, resulting in a 
reflexive and subjectively convincing symptom experience (Brown, 2004). 
There is evidence that people with MUSs more easily report symptoms during pain-
ful stimulation. For instance, reporting of more pain is found in a variety of MUSs, such 
as irritable bowel syndrome, and in common HCs, such as headache (Rodrigues, Verne, 
Schmidt, & Mauderli, 2005; Verkuil et al., 2007). In addition, a large number of studies 
found that patients with MUSs and people suffering from common HCs also show 
increased selective attention for external information related to their HCs, including 
pain (Afzal et al., 2006; Karademas, Sideridis, & Kafetsios, 2008; Pincus & Morley, 
2001). Likewise, several studies have linked symptom reporting with increased atten-
tion to SEN (Barsky et al., 1988; Kolk et al., 2002; L. C. Miller et al., 1981; Pennebaker 
& Lightner, 1980). 
Despite the high number of studies on the link between symptom reports and selec-
tive attention toward illness information and innocuous bodily information, few studies 
have yet tested the crucial notion of the cognitive theory of MUSs that activation of an 
illness- or pain-related network in memory causes symptoms (Brown, 2004). In the 
present study, we aimed to test whether activating illness memories results in en-
hanced reporting of symptoms. We specifically focused on the reporting of pain, which 
is the most frequently reported MUS (Khan et al., 2003). Everyone experiences pain 
from time to time, but not everyone develops pain complaints. In general, pain be-
comes a symptom when a pain signal becomes intolerable and people start reporting 
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about it. For these reasons, we used pain tolerance (PT) during a cold pressor task 
(CPT) as a measure of symptom reporting. 
To unambiguously test the hypothesis that involuntarily (i.e. unconsciously) acti-
vated illness-related memory can cause participants to report lower PT, we used a 
subliminal priming technique. This technique of presenting stimuli (“primes”) under 
the awareness threshold activates, or primes, the semantic category of a word in 
memory while participants remain unaware of it. We used words describing common 
HCs to activate the illness-related memory and we compared the reported PT of 
participants primed with these HC words with those of participants who were shown 
neutral (NEU) words. In an explorative manner, we also tested two alternative hypoth-
eses, namely that lower PT would already be observed with the semantic activation of 
SEN or negativity in general. To test this, we added two groups that were shown either 
words describing SEN or negative valence (NEG) words. 
Two earlier studies showed that pictures illustrating physical suffering, which acti-
vate pain or illness memory, cause people to report lower PT (De Wied & Verbaten, 
2001) and pain intensity (Godinho et al., 2006). While this is in line with the hypothe-
sized role of illness memory, the researchers' use of consciously perceived pictures to 
activate memory makes their findings difficult to interpret and possibly even con-
founded. First, the findings are silent about whether memory is activated involuntari-
ly. Second, the participants may have guessed the experiment's purpose and may not 
have responded spontaneously. In the current study, this problem was circumvented by 
using subliminal priming. Moreover, in these studies, the pictures illustrating physical 
suffering were presented at the same time as the pain stimuli. This procedure cannot 
exclude the possibility that the pictures simply interfered with attempt to tolerate 
pain. In the present study, we presented the primes first and administered the pain 
stimulus immediately afterwards. 
Negative affectivity (NA), health worry, and common HCs have all been linked with 
increased reporting of more symptoms. Therefore, we measured these traits and 
symptoms and explored whether they interacted with our hypothesized main effect 
(Kolk et al., 2002; Petrie et al., 2005; Verkuil et al., 2007; Watson & Pennebaker, 
1989). 
In sum, our main hypothesis was that activating illness-related memory, by sublim-
inally priming with HC words, would cause enhanced pain complaints, operationalized 
as a lower tolerance for induced pain. 
METHODS 
Subjects 
Eighty students from Leiden University participated in the present study. Participants 
received either course credits or 8 Euros for participating. This study was approved by 
the ethics committee of the Leiden University Institute of Psychological Research. 
Prior to participating, subjects were screened for any medical disease, feelings of 
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anxiety or depression, and native language. Participants were required to refrain from 




Subjective health was measured in specific and general ways. Specific subjective HCs 
(SHCs) were measured with the SHC Questionnaire (Eriksen, Ihlebaek, & Ursin, 1999). 
The SHC Questionnaire is a 29-item self-report questionnaire that reliably measures 
the number and severity of SHCs experienced during the last month. It has five areas 
of complaints as subscales: musculoskeletal pain, pseudoneurology, gastrointestinal 
problems, allergy, and flu. Severity of each complaint is rated on a four-point scale. 
Total number of complaints and a total severity score were used. The SHC does not 
measure whether or not the 29 items are caused by a medical disease. However, we 
used “being diagnosed with a medical disease” as an exclusion criterion. The internal 
consistency of the SHC Questionnaire has been proven to be sufficient (Eriksen et al., 
1999). The internal consistency of the total SHC scale (Severity × Days) was sufficient, 
α = .75. 
In addition, we also measured general self-rated health (SRH) (Idler & Benyamini, 
1997). Participants were asked to rate their health in comparison with that of people 
of the same age. They could respond with “worse, ” “the same, ” or “better.” 
Health worry 
Complaint-specific worry was assessed by asking the extent to which participants had 
been worrying about a complaint for each of the 29 complaints on the SHC Question-
naire. The participants could indicate on a four-point scale how much they had wor-
ried about that specific complaint during the last month. The total score of worry on 
the SHC Questionnaire was used as a measure of health worry. The internal consistency 
of this added scale to the SHC was high, α = .81. 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
The Dutch trait version of the PANAS consists of 10 positive [positive affectivity (PA)] 
and 10 (NA) adjectives. Participants indicate on a five-point scale the extent to which 
the items apply to how they generally feel in normal daily life. The reliability and 
construct validity of the PANAS have been documented (Engelen, De Peuter, Victoir, 
Van Diest, & Van Den Bergh, 2006; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The internal 








To activate general illness memory, we used words related to somatic complaints. 
Participants were randomly assigned to four conditions, with prime words describing 
either (a) HCs, to activate an illness-related schema, or the three control categories: 
(b) NEU words, (c) words describing SEN and (d) NEG words (Appendix). The NEU prime 
words consisted of animals, and the NEG words consisted of negative personality traits 
that were rated on their valence in earlier research by Hermans and de Houwer (1994). 
We generated the list of words describing SEN and HCs, with each word rated on the 
representativity of the semantic category, along with three colleagues. Only words 
rated high (at least 4 on a six-point scale) on representativity were chosen for primes. 
All categories contained 10 words and did not differ in number of syllables, length, and 
frequency in the Dutch language [Kruskal–Wallis: H(3) = 1.50, p = ns; H(3) = 1.10, p = ns; 
and H(3) = 3.65, p = ns]. In every prime condition, the 10 prime words were shown 
randomly 10 times, thus giving a total of 100 trials. 
Priming task 
In order to rule out any effects on pain of distraction by the computer task, we per-
formed the computer task (with primes) immediately before the pain task. Several 
studies have shown that subliminal priming effects can last for at least a couple of 
minutes (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Levy, Hausdorff, Hencke, & Wei, 2000; Lowery, 
Eisenberger, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2007). The priming manipulation was a variation of a 
common paradigm in which participants judge as quickly and accurately as possible 
whether briefly flashed letter strings appear on the right or left side of a computer 
monitor (Lowery et al., 2007). Because we wanted to ensure that the priming effect 
would last during the CPT, we decided to use a prime stimulus duration that would 
resemble the prime duration closest that in a previous study was found to have long-
lasting subliminal priming effects (Lowery et al., 2007). That study used 34 ms; how-
ever, because of computer-related technical restrictions, we used 33 ms. Many other 
studies used the same prime duration of 33 ms (for example, Refs. Kiefer, 2002; Levy, 
1996; Pierce & Lydon, 1998). The present subliminal priming task consisted of a simple 
computer task presented to the participants as a reaction time task. For each trial of 
the task, a fixation cross with a random duration of 500–1000 ms appeared in the 
center of the screen. Students were then exposed to the prime word (33 ms) and 
immediately after a string of XXX's that served as a backward mask for the prime word. 
The prime word and mask appeared on either the right side or the left side of the 
screen in the parafoveal region (at a 2-deg visual angle (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). 
Participants indicated with the arrow keys what the position of the XXX's was. Each 
trial was separated by a 500-ms interval in which the screen was blank. The mean total 
duration of the priming task was 2.62 min (SD = 0.34). 
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Awareness checks 
In order to see whether the primes were indeed shown under the awareness threshold, 
we checked after the pain task whether the participants could detect the primes. We 
used a subjective threshold in which conscious awareness is indexed by participants' 
self-reports with a funneled debriefing questionnaire that consisted of increasingly 
specific questions that were designed to probe for any suspicions regarding the priming 
task and its purpose (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). We also used an objective threshold in 
which conscious awareness is indexed by the d’ measure, a measure of the partici-
pants' discriminative abilities based on signal detection theory (Macmillan, 2005). We 
calculated the d’ measure and its 95% confidence intervals from the proportion of true 
hits and correct rejections that the participants made on 30 discrimination trials. The 
corrections of 1/(2N) and 1−1/(2N) were used for perfect accuracy scores with n = 15, 
the number of trials on which the proportion is based. If the 95% confidence intervals 
of the d’ measure included zero, then these participants were assumed to have not 
been able to discriminate between the prime words (Macmillan, 2005). Only six partic-
ipants could discriminate between the words after they were told that it involved a 
subliminal priming task. Although a non-zero d’ measure does not have to imply 
awareness, it could still be a result of an unconscious process; we thus excluded these 
participants to use the most stringent criterion of awareness. 
Pain Tolerance (PT) 
For pain stimulation, we used a CPT. During a CPT, participants are asked to keep 
their non-dominant hand in a basin filled with ice-cold water for as long as they can. 
The basin is, on the surface of the water, divided into two sections. One is filled with 
ice and the other is kept free of ice to allow a hand to be immersed in the water 
without direct ice contact. A pump kept the water flowing continuously to prevent 
buildup of warmer water around the hand. The mean water temperature was 1.64°C 
(SD = 0.81). PT was defined as time elapsed (in seconds) between immersion and 
withdrawal (De Wied & Verbaten, 2001). Unbeknown to the participants, the maximum 
duration of hand immersion was limited to 4 min. For exploratory reasons, pain inten-
sity and pain unpleasantness ratings were also rated on a scale of 0–10, from “not at 
all intense” or “not at all unpleasant” to “extremely intense” or “extremely unpleas-
ant”. To prevent interference with PT, we took these measures immediately after the 
participants withdrew their hand from the water. 
Procedure 
Information about the experiment was posted on the Internet, making clear that it 
consisted of filling in questionnaires, with a special focus on study skills (which served 
as a cover story), reaction time tasks on the computer, and a pain task. Participants 
were tested individually by one male experimenter. The experimenter was kept blind 
about the random assignment of the participants. When the participants arrived at the 
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laboratory, they were screened as to whether they fulfilled the requirements. The 
participants were asked to provide demographic information (age and gender), and the 
computer task was started. The experimenter moved to an adjacent room, where he 
followed the procedure. After questionnaires regarding health and mood, participants 
filled in questionnaires about study skills for 10 min to mask the goal of the experi-
ment. Thereafter, the priming task started, immediately followed by the CPT. After 
they took their hand out of the water, participants were asked to rate pain unpleas-
antness and pain intensity. Awareness of the priming procedure was assessed with the 
funneled debriefing questionnaire and with the forced-choice word identification task. 
Finally, participants rated the negative versus positive valence of all prime words on a 
seven-point scale, and they performed the same priming task but with positive health 
words to counteract any potential longer-lasting effects of the previous priming that 
might have a negative effect on PT. At last, the participants were fully debriefed and 
received money or course credits. 
Data analyses 
We used an analysis of variance with PT as dependent variable and the four groups as 
independent variables, producing three pairwise planned comparisons. Stepwise 
backward regression analysis with a high p value criterion of .55 was used to select an 
optimal set of covariates among the baseline and experimental factors (Steyerberg & 
Harrell, 2003). The critical F values for the planned comparisons are reported 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Because of our specific hypotheses, we used one-tailed 
tests, but we also report the two-tailed p values. 
RESULTS 
Data of participants who afterwards indicated on the funneled debriefing question-
naire that they thought the task involved priming (n = 3), participants who could 
discriminate between the primes according to their d’ measure (see forced-choice test 
above) (n = 6), participants who had a diagnosed minor medical disease (n = 3), and 
participants with missing data due to computer failure (n = 2) were excluded. 
Prior to analysis, the variables were examined separately for the four conditions on 
accuracy of data entry: missing values, linearity, homogeneity of variance and regres-
sion, and normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Variables were transformed if neces-
sary. 
Descriptives 
The mean age of the participants was 21.57 years (SD = 3.45), and 84.8% were female. 
Participants in the four conditions did not differ at baseline in factors that might 
influence PT, including (a) demographic features, such as age and gender; (b) psycho-
social factors, such as SRH and NA; and (c) experimental factors, such as water tem-
perature of the CPT (see Table 2-1). 
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Priming effect on PT 
Stepwise regression revealed that water temperature at the beginning of the CPT task 
and the difference in water temperature between the start and finish were significant 
predictors of PT (log). Higher starting temperature of the water and bigger increases in 
temperature were associated with significantly higher PT: F(1, 60) = 6.36, p < .05, and 
F(1, 60) = 27.22, p < .001, respectively (see Table 2-2). Because significance did not 
differ much after adjusting for these variables as covariates and since there were no  
Table 2-1. Sample baseline characteristics among the four experimental groups  
(mean of untransformed data ± SD) 
Characteristics NEU group  
(n = 17) 
SEN group   
(n = 17) 
NEG group  
(n = 17) 
HC group    







13 (76.5) 14 (82.4) 16 (94.1) 13 (86.7) 2.20 .58 n.s. 
Age (reciprocal)b 21.23 ± 2.47 21.75 ± 3.23 21.99 ± 4.40 21.32 ± 3.72 0.13 .94 n.s. 
PAb 32.29 ± 4.95 34.59 ± 4.03 34.47 ± 5.59 34.13 ± 5.28 0.78 .51 n.s. 
NAb 17.18 ± 4.22 17.47 ± 5.91 17.47 ± 4.69 16.40 ± 6.79 0.13 .94 n.s. 
SRHb 1.29 ± 0.59 1.12 ± 0.49 1.18 ± 0.53 1.13 ± 0.52 0.38 .77 n.s. 
SHC (Number × 
Severity)b 
8.94 ± 5.07 10.24 ± 5.64 13.94 ± 8.17 12.33 ± 7.35 1.87 .14 n.s. 




2.94 ± 2.49 3.00 ± 2.21 4.06 ± 3.34 3.67 ± 3.22 0.61 .61 n.s. 




1.53 ± 1.87 0.76 ± 1.20 1.94 ± 2.93 1.33 ± 1.59 0.81 .49 n.s. 
Water tempera-
ture at startb 
1.71 ± 1.08 1.67 ± 0.70 1.51 ± 0.92 1.66 ± 0.44 0.19 .90 n.s. 
Water tempera-
ture at end of 
CPTb 
1.92 ± 1.02 1.82 ± 0.75 1.71 ± 0.96 1.83 ± 0.49 0.17 .91 n.s. 
Difference in 
water tempera-
ture before and 
after the CPTb 
0.21 ± 0.15 0.15 ± 0.15 0.21 ± 0.15 0.17 ± 0.14 0.71 .55 n.s. 
Time of day 
experimentb 
14:14 ± 1:57 13:25 ± 1:54 13:54 ± 2:10 13:58 ± 2:09 0.46 .71 n.s. 
d′ measureb, c 0.19 ± 0.49 0.21 ± 0.54 0.28 ± 0.46 0.28 ± 0.41 0.14 .94 n.s. 
Valence rating of 
prime words per 
groupd 
43.41 ± 6.87 31.88 ± 5.69 17.76 ± 4.97 22.53 ± 6.07 50.94 < .001 3 < 4 
< 2 < 
1 
SHC, total severity of SHCs experienced in prior month; SHC worry, total severity of worry about SHCs in prior 
month. a Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding. Fisher's exact test statistic, p ≤ .05; post hoc 
repeated 2 × 2 Fisher's exact test statistic, p ≤ .05. b Analysis of variance F statistic, p ≤ .05; Scheffé' s post 




34| Chapter 2 
2 
differences between the experimental groups on these variables, the unadjusted 
effects of priming on PT are given (see Table 2-2). 
The planned comparisons showed that participants primed with HC words (M = 
77.87 s, SD = 79.71) reported less PT compared with participants primed with NEU 
words (M = 127.18 s, SD = 92.52): F(1, 62) = 3.85, p < .05 (one-tailed), p = .054 (two-
tailed), d = 0.72 (medium effect). The means of PT are shown in Figure 2-1. On aver-
age, participants primed with HC words kept their hand in the water for 49.31 s less 
than participants primed with NEU words. Participants primed with either SEN words 
(M = 95.94 s, SD = 75.33) or NEG words (M = 95.35 s, SD = 77.84) did not significantly 
differ in PT from participants primed with NEU words—F(1, 62) = 0.34, p = ns (one-
tailed), d = 0.21 (small effect), and F(1, 62) = 0.74, p = ns (one-tailed), d = 0.30 (small 
effect), respectively, although these conditions both showed a tendency to reduce PT, 
Table 2-2. Tests of between-subjects effects 
Source df F Sig.   
  
Model 1 
Corrected modela 3 1.345 .268 .061 
Groupb 
HC 1 3.853 .027c* .059 
NEG 1 .738 .197c .012 
SEN 1 .338 .282c .005 
Error 62 
   
Model 2 
Corrected modeld 11 3.844 .000 .439 
Water temperature at end of CPT 1 4.586 .037* .078 
Difference in water temperature 1 16.297 .000*** .232 
Gender 1 1.013 .319 .018 
SRH 1 .646 .425 .012 
NA 1 .756 .388 .014 
SHC worry (log) 1 .835 .365 .015 
SHC musculoskeletal pain subscale 1 .559 .458 .010 
SHC worry about musculoskeletal pain (log) subscale 1 .380 .540 .007 
Groupb 
HC 1 3.494 .033c* .061 
NEG 1 .179 .337c .003 
SEN 1 .019 .446c .000 
Error 54 
   a R2 = .061 (adjusted R2 = .016). b Pairwise comparisons with the NEU group. c One-tailed. dR2 = .439 (adjusted 
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which is in the same direction as the HC condition. Exploratory post hoc comparisons 
of the unadjusted means did not reveal any other significant differences between the 
groups on PT. 
Secondary pain outcomes: intensity and unpleasantness 
The effect of priming on pain intensity and pain unpleasantness (both inverse log) was 
examined exploratorily (Fig. 2). Stepwise backward regression analysis revealed no 
significant covariates for pain intensity (M = 6.68, SD = 1.84). There was no overall 
effect of priming condition on the ratings of intensity: F(3, 56) = .369, p = ns. The 
variables worry about HCs on the SHC (log) and age (reciprocal) were used as covari-
ates for pain unpleasantness (M = 7.21, SD = 2.19). Pain unpleasantness was related to 
worry about HCs (higher worry, higher pain unpleasantness: F(1, 52) = 5.62, p < .05) and 
age (older participants' higher pain unpleasantness: F(1, 52) = 4.37, p < .05). No effect of 
priming was found on pain unpleasantness: F(3, 52) = 0.67, p = ns. Again, it is important 
to note here that these pain ratings were taken just after withdrawal from the water 
and thus at each participant's moment of “highest intolerance.” 
Figure 2-1. Effect of subliminal priming task on PT. Bars indicate PT 
scores, defined as the duration of hand immersion, for each priming 
condition ( ± S.E.M.) 
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Valence ratings 
The analyses of the valence rating per semantic category of all the participants 
showed that there was a significance difference among the semantic categories: χ2(3) = 
180.38, p < .001. If we inspected only the valence ratings that the participants made 
for the words that were actually shown as prime words to the subjects (neutral va-
lence ratings of the participants in the neutral condition and so forth), they also 
differed for each condition: χ2(3) = 50.94, p < .001. The outcome of the post hoc anal-
yses for the latter analyses is shown in Table 2-1. The NEG words were rated as the 
most negative in valence compared with the words of the other groups. Thus, the 
finding that PT in the HC group was reduced compared with the NEU group, whereas 
this was not the case in the NEG group, could not be explained by increased negative 
values of the words, since the NEG prime words were rated as more negative than the 
HC words: U = 70, p < .05 (two-tailed). 
Moderator effects 
Potential moderating effects of NA, SRH, SHC (Number × Severity), health worry (log), 
SHC musculoskeletal pain subscale, and SHC worry about musculoskeletal pain (log) 
subscale were also analyzed exploratorily with regression analyses. First, the scores of 
the potential moderators were centered, and then this was used to calculate the 
product with the dummy variables of the priming condition to create interaction terms 
Figure 2-2. Effect of subliminal priming task on pain ratings. Bars indicate 
pain rating scores on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 for each priming condition ( ± 
S.E.M.). A higher score means greater pain intensity and pain unpleasantness 
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(West, Aiken, & Krull, 1996). After adjustments were made for the same covariates 
used in Table 2-2 for PT (log), no moderator effects of NA, SHC, SHC worry (log), and 
SRH, nor the SHC subscales on musculoskeletal pain and worry about musculoskeletal 
pain (log), were found: respectively, F(3, 51) = 2.51, p = .07; F(3, 50) = 0.62, p = ns; F(3, 51) 
= 0.04, p = ns; F(3, 51) = 1.64, p = ns; F(3, 51) = 0.34, p = ns; and F(3, 51) = 0.07, p = ns. 
Moderator analyses without adjusting for the covariates did not change the results. 
DISCUSSION 
The results suggest that showing healthy subjects subliminal words (i.e., below the 
awareness threshold) related to illness causes them to retract their hands from ice-
cold water considerably earlier than people who were shown NEU words. In other 
words, unconsciously perceived illness-related information lowered PT. This finding is 
likely due to the activation of illness memory by these illness-related words. The fact 
that our subjects were unaware of the manipulation means that the effects were 
involuntary and excludes that they were influenced by conscious thoughts (e.g., about 
the experiment's purpose). We also demonstrated that prime words related to sensa-
tions or negative emotion alone did not influence PT significantly, ruling out the 
possibility that the effect was due to these subcomponents of somatic complaining. 
The insignificant results that we found of sensation and NEG words on PT do not mean 
that they do not have any effect on PT. They merely mean that there is a possibility 
that they had a small effect that we were unable to detect due to the rather small 
sample sizes of the conditions. Despite the sample sizes, the effect size found of the 
main hypothesis, namely whether priming participants with HC words causes reduced 
PT compared with priming participants with NEU words, was clearly sufficiently large 
to obtain a statistically significant result. 
The finding that priming healthy subjects with HCs without awareness reduced PT 
supports recent cognitive theories about MUSs (Brown, 2004), which propose that 
activated illness memory on itself is sufficient to cause symptom reports. Importantly, 
the effect that we found in this study after a short (2 min) priming task, although 
already substantial (earlier withdrawal from the water of 49 s), might be even much 
larger in daily life, in which we are very frequently and much more intensively exposed 
to illness information, in the media, and in our private lives. 
The results yield some findings that require more discussion though. Several varia-
bles that could have a potential effect on PT, such as NA, health worry, and number 
and severity of HCs experienced in the prior month, were not found to be moderators. 
It is possible that fear of pain and pain catastrophizing, which are also variables that 
have been associated with increased reporting of pain (Crombez, Vlaeyen, Heuts, & 
Lysens, 1999; R. R. Edwards, Smith, Stonerock, & Haythornthwaite, 2006; Vlaeyen & 
Crombez, 1999), could have moderated the effect. However, these variables overlap 
considerably with NA, and NA did not explain or moderate the effects of the priming 
task in this study. Still, it is possible that activating illness-related memory causes 
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increased fear of pain or pain catastrophizing during a CPT, leading to reduced toler-
ance of pain. 
Furthermore, the subliminal priming procedure did not show an effect on our sec-
ondary outcomes of pain intensity and pain unpleasantness. However, these ratings 
were taken just after withdrawal from the water. This is a different moment for each 
individual participant and at the moment in which the pain became unbearable for 
each participant (except for those who kept their hand in until the end). It is also 
likely to be influenced by feelings of numbness in the hand, which were reported by 
some of the participants. Measuring earlier or continuously would have been possible, 
but as we stated before, this would probably have interfered with the pain task itself; 
however, the PT measurement still inherently results in different pain exposure 
periods. As argued in the Introduction, we chose PT because pain experiences only 
become a symptom or complaint when the experience becomes intolerable and people 
decide to report them and even seek medical help. In addition, rating intensity and 
unpleasantness is behavior initiated by others (in this case, the experimenter), while 
reduced PT is self-initiated behavior and more closely resembles people's decision to 
report symptoms in daily life. 
A limitation of this study is that we assumed that activation of illness-related 
memory causes an increased selective attention toward bodily symptoms and leads to 
a bias in their interpretation. We did not measure these mechanisms directly; howev-
er, it was difficult in the current design to add a selective attention test without 
disturbing the delicate effects of priming. 
In addition, we did not take menstruation cycle of the female subjects into ac-
count, which also influences pain measures (Riley, Robinson, Wise, & Price, 1999). 
Because we used an experimental approach, it is likely that menstruation cycle, trait 
fear of pain, and trait pain catastrophizing have been randomized among the four 
groups. Another limitation is that we have examined the effect of illness memory on 
symptom perception in a healthy sample. Although the study's aim was to find proof 
for a purely psychological cause of symptoms, which may play a role in the develop-
ment of MUSs (and excess complaints in medically explained conditions), we realize 
that the situation for chronic MUS patients may be quite different. Future research 
should examine whether this priming effect plays a role in an MUS sample. 
The results of the current study and the two related studies (De Wied & Verbaten, 
2001; Godinho et al., 2006) seem to urge replications in patients and using other bodily 
symptoms. Other research had already shown that MUS patients show selective atten-
tion toward information that is related to their symptoms (Afzal et al., 2006; 
Karademas et al., 2008) and that symptom reporting is related to increased attention 
to SEN (Barsky et al., 1988; Kolk et al., 2002; L. C. Miller et al., 1981; Pennebaker & 
Lightner, 1980). The results of this study should therefore be tested in these popula-
tions as well to provide a broader insight into the cognitive aspects of symptom report-
ing. If effects such as those we found here would hold in other studies, it would 
suggest that future interventions might do well to focus on reducing the effects of an 
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overactive illness memory network—for example, by pairing negative illness memories 
with positive stimuli (evaluative conditioning) or by reducing the attention toward 
bodily signals with an attentional retraining task (Dijksterhuis, 2004; MacLeod, 
Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). Future studies could also focus on 
the potential mechanisms by which illness-related memory causes reporting of lower 
PT. For instance, a recent study found that pain catastrophizing, in which increased 
attention to pain is a core element, is related to amplified proinflammatory immune 
system responses to noxious stimulation. This pathway may represent one important 
mechanism by which cognitive-attentional processes can influence the experience of 
pain (R. R. Edwards et al., 2008). 
 In conclusion, this study supports the view that activation of illness-related 
memory, and not other related concepts or components, can cause people to report 
less tolerance for experimentally induced pain. According to the symptom perception 
model, this is caused by activation of illness-related memory, which is thought to be 
chronically overactivated in MUS patients (Brown, 2004). In other words, MUS patients 
are continuously in the state in which the participants in the HC prime condition were 
only briefly in. This would explain why they have complaints without observable bodily 
pathology and thus without a medical explanation. This study shows that bodily com-
plaints are not always simple products of physical characteristics of bodily signals 
(“bottom–up”) but can be produced by mere activation of a relevant memory network 
(“top–down”) (Brown, 2004) and (Brosschot, 2002). In more general terms, our results 
add to those of the several recent lines of research showing that our behavior can be 
easily influenced by very subtle information (e.g., Refs. Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 
2008; L. E. Williams & Bargh, 2008), and our study is the first to show this in the 
context of health. Even when subtle illness-related information is only briefly shown 
for a couple of minutes, the behavioral effects are already substantial. 
Appendix. Words used as prime words. English words are translated from Dutch prime words. 
Neutral Sensation Negative Valence Complaint 
“bear” “tight” “mean” “throw up” 
“squirrel” “stiff” “cruel” “wound” 
“elephant” “burning” “hostile” “fever” 
“gorilla” “itch” “antisocial” “diarrhea” 
“rhino” “ice cold” “coward” “allergy” 
“giraffe” “pounding” “unfair” “infection” 
“gazelle” “smarting” “liar” “flu” 
“chimpanzee” “scalding” “evil” “asthma” 
“lynx” “sweltering” “hateful” “invalid” 
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ABSTRACT  
Objective In our previous study (Meerman, Verkuil & Brosschot, 2011) we found that 
activating illness-related memory caused a lower pain tolerance during a pain task. 
This served as support for a model that uses cognitive psychology principles to explain 
medically unexplained symptoms. In the present study we tried to replicate and 
extend this previous study. We investigated whether reduced pain tolerance was due 
to specific prime words, and whether administering health-related questionnaires 
before priming with health-complaint words could account for the effect found, 
because it might have acted as an unintended prime.  
Methods Activation of illness-related memory was manipulated by a priming technique 
using subliminally presented words. Eighty-one participants were randomly assigned to 
one of four priming conditions; (a) health-complaints, to activate an illness-related 
memory, or the three control categories: (b) neutral content, (c) general bodily 
sensations and (d) negative valence. We measured pain tolerance using a cold pressor 
task. Half of the participants completed a health-complaint questionnaire before the 
priming task, and half completed this questionnaire a week later.  
Results Unlike the previous study, no significant differences were found between 
participants primed with health-complaint and neutral words. No interaction-effect 
was found between the timing of the health-related questionnaires and prime type.  
Conclusions We could not replicate the priming effect of health words on pain toler-
ance, and therefore did not support the model that states that activated illness-
related memory causes increased symptom reporting, suggesting that illness memory 
networks only affect symptom reporting if seriously threatening primes are used. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Everyone experiences somatic complaints that are not caused by a medical disease. 
Between 80 and 90% of healthy adults experience one or more somatic complaints per 
week (Mayou, Bass, & Sharpe, 1995). At least one third of these symptoms remain 
unexplained (Kroenke & Price, 1993). It has been hypothesized that complaints with-
out any medical origin are the result of illness-related memory networks, which cause 
increased selective attention towards innocuous bodily signals, and in turn cause 
increased detection, interpretation and reporting of these signals as complaints 
(Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004; Meerman, Verkuil, & Brosschot, 2011). The reporting of 
these signals as complaints, in turn, reactivates the memory network of illness, and 
thus produces a vicious cycle. With repeated triggering of illness memory, its activa-
tion by associated stimuli becomes more likely and therefore more frequent (Brown, 
2004; Pincus & Morley, 2001), and bodily sensations are increasingly likely to be 
misinterpreted as signs of illness, resulting in a reflexive and subjectively convincing 
symptom experience (Brown, 2004).  
Two earlier studies showed that consciously perceived pictures illustrating physical 
suffering, which activate pain or illness memory, cause people to report lower pain 
tolerance (De Wied & Verbaten, 2001) and pain intensity (Godinho et al., 2006). We 
argued (Meerman et al., 2011) before that conscious primes have the disadvantage 
that subjects may guess the experiment’s goals and act accordingly, and that it is 
unclear whether illness memory is activated involuntarily, as the model predicts 
(Brown, 2004). Moreover, in these studies the effect on pain might have been caused 
by simple interference by the simultaneously presented conscious primes. Therefore, 
in a previous study (Meerman et al., 2011) we used subliminal priming with illness 
words to assess whether an activated illness memory network could influence pain 
tolerance, and presented these words before rather than during pain measures. The 
technique of presenting stimuli ('primes') under the awareness threshold activates the 
semantic category of a word in memory while participants remain unaware of it. We 
used words describing common health-complaints (HC) to activate illness-related 
memory and we compared the pain tolerance of participants primed with these HC 
words to participants that were shown neutral words (NEU). We indeed found that only 
participants primed with HC words showed lower pain tolerance compared to partici-
pants primed with NEU words: they held their hand in the ice water of the cold pressor 
nearly 50 seconds shorter. In that study, we also tested two alternative hypotheses, 
namely that lower pain tolerance would already be observed after the semantic 
activation of bodily sensations or negativity in general. To test this, we added two 
groups that were shown either words describing bodily sensations (SEN) or negative 
valence words (NEG). However, these two groups did not show any significant differ-
ence in pain tolerance compared to participants primed with NEU words.  
In the current study, we attempted to replicate the findings of this previous study, 
while addressing some of its limitations. Firstly, in our previous study participants 
 
 
44| Chapter 3 
3 
were asked to fill in health-related questionnaires before the priming task. Although 
these questionnaires were followed by a distracter questionnaire about study skills 
that lasted for 10 minutes, the possibility remains that filling in the health-complaints 
questionnaire has acted as an additional priming intervention for all participants. The 
priming effect of HC words could actually be the result of an interaction between 
filling in the health related questionnaires and the HC words as primes later on. In 
addition, in our previous study we used some prime words that were not a perfect 
representation of the category, such as “invalid” for the health-complaint group, or 
words related to heat that could have interfered with the cold pressor task, like 
“burning” and “scalding” for the sensation group. Finally, we did not control for 
smoking or coffee intake on the day of participation and in daily life, which are known 
to influence pain tolerance (Jamner, Girdler, Shapiro, & Jarvik, 1998; Nastase, Ioan, 
Braga, Zagrean, & Moldovan, 2007). All of these above mentioned limitations were 
addressed in the current study, by (a) varying the timing of the health questionnaires, 
that is, before the priming procedure and a week after the experiment, (b) we re-
placed the words mentioned by more appropriate words and (c) by measuring and 
controlling for coffee intake and smoking.  
Similar to our previous study we exploratory examined whether negative affect, 
health worry and common health-complaints were moderators of our hypothesized 
main effect (Kolk et al., 2002; Meerman et al., 2011; Petrie et al., 2005; Verkuil et al., 
2007; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). 
Thus, our main hypothesis was that activating illness-related memory, by sublimi-




Ninety-seven students from Leiden University participated in the present study. Partic-
ipants received either course credits or eight Euros. This study was approved by the 
Ethics Committee of the Leiden University Institute of Psychological Research. Subjects 
were required to meet the following criteria: no medical disease, no anxiety or de-
pression disorder, and Dutch native language. Participants were required to refrain 
from taking pain-killers. We also asked the participants not to drink caffeinated drinks 
on the day of the experiment and to smoke cigarettes up to one hour prior to the 
experiment, which was an addition compared to our previous study. 
 
 





Subjective health was measured in a specific and general way. Specific subjective 
health-complaints (SHCs) were measured with the SHC Questionnaire (Eriksen et al., 
1999). The SHC is a 29-item self-report questionnaire that measures the number and 
severity of SHCs experienced in previous month on a 4-point scale, from “not at all” to 
“very much”. Its subscales are; musculoskeletal pain, pseudoneurology, gastrointesti-
nal problems, allergy, and flu. A total score was calculated by summing the severity of 
the health-complaints. The internal consistency of the SHC questionnaire has been 
proved sufficient (Eriksen et al., 1999).  
In addition, we also measured general Self-Rated Health (SRH)(Idler & Benyamini, 
1997). Participants were asked to rate their health in comparison with that of people 
of the same age. They could respond with “worse, ” “the same, ” or “better.”  
Health worry 
Complaint-specific worry was assessed by asking to what extent participants had been 
worrying about a complaint for each of the 29 complaints on the SHC Questionnaire on 
a 4-point scale, from “not at all” to “very much”. The total score of worry on the SHC 
questionnaire was used as a measure of health worry. The same subscales were used as 
the SHC subscales. 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
The Dutch trait version of the PANAS consists of 10 positive (positive affectivity [PA]) 
and 10 negative adjectives (negative affectivity [NA]). Participants indicate on a 5-
point scale the extent to which the items apply to how they generally feel in normal 
daily life. The reliability and construct validity of the PANAS have been found to be 
satisfactory (Engelen et al., 2006; Watson et al., 1988). 
Demographics and biobehavioral variables 
We asked the participants to report; gender, age, Body Mass Index (BMI), ethnicity, 
physical activities, usage of sleeping medication, pain killers or tranquilizers in the last 
30 days, number of doctor visits in the last 6 months, and habits in smoking, coffee 








Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, with prime words 
describing either (a) Health-complaints (HC), or the three control categories: (b) 
neutral (NEU) words, (c) words describing bodily sensations (SEN) and (d) negative 
valence (NEG) words. With a few exceptions, the prime words in this study were 
similar to our previous study (Meerman et al., 2011). In the sensation group we re-
placed previous prime words that were describing sensations that were related to heat 
by the words “trembling”, “throbbing” and “tingling”, and for the HC group we re-
placed the word “invalid” (in the sense of a seriously disabled person) by “heartburn”. 
The neutral prime words consisted of animals and the negative valence words consist-
ed of negative personality traits that were rated on their valence in earlier research by 
Hermans and de Houwer (1994). In order to keep the word frequency, length and 
syllables the same among the four categories, we also had to change the word “evil” 
into “fake” for the NEG group. The Appendix shows the prime words that were used in 
the current study. All categories contained 10 words and did not differ in number of 
syllables, length and frequency in the Dutch language [respectively Kruskal-Wallis H(3) 
= 1.19, p = .76, H(3) = 0.44, p = .93 & H(3) = 4.90, p = .18]. In every prime condition the 
10 prime words were shown randomly 10 times, leading to a total of 100 trials.  
Priming task 
The present subliminal priming task consisted of a simple computer task presented to 
the participants as a reaction time task and was exactly the same as in our previous 
study (Meerman et al., 2011). We used a prime stimulus duration (33 ms) approximate 
to that of studies that found long-lasting subliminal priming effects (Kiefer, 2002; 
Levy, 1996; Lowery et al., 2007; Pierce & Lydon, 1998). The priming manipulation was 
a variation of a common paradigm in which participants judge as quickly and accurate-
ly as possible whether briefly flashed letter strings appear on the right or left side of a 
computer monitor (Lowery et al., 2007). Each trial started with a fixation cross of a 
random duration between 500 and 1000 ms in the center of the screen. Students were 
then exposed to the prime word (33 ms), followed by a string of XXX’s that served as a 
backward mask for the prime word. The prime word and mask appeared on either the 
right or left side of the screen, in the parafoveal region [at a ˚2 degree visual angle 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000)]. Participants indicated with the arrow keys what the 
position was of the mask. Each trial was separated by a 500 ms interval in which the 
screen was blank. 
Awareness checks 
In order to examine whether the primes were indeed shown under the awareness 
threshold, we checked after the pain task whether the participants could detect the 
primes. We used both a subjective threshold, in which conscious awareness is indexed 
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by participants’ self-reports with a funneled debriefing questionnaire and an objective 
threshold, in which conscious awareness is indexed by the d’ measure, a measure of 
the participants’ discriminative abilities based on signal detection theory in a forced 
choice test (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Macmillan, 2005).  
Pain tolerance and threshold 
Similar to our previous study, we used a cold pressor task (CPT) for pain stimulation 
(Meerman et al., 2011). During a CPT, participants are asked to keep their non-
dominant hand in a basin filled with ice-cold water for as long as they can. The basin 
is, on the surface of the water, divided into two sections. One is filled with ice and 
another kept free of ice to allow a hand to be immersed in the water without direct 
ice contact. A pump kept the water flowing continuously to prevent buildup of warmer 
water around the hand. The mean water temperature at the start was 2.64°C (SD = 
1.25). To control for differences in increases in water temperature during the CPT, we 
also measured the water temperature at the end of the CPT and we used the differ-
ence in water temperature as a possible covariate. Pain tolerance was defined as time 
elapsed (in seconds) between immersion and withdrawal (De Wied & Verbaten, 2001). 
Pain threshold was defined as time elapsed between immersion and start of pain 
(Kállai, Barke, & Voss, 2004). Unbeknown to the participants, maximum duration of 
hand immersion was limited to four minutes. For exploratory reasons, pain intensity 
and pain unpleasantness ratings were also rated on a Visual Analogue Scale of 0-100, 
from not at all intense or unpleasant to extremely intense or unpleasant. 
Procedure 
Contrary to the previous study the study had two versions: in version A (similar to 
previous study) participants were required to fill in the questionnaires before the 
priming task, while in version B participants started out with reading magazines for 6 
minutes, then they performed the priming task and a week later they came back for 
the questionnaires. Information about the experiment was posted on the internet, 
making clear that it consisted of filling in questionnaires, with a special focus on study 
skills (which served as a cover story), reaction time tasks on the computer and a pain 
task. Participants were tested individually by one male and one female experimenter. 
The experimenters were kept blind about the random assignment of the participants. 
When the participant arrived at the laboratory, they were screened whether they 
fulfilled the requirements. The participants were asked to provide demographic 
information (age and gender) and the computer task was started. The experimenter 
left to an adjacent room, where he followed the procedure. After the study skills 
questionnaire that served as a distraction, the priming task started, immediately 
followed by the CPT. In order to rule out any effects on pain of distraction by the 
computer task, the computer task (with primes) was performed immediately before 
the pain task instead of simultaneously. After participants took their hand out of the 
water, they were asked to rate pain unpleasantness and intensity. Awareness of the 
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priming procedure was assessed with a funneled debriefing questionnaire and with a 
forced-choice word identification task. Finally, participants rated the negative versus 
positive valence and arousal of all prime words on a 7-point scale, and they performed 
the same priming task but with positive health words to counteract any potential 
longer lasting effects of the previous priming that might have a negative effect on pain 
tolerance. At last, the participants were fully debriefed and received money or course 
credits.  
Data analyses 
We used a 2 by 4 analysis of (co)variance with Version (A or B) and priming condition 
(neutral, sensation, negative and illness) as the independent variables and the pain 
measures as dependent variables. Stepwise regression analysis was used to select an 
optimal set of covariates amongst the baseline and experimental factors (Steyerberg & 
Harrell, 2003). We first report the analysis without covariates (based on unadjusted 
means) and then the analyses with covariates (based on adjusted means)(Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). For the planned comparisons, we compared each priming 
group with the neutral group, producing three pairwise comparisons, the critical F 
values for these are reported (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Because of our specific 
planned comparisons, we used one-tailed tests but we also report the two-tailed p 
value. For the exploratory analyses, we report the two-tailed p value and for post hoc 
comparisons we used Bonferroni adjustments for the three pairwise comparisons (p < 
.0167). Prior to analysis, the variables were examined separately for the eight condi-
tions on accuracy of data entry, missing values, linearity, homogeneity of variance and 
regression, and normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Variables were transformed if 
necessary.  
RESULTS 
As in the previous study, data was excluded of participants that afterwards indicated 
on the funneled debriefing questionnaire that they thought the task involved priming 
(n = 2), participants that could discriminate between the primes according to their d’ 
measure (see forced-choice test above) (n = 6), if they had a diagnosed minor medical 
disease (n = 4), who did not participate in the second part of version B (n = 3), who 
still reported to have used coffee on the day of the experiment (n = 8), and if they 
afterwards indicated to have participated in an experiment related to the current 
study (n = 3). 
Descriptives 
A total of 73 participants remained with 18 participants in the health-complaint 
priming group (HC), 18 participants in the negative priming group (NEG), 20 partici-
pants in the sensation group (SEN) and 17 participants in the neutral group (NEU). The 
factor Experiment Version had 39 participants in version A and 34 participants in 
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version B. The mean age of the participants was 21.07 years (SD = 4.52) and 68.5% was 
female.  
We checked whether the participants in the eight groups differed in factors meas-
ured at baseline that might influence pain tolerance, including; (a) demographic 
features, such as age and gender, (b) psychosocial factors, such as self-rated health 
and NA, (c) experimental factors, such as water temperature of the CPT. The number 
of participants that normally drink coffee differed among the groups, Fisher’s Exact 
Test = 15.46, p = .03. The SEN group of version A did not have any coffee drinkers, 
while the others groups did. The groups also differed in positive affect (PA) [F(7, 65) = 
2.26, p = .04] and the total score of SHC [F(7, 65) = 3.41, p = .00]. Post hoc pairwise 
comparisons among the experimental groups with Bonferroni adjustments showed that 
the NEG group of version A had significantly lower SHC total scores compared to the 
SEN group of version A and B. Post hoc tests did not show any significant differences in 
PA. 
Priming effect on pain tolerance 
Experiment Version had no main effect on pain tolerance (PT) and the effect of Prim-
ing did not differ across the Experiment Versions A and B (see Table 3-1). The planned 
comparisons showed that participants primed with HC words (M = 116.78 s, SD = 91.67) 
or with the NEG words (M = 107.50 s, SD = 99.70) did not differ in PT compared to 
participants primed with NEU words (M = 94.24 s, SD = 87.42). However, participants 
primed with SEN words (M = 148.00 s, SD = 104.69) had marginally significant higher PT 
compared to participants primed with NEU words. Additional exploratory comparisons 
of the unadjusted means did not reveal any other significant differences between the 
groups on PT.  
Several covariates were found to have an effect on pain tolerance: lower pain tol-
erance was found for female participants, right-handed participants, coffee consum-
ers, and for participants with a decrease in water temperature during the CPT (see 
Table 3-2). After adjusting for the covariates, no significant effects were found on PT. 
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Since a large group of participants could leave their hand in the water for the maxi-
mum of four minutes (35.6% versus 16.7% in our previous study), we explored whether 
we might find a priming effect on pain threshold instead. The unadjusted means of the 
three pairwise comparisons showed a marginal difference between the sensation (M 
threshold = 67.70 s, SD = 91.02) and neutral group (M threshold = 21.41 s, SD = 10.87) 
(Table 3-1). No difference was found between the HC (M threshold = 24.89 s, SD = 
17.00) and NEG (M threshold = 19.06 s, SD = 19.69) group compared to the neutral. 
Several covariates were found to have an effect on pain threshold. Lower pain thresh-
old was found for participants with a decrease in water temperature during the CPT, 
with lower temperature at the start of the CPT, with more general health worry, and, 
surprisingly, for participants with less worry about musculoskeletal pain (see Table 3-
2). After including the covariates, the difference between the sensation and neutral 
group seemed to be different for the two Experiment Versions and on the increase in  
Table 3-1. ANOVA results for dependent variables based on unadjusted means 
Dependent Variable Source df F p   
  
Pain tolerance Experiment Version 1 .235 .629 .004 
Priming HC vs NEUa 1 .494 .485 .008 
 
SEN vs NEUa  1 2.815 .098† .042 
 
NEG vs NEUa 1 .180 .672 .003 
Experiment Version × Priming 1 .062 .980 .003 
Error 65 
   Pain threshold  
(log) 
Experiment Version 1 .579 .449 .009 
Priming HC vs NEUa 1 .009 .923 .000 
 
SEN vs NEUa  1 2.676 .107 .040 
 
NEG vs NEUa 1 .975 .327 .015 
Experiment Version × Priming 1 .330 .803 .015 
Error 65     
 Pain intensity Experiment Version 1 .047 .829 .001 
Priming 3 2.443 .072† .101 
Experiment Version × Priming 1 .159 .923 .007 
Error 65     
 Pain unpleasantness Experiment Version 1 .105 .747 .002 
Priming 3 .153 .927 .007 
Experiment Version × Priming 1 .161 .922 .007 
Error 65       
a Planned pairwise comparisons. †p < .05 (one-tailed), *p < .05 (two-tailed), **p < .01 (two-tailed), ***p < .001 
(two-tailed). HC, Health-complaint group; NEU, Neutral group; SEN, Sensation group; NEG, Negative group 
 
 






Table 3-2. ANOVA effects for the pain measures including covariates 
Dependent variable Source df F p   
  
Pain tolerance Gender 1 6.695 .012* .102 
Handedness 1 8.532 .005** .126 
Coffee drinkers 1 2.925 .092† .047 
Alcohol drinker 1 1.830 .181 .030 
Difference in water temperature start to finish 1 4.676 .035* .073 
Age (reciprocal) 1 2.270 .137 .037 
Experiment Version 1 .087 .769 .001 
Priming HC vs NEUa 1 .041 .840 .001 
 SEN vs NEUa  1 .591 .445 .010 
 NEG vs NEUa 1 .005 .945 .000 
Experiment Version × Priming 3 .248 .863 .012 
Error 59    
Pain threshold (log) Difference in water temperature start to finish 1 12.569 .001** .198 
Water temperature at start 1 6.162 .016* .108 
SHC Worry 1 4.331 .042* .078 
SHC Worry subscale Musculoskeletal pain (log) 1 3.581 .064† .066 
SHC subscale Musculoskeletal pain (log) 1 1.213 .276 .023 
Alcohol drinker 1 1.210 .277 .023 
Coffee drinkers 1 2.449 .124 .046 
Experiment Version 1 .026 .872 .001 
Priming HC vs NEUa 1 1.459 .233 .028 
 SEN vs NEUa 1 1.448 .234 .028 
 NEG vs NEUa 1 1.784 .188 .034 
Experiment Version × Priming 3 .551 .650 .031 
Experiment × Diff. water temperature 1 .503 .482 .010 
Priming × Diff. in water temperature 3 1.264 .297 .069 
Experiment × Priming × Diff. in water temperature 3 2.959 .041* .148 
Error 51    
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water temperature during the CPT. However, these effects did not survive the Bonfer-
roni correction, which suggests that they probably occurred by chance. 
Secondary Pain Outcomes: Intensity and Unpleasantness 
We exploratory examined the priming effect on pain intensity (PI) and pain unpleas-
antness (PU). As before, Experiment Version had no effect on PI and PU and the 
priming effect on these variables did not differ across the Experiment Versions A and 
B. No priming effect was found on PU (Table 3-1, M neutral = 66.12, SD = 23.91; M HC 
= 64.56, SD = 24.66; M NEG = 61.22, SD = 26.61; M SEN = 60.95, SD = 32.43). However, 
we found a marginal significant effect on PI, which became more significant, after 
adjusting for the covariates (see Table 3-2, M neutral = 68.53, SD = 21.59; M HC = 
67.22, SD = 24.77; M NEG = 55.56, SD = 33.24; M SEN = 45.50, SD = 31.45). Higher PI 
was found for females, right-handed participants, participants with a decrease in 
water temperature during the CPT, and older participants (see Table 3-2). Pairwise 
Table 3-2. ANOVA effects for the pain measures including covariates (continued) 
Dependent variable Source df F p   
  
Pain intensity Gender 1 8.716 .004** .127 
Handedness 1 3.734 .058† .059 
Experiment leader 1 2.764 .102 .044 
Difference in water temperature start to finish 1 9.765 .003** .140 
Age (reciprocal) 1 6.470 .014* .097 
Experiment Version 1 .278 .600 .005 
Priming 3 2.803 .047* .123 
Experiment Version × Priming 3 .989 .404 .047 
Error 60    
Pain unpleasant-
ness 
Handedness 1 9.563 .003** .136 
Difference in water temperature start to finish 1 13.413 .001** .180 
SHC Worry subscale Musculoskeletal pain (log) 1 7.000 .010* .103 
SHC subscale Musculoskeletal pain (log) 1 8.852 .004** .127 
Experiment Version 1 .014 .906 .000 
Priming 3 .313 .816 .015 
Experiment Version × Priming 3 .644 .590 .031 
Error 61    
a Planned pairwise comparisons. †p < .05(one-tailed), *p < .05(two-tailed), **p < .01 (two-tailed), ***p < .001 
(two-tailed). HC, Health-complaint group; NEU, Neutral group; SEN, Sensation group; NEG, Negative group; 
SHC, Subjective Health-complaints. 
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comparisons, however, did not survive Bonferroni corrections. Higher PU ratings were 
found for right-handed participants, participants with a decrease in water temperature 
during the CPT, lower worry about musculoskeletal pain but higher actual experienced 
musculoskeletal pain (Table 3-2). After adjusting for covariates of PU (Table 3-2), no 
priming effect was found.  
Moderator effects 
Just like in our previous study, we examined potential moderating effects, by adding 
the interaction term of the potential moderator with Priming, Experiment Version and 
Version   Priming. No significant unadjusted moderating effects were found of SRH, 
health worry, SHC (log), SHC subscale musculoskeletal pain (log) and SHC subscale 
worry about musculoskeletal pain (log). However, we did find a significant moderating 
effect of NA on the priming effect on the unadjusted means of pain threshold (log), F(3, 
57) = 2.91, p = .04. Simple effect tests showed that only for the low NA subgroup (-1SD) 
a significant main priming effect was found, F(3, 57) = 4.44, p = .01. Tests with Bonfer-
roni adjustments within the low NA subjects did not show any significant differences of 
the three priming conditions with the neutral control group, but showed that the 
sensation group had a significantly higher threshold compared to the negative and 
health-complaint group, respectively p = .012 and p = .022. This moderating effect of 
NA on pain threshold disappeared after adjusting for the covariates. 
After we adjusted for the covariates, we did find a significant moderation effect of 
SHC subscale worry about musculoskeletal pain on the priming effect of group on PT, 
F(3, 51) = 3.41, p = .02. The simple effect of priming was not significant for the low 
worry musculoskeletal subgroup (-1SD), but it was marginal significant at the high 
subgroup (+1SD), F(3, 51) = 2.58, p = .06. Pairwise comparisons with the neutral group 
and with Bonferroni adjustments did not show any significant differences, which means 
that this finding was likely due to chance. 
For PU, we found a significant moderating effect of SHC on the priming effect, F(3, 
53) = 3.11, p = .03, but only after adjusting for the covariates. Only the low subgroup 
(-1SD) of SHC showed a marginal significant priming effect, F(3, 53) = 2.49, p = .07. 
Again, however, Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons did not show a significant 
difference between the groups. No moderating effects were found on PI. 
Comparison of samples 
We compared the participant samples of this experiment to our previous experiment 
on the measures of demographics, personality traits and experimental variables. The 
current sample had: more negative valence ratings of the health-complaints words, 
Mann-Whitney U = 1483, p = .00, more positive valence ratings of the Sensation words, 
U = 1674, p = .00, higher Positive Affect, U = 1863.5, p = .02, less SHC worry, U = 
1955.5, p = .05, a higher Water temperature at the start (M = 2.65 degrees, SD = 1.31 
versus M = 1.64, SD = 0.81), U = 1228.5, p = .00, more men, χ2 = 5.12, p = .03 and more 
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participants that could reach the maximum of four minutes at the CPT, χ2 = 6.37, p = 
.01. 
DISCUSSION 
The present study could not replicate the finding of our previous study that subliminal 
priming with illness words causes lower pain tolerance (Meerman et al., 2011). The 
only effect found was a small increasing effect of priming with sensation words on pain 
tolerance that disappeared when the analyses included the covariates, suggesting that 
it was most likely due to the difference of coffee drinkers among the groups. No 
priming effects were found on pain unpleasantness and pain intensity scores. Further-
more, the current study showed that administering a health-related questionnaire 
before a subliminal priming task using health-complaint words does not influence pain 
tolerance. This suggests that the results of our previous study were not caused by an 
interaction between the questionnaire and the health-complaint prime words.  
It is possible that since the effects are relatively subtle, either the previous or the 
current result is due to chance. Another possibility is that the priming method used 
does not consistently activate illness memory. In neither the current nor the previous 
study we checked whether the subliminal priming task was actually successful in 
activating illness-related memory. On the other hand, this priming method is broadly 
used and standard (see for example Ref. Lowery et al., 2007). Provided that the 
methods are sound, another possible cause for the failed replication that is still con-
sistent with the hypothesis is the removal of the prime word “invalid”, which seems 
the most ‘intense’ ill health word. Is it possible that the lower pain tolerance in our 
previous study was the result of mainly priming with “invalid”, perhaps in interaction 
with ‘surrounding’ health-related words? Although this might seem unlikely, the prime 
“invalid” reflects a condition that is likely to be more threatening for the bodily 
integrity than words like “wound”, or “headache” or “heartburn”. The possibility that 
illness memory networks – and with that symptom reporting – are only affected by 
primes that seriously threaten bodily integrity, such as “invalid” is further supported 
by a study (De Wied & Verbaten, 2001) showing that pain tolerance was successfully 
lowered by other really intrusive stimuli, namely pictures depicting blood and serious 
wounds (though consciously presented), that also do not necessarily refer to common 
daily health experiences (De Wied, personal communication). This clearly suggests a 
path for future studies. In sum, our current study with methodological improvements 
could not confirm the evidence found in the previous study and therefore does not 
yield support for the theory that an activated illness memory network causes increased 
symptom reporting (Brown, 2004; Meerman et al., 2011). However, it is possible that 
support would be obtained with more intensely physically threatening primes, since we 
removed one such prime in the current study. Future experiments using more intense 
stimuli might help to elucidate this. Importantly, such studies should include a test of 
actual memory activation, like the lexical decision task. However, the current results 
suggest that the result of our previous study is either due to chance or due to the 
 
 
|55 The Effect of Priming Illness Memory on Pain Tolerance: a Failed Replication 
3 
threatening content of the prime “invalid”. Though, in case of the latter, the depend-
ence of the effects on one single subliminally presented word makes one question the 
validity of the method and merits using different techniques in the future. The non-
trivial prevalence and humanitarian and economic costs of medically unexplained 
health complaints in our society warrants further investigation. 
Appendix. Prime words used in current study. Prime words in italics differ from previous study. English prime 
words were translated from Dutch. 
Neutral Sensation Negative Valence Health Complaints 
“bear” “throbbing” “fake” “allergy” 
“butterfly” “tingling” “hostile” “asthma” 
“seal” “trembling” “hateful” “throw up” 
“giraffe” “pounding” “coward” “diarrhea” 
“gorilla” “tickling” “liar” “flu” 
“rhino” “smarting” “heartless” “headache” 
“panda” “tight” “antisocial” “fever” 
“turtle” “stiff” “unfair” “heartburn” 
“chimpanzee” “ice cold” “mean” “infection” 
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ABSTRACT 
Background Cognitive models explaining medically unexplained complaints propose 
that activating illness-related memory causes increased complaints such as pain. 
However, our previous studies showed conflicting support for this theory.  
Purpose Illness-related memory is more likely to influence reporting of complaints 
when its activation is enmeshed with that of self-related memory. We therefore 
investigated whether inducing this association would cause a stronger decrease in pain 
tolerance. In addition, we examined whether self-focused attention (SFA) acted as a 
moderator of this effect.  
Methods We used subliminal evaluative conditioning (SEC) to induce an association 
between activated self-related and illness-related memory. Seventy-six participants 
were randomly assigned to four combinations of two priming factors: (1) the self-
referent word “I” versus the nonself-referent “X” to manipulate activated self-related 
memory; (2) health complaint (HC) words versus neutral words, to manipulate activat-
ed illness-related memory. Pain tolerance was assessed using a cold pressor task (CPT).  
Results Participants primed with the self-referent “I” and HC words did not demon-
strate the expected lower pain tolerance. However, SFA acted as a moderator of the 
main effect of the self prime: priming with “I” resulted in increased pain tolerance in 
participants with low SFA.  
Conclusions The current study did not support the hypothesis that associations be-
tween activated self-related memory and illness-related memory cause increased 
reporting of complaints. Instead, activating self-related memory increased pain toler-
ance in participants with low SFA. This seems to indicate that the self-prime might 
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INTRODUCTION 
Somatic complaints with no apparent medical explanation are a common phenomenon 
in the general population (Eriksen & Ursin, 2004). Most of these complaints disappear 
quickly and only few people with these complaints will visit a doctor. Nevertheless, at 
least one-third of all health complaints (HCs) presented to primary care professionals 
lack an adequate organic explanation (Peveler et al., 1997). Such complaints are 
referred to in the literature as medical unexplained symptoms (MUS), functional 
somatic syndromes or somatoform disorders (Henningsen, Zipfel, & Herzog, 2007; Page 
& Wessely, 2003). Although past research has uncovered several predisposing and 
precipitating factors of MUS, still little information exists that can explain how these 
complaints are produced and maintained (Page & Wessely, 2003). Recently, it has been 
hypothesized that these complaints can be explained by individual differences in 
neural sensitization of certain parts of the central nervous system, such as limbic 
system or peripheral and central parts of the pain pathway (Eriksen & Ursin, 2004; 
Henningsen, Zimmermann, & Sattel, 2003; Henningsen et al., 2007). This sensitization 
might in turn be enhanced or even caused by cognitive processes such as selective 
attention to and enhanced memory of illness-related information, such as bodily 
signals (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004). 
Early research on these cognitive processes involved in the production of HCs has 
focused on the role of attention on the perception of bodily signals, showing that a 
lack of distraction of external cues causes people to focus their attention on internal 
signals, thereby perceiving more bodily signals compared to when external distraction 
is present (Pennebaker, 1982b; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). Several studies have 
found that dispositional measures of increased self-focused attention (SFA) were 
related to increased complaint reports (for more studies see Cioffi, 1991; Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989; P. G. Williams, Wasserman, & 
Lotto, 2003), although one study found the opposite: people with high SFA had less HCs 
compared to people with less SFA when facing stress. This finding was explained as 
followed: people with high SFA might be more aware of the effects of stress and, 
therefore, might deal with the stress using better coping strategies (Suls & Fletcher, 
1985). Thus, the association between SFA and HCs is still ambiguous. 
More recently, it has been suggested that this increased bodily focused attention is 
actually the result of activation of implicit illness memory networks. Brown’s model 
suggests that when illness memory networks are activated, they guide automatic 
attentional processes to select innocuous body signals for further processing (Brown, 
2004; Skelton & Strohmetz, 1990). Thus, Brown’s model provides a link between 
perceptual processes and cognitive processes, such as attention and memory. A con-
cept related to illness memory networks is expectancy. Expectations can have a big 
influence on pain perception, such as the placebo effect and also on reporting of flu 
symptoms (Pennebaker, 1982b). It has been hypothesized that MUS patients might 
have high expectations of experiencing somatic complaints. In turn, these expectations 
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can prime subsequent bodily sensations. However, expectancy of somatic complaints 
also interacts with illness memory networks. If a memory bias causes people to memo-
rize more painful events, then more somatic complaints will be expected in the future 
(Rief & Broadbent, 2007). Another model suggests that normally, a filtering system, 
which consists of cognitive processes such as attention, filters out irrelevant bodily 
signals. However, when this filtering systems becomes distorted, for example, by 
increased attention to bodily signals, then more irrelevant bodily signals will become 
noticeable (Rief & Broadbent, 2007). Although some studies have shown that illness-
related cues, which presumably activate illness memory networks, cause increased 
reporting of complaints, including lower pain tolerance, it still remains a largely 
unrevealed research area (De Wied & Verbaten, 2001; Godinho et al., 2006; Skelton & 
Strohmetz, 1990). A previous study by our group found that unconsciously processed 
illness-related cues resulted in lower pain tolerance during a cold pressor task (CPT) 
(Meerman et al., 2011). However, a follow-up study could not reproduce this effect 
(Meerman, Brosschot, & Verkuil, 2012). 
The strength with which activated illness memory can guide attention and report-
ing of complaints is likely to depend on the specific associations that are simultaneous-
ly activated in this memory. For example, in the context of chronic pain, it has been 
proposed that biases in information processing are the result of a co-activation be-
tween three cognitive schemata, namely, those related to pain, illness, and self 
(Pincus & Morley, 2001). Pain schema represents sensory intensity, spatial, and tem-
poral features of a pain experience, whereas illness schema represents affective and 
behavioral consequences of illnesses. The self-schema is a cognitive representation of 
the self and organizes knowledge about the self and guides the processing of self-
relevant information. Repeated simultaneous activation of the content of these three 
different schemas may result in “enmeshment”, which causes an increased implicit 
association of the self with illness or pain. The extent of the enmeshment and the 
main content of the schema determine the strength of the cognitive bias (Pincus & 
Morley, 2001) and ultimately reporting of complaints. However, this hypothesis has not 
yet been tested. Importantly, studies have shown that the association of the self with 
another concept can be experimentally induced, or in other words, that enmeshment 
between schemata can be created. For example, implicit self-esteem can be enhanced 
as well as reduced by pairing the self-related schema with a positive schema, which 
was done by presenting a self referent word (“I”) with a word of positive or negative 
valence (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003). This procedure is called 
evaluative conditioning and is theoretically based on the classical conditioning para-
digm.  
Since our two previous priming studies yielded inconsistent results, the purpose of 
the current study was again to examine whether activation of implicit illness memory 
networks would increase reporting of complaints during a pain task. However, this 
time, we changed the experimental paradigm into an evaluative conditioning paradigm 
in order to increase the possibility of finding support for the implicit illness memory 
 
 
|61 The Effect of Subliminal Evaluative Conditioning of Cognitive Self-Schema and Illness Schema 
4 
networks model as an explanation for MUS (Brown, 2004; Meerman et al., 2011). More 
precisely, in the current study, we aimed to investigate whether pain reporting would 
be more strongly affected when enmeshment of the self schema and illness schema 
was created, compared to activation of the implicit illness schema alone. We, there-
fore, hypothesized that priming of HC words in combination with the self-referring “I” 
would lead to a lower pain tolerance compared to priming of HC words in combination 
with the nonself-referring word “X”. Similar to our previous study, we also hypothe-
sized that priming with HC words would lead to lower pain tolerance compared to 
priming with neutral words.  
In addition, we investigated whether dispositional SFA was related to pain toler-
ance. We did not have an explicit directional hypothesis regarding dispositional SFA as 
studies, thus far, have yielded opposing results (see above). In addition, we examined 
whether dispositional SFA moderated priming effects as previous studies found that 
priming is more effective for participants high on this ‘trait’ (i.e. private self-
consciousness [PSC], see Hull, Slone, Meteyer, & Matthews, 2002). 
Negative affect, health worry, and common HCs have all been linked with in-
creased reporting of somatic complaints (Brown, 2004; Fenigstein et al., 1975; Verkuil 
et al., 2007; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). It is possible that these traits make people 
more sensitive to activation of illness memory or SFA. Therefore, we measured these 
traits and complaints and checked whether the experimental conditions differed on 
them. 
We used subliminal techniques for presentation of the stimuli to prevent the par-




Eighty-seven students from Leiden University participated, and received course credits 
or 8 Euros for their effort. This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the 
Leiden University Institute of Psychology. Subjects were required to meet the follow-
ing criteria: no medical disease, no anxiety or depression, and Dutch as a native 
language. Participants were required to refrain from taking pain killers and to drink 
caffeinated drinks or alcohol on the day of the experiment and smoking cigarettes up 
to 1 h prior to the experiment. 
 
 





To measure dispositional SFA, we used the private subscale of the self-consciousness 
scale (SCS) (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Vleeming & Engelse, 1981, Dutch translation). The 
private SCS consists of ten items that are rated on a five-point Likert-type scale, of 0 
(‘not at all characteristic) to 4 (‘very characteristic’). Cronbach’s α for the subscale 
PSC was .68.  
Demographics and Biobehavioral Variables 
We measured gender; age; body mass index (BMI); ethnicity; physical activities; usage 
of sleeping medication, pain killers or tranquilizers in the last 30 days; number of 
doctor visits in the last 6 months; and habits in smoking, coffee and alcohol drinking; 
drug use; medication use; illnesses; history of and current psychological problems; 
negative affect; number of HCs; and self-rated health. 
Subliminal Evaluative Conditioning Priming Task 
Prime Words 
The forward conditioning method was used, which is the most common in evaluative 
conditioning research (Dijksterhuis, 2004). In this method, a cognitive schema is 
temporarily ‘charged’ with affective meaning by pairing a stimulus activating the 
schema with one from an affective schema. In our study, participants were repeatedly 
presented, on a computer screen, with either the self-referring word “I” (the Dutch 
word “ik”), to activate a self-schema, or the non self-referring word “X” as a control 
manipulation. Immediately after each presentation of “I” or “X”, another prime 
followed that was either a word describing HC, to activate an illness-related schema, 
or neutral (NEU) words for the control group. The neutral prime words described 
animals. The Appendix shows the prime words that were used in the current study. 
The HC and neutral categories contained ten words and did not differ in number of 
syllables, length, and frequency in the Dutch language (respectively, t(18) = .61, p = 
.55, t(18) = .59, p = .56, and t(18) = .01, p = .99). In every prime condition, the ten 
prime word pairings were shown randomly ten times, thus a total of 100 trials.  
Priming Task 
The present subliminal priming task consisted of a simple computer task presented to 
the participants as a reaction time task. For each trial of the task, a row of Xs, with a 
random duration of 500 ms, appeared in the center of the screen. Students were then 
exposed to either the self-referring “I” or neutral “X” prime words, followed by the 
health or neutral prime. Most prime words (82 %) were shown for 33 ms, as we did in 
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our previous study (Meerman et al., 2011) and as is quite common for this kind of 
studies (Kiefer, 2002; Levy, 1996; Pierce & Lydon, 1998), but due to a slight program-
ming error, some primes (18 %) were shown for 17 ms, which is, however, also quite 
common (Kawakami, Dovidio, & Dijksterhuis, 2003; Spalding & Hardin, 1999) and 
successful subliminal evaluative conditioning (SEC) has also been accomplished with 
priming durations of 17 ms (Dijksterhuis, 2004). The prime duration was on average 
31.62 ms. It was somewhat longer for the self-referent primes (“I” and “X”; M = 32.89 
ms, SD = 0.180) than for the health and neutral primes (M = 30.33 ms, SD = 1.803, t(86) 
= 14.644, p < .01). A string of random letters served as a backward mask for the prime 
words. The backward masks were presented to the participants as target words, and 
the participants were asked to decide as quickly as possible whether the letter string 
started with a vowel or consonant. The trials were presented in random order. The 
prime words and masks appeared in black in the center of the white screen. Each trial 
was separated by a 1000 ms interval in which the screen was blank. 
Awareness Checks 
In order to check whether the primes were indeed shown under the awareness thresh-
old, we tested after the pain task whether the participants could detect the primes. 
We used both a subjective threshold, in which conscious awareness is indexed by 
participants’ self reports with a funneled debriefing questionnaire and an objective 
threshold in which conscious awareness is indexed by the d’ measure on a forced-
choice word identification task. The d’ is a measure of the participants’ discriminative 
abilities based on signal detection theory (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Macmillan, 2005). 
Pain Tolerance 
Similar to our previous study, we used a CPT for pain stimulation (Meerman et al., 
2011). During a CPT, participants were asked to keep their nondominant hand in a 
basin filled with ice-cold water for as long as they can. The basin is, on the surface of 
the water, divided into two sections. One is filled with ice and another kept free of ice 
to allow a hand to be immersed in the water without direct ice contact. A pump kept 
the water flowing continuously to prevent buildup of warmer water around the hand. 
The mean water temperature at the start was 0.88 °C (SD = 0.72). Pain tolerance was 
defined as the total duration between the immersion and the withdrawal of the hand 
(De Wied & Verbaten, 2001; Meerman et al., 2011). Unbeknown to the participants, 
maximum duration of hand immersion was limited to 4 min. For exploratory reasons, 
pain intensity (PI) and pain unpleasantness (PU) ratings were also rated on a Visual 
Analogue Scale, ranging from not at all intense or unpleasant to extremely intense or 
unpleasant (Price, McGrath, Rafii, & Buckingham, 1983). To prevent interference with 
pain tolerance, these measures were taken immediately after the participant with-
drew their hand from the water. 
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Procedure 
Information about the experiment was posted on the internet, making clear that it 
consisted of filling in questionnaires, with a special focus on study skills (which served 
as a cover story), reaction time tasks on the computer, and a pain task. Participants 
were tested individually by one female experimenter. The experimenter was kept 
blind about the random assignment of the participants. When the participant arrived 
at the laboratory and gave their (partial) informed consent, they were asked to pro-
vide demographic information (age and gender) and the questionnaires started. The 
experimenter left to an adjacent room, where she followed the procedure. After the 
study skills questionnaire, which served as a distraction, the SEC task started. In order 
to rule out any effects on pain of distraction by the computer task, the computer task 
(with primes) was performed immediately before the pain task. Several studies have 
shown that subliminal priming effects can last for at least a couple of minutes (Bargh 
& Chartrand, 2000; Levy et al., 2000; Lowery et al., 2007). After participants took 
their hand out of the water, they were asked to rate PU and PI. Awareness of the 
priming procedure was assessed with the funneled debriefing questionnaire and with 
the forced-choice word identification task. Finally, participants rated the negative 
versus positive valence and arousal of all prime words on a seven-point scale, and they 
performed the same SEC task but with positive health words (such as “vital”, 
“healthy” and “fit”) to counteract any potential longer lasting effects of the previous 
priming that might have a negative effect on pain tolerance. At last, the participants 
were fully debriefed, asked again for permission to use their data, and then they 
received money or course credits.  
Data Analyses 
We used a 2-by-2 analysis of (co)variance with the self-referent prime word (“I” or 
“X”) and priming condition (NEU, neutral, and, HC) as the independent variables and 
the pain measures as dependent variables. A stepwise regression analysis was used to 
select an optimal set of covariates among the baseline and experimental factors with a 
high p-criterion of .20 (Steyerberg & Harrell, 2003). The critical F values for the 
planned comparisons are reported (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Because of our specific 
planned comparisons, we used one-tailed tests but we also report the two-tailed p 
value. For the exploratory analyses, we report the two-tailed p value. We first report 
the unadjusted effects and then the adjusted effects of priming (Simmons et al., 
2011). Prior to analysis, the variables were examined separately for the four conditions 
on accuracy of data entry, missing values, linearity, homogeneity of variance and 
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RESULTS 
Data of participants was excluded if they: afterwards indicated on the funneled 
debriefing questionnaire that they thought the task involved priming (n = 4), could 
discriminate between the primes according to their d’ measure (see forced-choice test 
above) (n = 2), had a diagnosed minor medical disease (n = 3), still reported to have 
used coffee on the day of the experiment (n = 1), were currently being treated for 
anxiety (n = 1), listed special medication use (n = 2) and participated in a previous 
experiment similar to the current study (n = 1).  
Descriptives 
A total of 76 participants remained with 19 participants in the “I”-HC priming group, 
18 participants in the “X”-HC priming group, 20 participants in the “I”-NEU group and 
19 participants in the “X”-NEU group. The mean age of the participants was 22.21 
years (SD = 10.87) and 88.2 % were female. Participants had on average 8.12 HCs in 
the last month (SD = 3.01) and rated on average their own health as similar to people 
of the same age (M Self-Rated Health [SRH] = 1.14, SD = .48). 
We checked whether the participants in the four groups differed in factors meas-
ured at baseline that might influence pain tolerance including: (1) demographic fea-
tures, such as age and gender; (2) psychosocial factors, such as self-rated health and 
NA; and (3) experimental factors, such as water temperature of the CPT and the 
average duration of the prime presentation. The four experimental groups significantly 
differed only in self-rated health, F(3, 75) = 3.02, p = .04, and marginally on the use of 
painkillers, F(3, 75) = 2.50, p = .07. Post hoc tests with Bonferroni correction showed 
that the X-NEU group had a significantly higher self-rated health compared to the I-HC 
group, but similar tests for painkillers did not show any significant differences between 
the conditions. However, while SRH was not related to any outcome measures in the 
stepwise regression analyses used to assess potential covariates, use of painkillers was 
related to pain tolerance, and was thus used as a covariate. The other variables, 
including the mean prime durations, did not differ among the groups. However, as the 
stepwise regression analyses showed that besides painkillers, water temperature of the 
pain task, coffee consumers, physical activity, BMI, doctor visits in the past month, 
SHC musculoskeletal pain (rec), gender and cigarette consumption were also related to 
one or more of the pain measures, they were used as covariates to remove noise 
variance in these dependent variables (G. A. Miller & Chapman, 2001). 
Priming Effect on Pain Tolerance 
Contrary to our hypotheses, neither self-referent priming (“X” versus “I”) nor HC 
priming (HC versus neutral words) had a main effect on pain tolerance, nor did these 
priming factors interact (Table 4-1). These results remained the same after adjusting 
for the covariates (Table 4-2).  
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Secondary Pain Outcomes: Intensity and Unpleasantness 
The effect of priming on PI and PU was examined for exploratory purposes. Neither 
self-referent priming nor priming with HC words had a main effect on PI and PU (Table 
4-1), nor did these priming factors interact. These results remained the same after 
adjusting for the covariates (Table 4-2).  
Self-focused Attention 
No significant correlation of SFA was found on any of the pain measures. However, we 
also tested whether SFA acted as a moderator of the experimental manipulations. The 
expected Self-referent   HC   SFA interaction was not significant. However, we found 
that SFA acted as a moderator of the effect of self-referent priming (see Table 4-1). 
Simple effect tests of the unadjusted means showed that participants with low SFA (< 
M -1SD) had significantly higher pain tolerance when primed with “I” compared to “X”, 
F(1, 68) = 4.70, p = .03,  p
  = .07, while no significant difference was found for partici-
pants with high PSC (>M +1SD), F(1, 68) = .83, p = .37,  p
 = .01 (see Fig. 4-1). Analyses 
with adjusted means showed the same pattern (see Table 4-2). 
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Table 4-1. ANOVA results for dependent variables based on unadjusted means 
  Main effects of priming Main effects of priming plus 
self- focused attention 
Source Dependent variable df F p   




Pain tolerancea  1c .974 .327 .013 1f 5.205 .026* .071 
Intensity rating 1d .000 .999 .000 1g .000 .986 .000 
Unpleasantness ratingb 1e .109 .742 .002 1h .664 .418 .010 
Health com-
plaint priming 
Pain tolerancea  1 .326 .570 .005 1 .943 .335 .014 
Intensity rating 1 .123 .727 .002 1 .195 .660 .003 




Pain tolerancea  1 2.049 .157 .028 1 .529 .470 .008 
Intensity rating 1 .371 .544 .005 1 .567 .454 .008 
Unpleasantness ratingb 1 1.336 .251 .018 1 .285 .595 .004 
Self-focused 
attention 
Pain tolerancea      1 .099 .754 .001 
Intensity rating     1 1.394 .242 .020 




Pain tolerancea      1 4.588 .036* .063 
Intensity rating     1 .000 .992 .000 





Pain tolerancea      1 .852 .359 .012 
Intensity rating     1 .151 .699 .002 






Pain tolerancea      1 .162 .689 .002 
Intensity rating     1 .757 .387 .011 
Unpleasantness ratingb     1 .668 .417 .010 
Error 
Pain tolerancea  72    68    
Intensity rating 72    68    
Unpleasantness ratingb 72    68    
a Log transformed; b Inverse square root transformed; c R2 = .046 (Adjusted R2 = .006); d R2 = .007 (Adjusted R2 
= -.034); e R2 = .022 (Adjusted R2 = -.019); f R2 = .118 (Adjusted R2 = .027); g R2 = .038 (Adjusted R2 = -.061); h 
R2 = .057 (Adjusted R2 = -.040).*p < .05 
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Table 4-2. ANOVA results for dependent variables based on adjusted means (continued) 
  Main effects of priming Main effects of priming plus SFA 
Dep.var. Source B df F p  p





Water temp. .160 1a 12.184 .001** .154 .148 1d 10.603 .002** .144 
Painkiller usage -.065 1 7.447 .008** .100 -.078 1 10.663 .002** .145 
Coffee drinkers -.177 1 5.937 .017* .081 -.173 1 5.780 .019* .084 
Physical activity -.060 1 2.835 .097† .041 -.071 1 4.227 .044* .063 
BMI (rec) 9.838 1 3.656 .060† .052 8.775 1 2.942 .091† .045 
HC  1 .307 .582 .005  1 .772 .383 .012 
Self  1 2.446 .123 .035  1 8.660 .005** .121 
Self × HC  1 1.085 .301 .016  1 .150 .700 .002 
SFA      -.015 1 .598 .442 .009 
SFA × self       1 7.058 .010* .101 
SFA × HC       1 1.155 .287 .018 
SFA × self × HC       1 .024 .877 .000 
Error  67        63    
Pain 
Intensity 
Doctor  6.006 1b 5.476 .022* .077 5.756 1e 4.438 .039* .067 
BMI (rec) -814.030 1 6.863 .011* .094 -883.019 1 7.846 .007** .112 
SHC musc. (rec) 22.672 1 7.162 .009** .098 24.675 1 7.280 .009** .105 
Physical activity 5.149 1 5.606 .021* .078 5.382 1 5.888 .018* .087 
Gender -19.627 1 8.262 .005** .111 -19.726 1 7.994 .006** .114 
Smokers -16.695 1 4.350 .041* .062 -19.091 1 5.537 .022* .082 
HC  1 .323 .572 .005  1 2.402 .126 .037 
Self  1 .018 .892 .000  1 .004 .952 .000 
Self × HC  1 .794 .376 .012  1 1.610 .209 .025 
SFA      .472 1 1.207 .276 .019 
SFA × self       1 .002 .961 .000 
SFA × HC       1 2.176 .145 .034 
SFA × self × HC       1 2.188 .144 .034 
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Table 4-2. ANOVA results for dependent variables based on adjusted means (continued) 
  Main effects of priming Main effects of priming plus SFA 
Dep.var. Source B df F p  p








Doctor -.643 1c 7.252 .009** .096 -.659 1f 6.555 .013* .093 
Smokers 1.125 1 2.584 .113 .037 -.452 1 2.108 .151 .032 
BMI (rec) 64.017 1 4.782 .032* .066 74.147 1 6.065 .016* .087 
Physical activity -.485 1 5.668 .020* .077 1.043 1 4.677 .034* .068 
HC  1 .616 .435 .009  1 .043 .837 .001 
Self  1 .048 .828 .001  1 .048 .827 .001 
Self × HC  1 .435 .512 .006  1 1.047 .310 .016 
SFA      .004 1 1.189 .280 .018 
SFA × self       1 .046 .831 .001 
SFA × HC       1 .190 .664 .003 
SFA × self × HC       1 1.528 .221 .023 
Error  68        64    
a R2 = .314 (Adjusted R2 = .233); b R2 = .358 (Adjusted R2 = .271); c R2 = .241 (Adjusted R2 = .162); d R2 = .398 
(Adjusted R2 = .284); e R2 = .407 (Adjusted R2 = .283); f R2 = .277 (Adjusted R2 = .153). Rec = reciprocal 
transformed, log = log transformed, SFA = Self-Focused Attention, HC = Health Complaint Priming, Self = Self-
Referent Priming, Water temp = Water temperature at the end of task, Doctor = Doctor visits in past month, 
SHC Musc. = SHC musculoskeletal pain. †p < .05(one-tailed), *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Figure 4-1. The estimated means for pain tolerance per self-referent priming 
condition and self-focused attention (SFA)(values have been transformed back 
to represent original scale, error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean). 
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DISCUSSION 
The present study was conducted to replicate and extend our previous studies, in 
which we tested an explanatory model for HCs without a medical explanation, based 
on principles from cognitive psychology (Meerman et al., 2011). Our previous study 
found that the activation of an illness-related cognitive schema, using subliminal 
priming, seemed to cause lower pain tolerance (Meerman et al., 2011). However, a 
follow-up study that used slightly different prime words could not reproduce this 
effect (Meerman et al., 2012). Therefore, we decided to replicate the previous study 
but this time using SEC to cause a temporary stronger association between the self and 
illness, which presumably would have a stronger effect on pain tolerance compared to 
activation of illness-related cognitive schemata alone (Pincus & Morley, 2001). Again, 
contrary to our first study (Meerman et al., 2011), and studies by others using supra-
liminal primes (De Wied & Verbaten, 2001; Godinho et al., 2006), we did not find that 
activating an illness-related cognitive schema caused a lower pain tolerance. We also 
did not find support for the hypothesis that an increased association between the self-
schema and illness-schema would cause lower pain tolerance compared to activating 
an illness-related cognitive schema alone. Yet, priming with a self-referent word (“I”) 
seemed to enhance pain tolerance, but only in participants with low SFA.  
There are several factors that could account for the failure to replicate our previ-
ous study. Previously, we used subliminal priming to activate an illness-related cogni-
tive schema (Meerman et al., 2011) while in the current study we used SEC techniques 
based on other studies that were able to improve self-esteem by pairing a self-referent 
word to a positive word (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003). One could 
argue that the duration of part (18%) of the primes (17 ms) in the current study was 
too short to have any effect. Yet, successful SEC has been accomplished with priming 
durations as low as 17 ms (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  
Another difference between the current study and the former study in which we 
did find that the HC words lowered pain tolerance (Meerman et al., 2011) is that we 
removed the prime word “invalid” (in the sense of ‘severely disabled person’) in the 
present study, which we also did in the follow-up study that could not replicate the 
finding of our first study as well (Meerman et al., 2012). These results seem to indicate 
that the lower pain tolerance found due to illness priming in our previous study was 
the result of priming with the word “invalid”, perhaps in interaction with the other 
health-related words used. It is possible that illness memory networks are only, or 
most easily, affected by seriously threatening primes such as “invalid”, or really 
intrusive pictures such as the blood- and wound-containing primes as used in other 
previous studies (De Wied & Verbaten, 2001), which would then result in more report-
ing of complaints. This clearly suggests a path for future studies.  
Another possible explanation for not finding the expected interaction between self- 
and illness primes might be that activating self- and illness schema only influences 
pain tolerance in people that already have strongly enmeshed schemata, for example, 
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chronic pain patients. It has indeed been suggested that only vulnerable chronic pain 
patients who have enmeshed schemas of pain and the self will show a tendency to 
preferentially process pain stimuli in reference to themselves in contrast with healthy 
people who will preferentially process positive and neutral information that is congru-
ent with their self-schema (Pincus & Morley, 2001).  
With respect to the expected effects of priming of the self-schema and disposition-
al SFA on pain tolerance, the literature up to now gives rise to contrary hypotheses: a 
higher pain tolerance could have been expected, caused by an increase in implicit 
positive affect resulting from ‘self priming’ that was found recently by Quirin et al. 
(Quirin, Bode, & Kuhl, 2011) or caused by increased effective coping with stress in 
people with high SFA, as found by Suls and Fletcher (1985) or the opposite: lower pain 
tolerance instead as a result of enhanced SFA or internal focus, which has been linked 
to increased reporting of complaints (Cioffi, 1991; Fenigstein et al., 1975; Watson & 
Pennebaker, 1989; P. G. Williams et al., 2003). In fact, we found support for the first 
hypothesis: participants primed with the self-referent word “I” showed increased pain 
tolerance compared to participants primed with the non self-referent word “X”, but 
only for participants with lack in SFA. It might be speculated that ‘boosting’ the 
activation of the self-schema stimulates a strategy to cope with pain. Since this seems 
solely the case in people who seem to lack in SFA, it might be that this effect is 
mediated by enhanced SFA. Still, this would suggest that high self-focused participants 
would have shown a higher pain tolerance which was not evident, at least not statisti-
cally confirmed. The finding that only participants with low SFA showed an effect of 
self-referring priming also seems to be inconsistent with an earlier study that found 
that priming was only effective in participants with high SFA and not low SFA (Hull et 
al., 2002). The reliability of the scale used however was relatively low; therefore, we 
have to interpret these results with caution. 
In conclusion, we could not replicate our previous study in which we found support 
for the theory that activation of cognitive schemata related to health can cause 
increased reporting of complaints and thereby provide evidence for an explanatory 
model for medically unexplained symptoms. However, due to our sample size, we were 
only able to detect large effect sizes and not smaller. The possibility remains that the 
hypothesized effect does exist but only with a medium or smaller effect size. We did 
find, however, that activating a self-schema seems to increase pain tolerance, espe-
cially in people lacking in SFA. This suggests that increasing attention on the self, 
implicitly as well as explicitly may offer a clue to improve prevention or treatment of 
these complaints, despite theories that predict the opposite (Cioffi, 1991; Fenigstein 
et al., 1975; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989; P. G. Williams et al., 2003). However, one 
major limitation of our study is the fact that we could not perform a manipulation 
check. Although the manipulation we employed is broadly used, with success, we 
cannot be sure whether our experimental manipulation of activating illness memory 
networks and/or self-related memory networks actually worked. The reason that such 
a manipulation check is seldom used, is perhaps that it is difficult to implement it 
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without seriously impairing the design. For example, a lexical decision task immediate-
ly after the priming, that is typically used to measure priming effects, would create an 
unwanted supraliminal priming effect. It might also be rare because most results that 
are published are positive (i.e., due to publication bias) and although there remains 
comparable ambiguity about the mechanism in these studies, such a test is not com-
monly required. Thus, the results of this study need to be carefully interpreted. Future 
studies should try to replicate the effect found for the effect of increased self-
attention causing less perception of pain while also administering experimental manip-
ulation checks to rule out the possibility of a “fluke” finding. Perhaps supraliminal 
evaluative conditioning techniques might give a different result compared to the 
subliminal techniques used in this study, as earlier research has shown that supralimi-
nal techniques have stronger effects than subliminal ones (Hofmann, De Houwer, 
Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). 
 
Appendix. Prime words used for the complaint versus neutral prime factor. English words are translated 
from Dutch prime words. 
Complaint  Neutral 
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ABSTRACT 
Objective We attempted to validate whether the paradigm for subliminal priming and 
subliminal evaluative conditioning that we used in our previous studies and that is 
commonly used to prime behavior in social psychological studies, was actually effec-
tive in activating semantic memory networks for at least several minutes. 
Methods In the first study we subliminally primed participants with either neutral or 
illness words. We then measured with a lexical decision task whether participants 
primed with illness words had quicker response latencies for illness words. In the 
second study, participants were subliminally exposed to either a self-referring word 
“I” or a nonself-referring word “X” paired with illness words using subliminally evalua-
tive conditioning. We then measured whether participants exposed to “I” and illness 
words showed stronger associations of the self with illness on an implicit associations 
task. 
Results The priming or subliminal evaluative conditioning did not cause differences in 
response latencies on subsequent tasks. 
Conclusions In both studies, we did not find that the priming techniques were effec-
tive in activating semantic memory networks. This study shows that it is important for 
future studies to include a manipulation check of subliminal priming to see whether it 
is effective in manipulating implicit memory. In addition, future studies should exam-
ine ways in which to make priming techniques more reliable.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In previous studies (Meerman, Brosschot, Van der Togt, & Verkuil, 2013; Meerman, 
Brosschot, & Verkuil, 2012; Meerman, Verkuil, & Brosschot, 2011) we tested a model of 
symptom reporting that holds that medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) are at least 
partly caused by chronically activated illness-related memory networks- or schemata 
of illness (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004; Rief & Barsky, 2005). The basic rationale is 
that activated illness memory would lead to increased selective attention towards 
bodily signals, which in turn causes increased detection of these signals and increased 
reporting of these signals as symptoms. We have experimentally tested this cognitive 
model of symptom perception by priming healthy participants subliminally with illness-
related words to (temporarily) increase activation of illness-related cognitive memory 
networks and afterwards examined whether this caused a lower pain tolerance 
(Meerman et al., 2011). The results of these studies have, however, been inconsistent. 
In one study we indeed found that pain tolerance was involuntarily decreased by 
activating illness-related memory, but we could not confirm this finding in a subse-
quent replication study (Meerman et al., 2012). The question rose whether our meth-
ods were sufficiently adequate to draw strong conclusions concerning the tenability of 
the illness activation model. We started to suspect that our priming method was 
suboptimal, in that its effects did not last long enough or that the prime stimulus 
duration itself was inadequate. As to the first possibility, several studies have shown 
that behavioral effects of subliminal priming can last for at least the duration of a 
subsequent task, usually several minutes (for example Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; 
Levy et al., 2000), and thus long enough for our purpose. With respect to the second 
possibility, i.e. prime stimulus duration, we used a duration (33 ms) that successfully 
produced effects before (for example, Kiefer, 2002; Levy, 1996; Pierce & Lydon, 1998; 
Lowery et al., 2007) amongst which long-lasting subliminal priming effects of up to 
four days (Lowery et al., 2007). Thus, prime duration is unlikely to have caused the 
negative findings. 
It is theoretically possible that priming does have no prolonged memory effects, 
despite is prolonged behavioral effects. However, several studies have found that 
priming leads to increased memory accessibility of the primed construct (Aarts, 
Custers, & Holland, 2007; see for example Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003). Our current 
study set out to test whether our subliminal priming task used in our previous studies 
was indeed successful in activating illness memory. If illness-related subliminal primes 
would turn out not to induce prolonged memory effects this could explain our incon-
sistent findings mentioned above, because the priming effects, if any, might be too 
brief to have substantial effect on symptom reports.  
Since our two previous priming studies (Meerman et al., 2012, 2011) yielded incon-
sistent results, we conducted a third study using another paradigm, namely an evalua-
tive conditioning paradigm, in which illness memory (illness schema) and self-schema 
was simultaneously activated. With this paradigm we aimed to investigate whether 
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symptom reporting would be more strongly affected when illness schema was repeat-
edly coactivated or ‘enmeshed’ with the self-schema (as suggested by Pincus & Morley, 
2001). However, we did not find that such a simultaneous subliminal priming by self- 
and illness-stimuli increased symptom reporting. The question that remained was 
whether we actually succeeded in temporarily associating self with illness information. 
However, several other studies were successful in increasing the association of the self 
with another concept (e.g. Dijksterhuis, 2004; Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003). 
Dijksterhuis (2004) verified the strengthened association between self and positive 
trait terms (thus temporarily increasing ‘self esteem’) by use of the Implicit Associa-
tion Test (IAT, see below). In the current study we aimed to do the same for the 
association between self and illness.  
In conclusion, two out of our three priming studies using either subliminal priming 
or subliminal evaluative conditioning, did not show support for the hypothesis that 
illness-schemata cause increases in symptom reporting. However, it is unclear whether 
this is due to a faulty model or due to the subliminal priming techniques being unrelia-
ble in temporarily activating the illness-related schemata. In the current studies, we 
first attempted to validate whether the paradigm for subliminal priming that we used 
in our previous studies and that is commonly used to prime behavior in social psycho-
logical studies, was actually effective in activating semantic memory networks for at 
least several minutes. This was done using a lexical decision task, which is a standard 
test to measure spreading of activation of across specified memory content. In the 
second part of the study we attempted to validate whether the subliminal evaluative 
conditioning was effective in creating an increased association between the self and 
another concept. We examined the effectiveness of the procedure by administering an 
IAT, which is designed for examining the strength of implicit associations. Our first 
hypothesis was that subliminal priming with illness words causes a significant quicker 
reaction time for illness words on a subsequent lexical decision task due to an activat-
ed illness memory network (study 1). Our second hypothesis was that subliminal 
evaluative conditioning of illness with the self-schema causes quicker reaction times of 
words related to illness and self on a subsequent implicit association task (Greenwald 
& Farnham, 2000; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), indicating a stronger 




Forty-two students from Leiden University participated in the present study. Partici-
pants received either course credits or five Euros for participating. This study was 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Leiden University Institute of Psychological 
Research. Subjects were required to meet the following criteria: no medical disease, 
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Demographics and bio-behavioral variables. We measured only gender, age, Body Mass 
Index (BMI), ethnicity, physical activities, usage of sleeping medication, pain killers or 
tranquilizers in the last 30 days, number of doctor visits in the last 6 months, and 
habits in smoking, coffee and alcohol drinking, drug use, medication use, illnesses, 
history of and current psychological problems.  
Experimental manipulation: subliminal priming task 
Prime words. Participants were randomly assigned to two different conditions, with 
prime words describing either (a) Health Complaints (HC), to activate an illness-
related schema, or a control category: (b) neutral (NEU) words. Appendix A shows the 
prime words that were used in the current study. These words were also used in our 
previous study (Meerman et al., 2012). The categories contained 10 words and did not 
differ in number of syllables, length and frequency in the Dutch language In every 
prime condition the 10 prime words were shown randomly 10 times, thus a total of 100 
trials.  
Priming task. The priming task was exactly the same as in our previous study (Meerman 
et al., 2012). The priming task was performed immediately before the lexical decision 
task. The priming manipulation was a variation of a common paradigm in which partic-
ipants judge as quickly and accurately as possible whether briefly flashed letter strings 
appear on the right or left side of a computer monitor (Lowery et al., 2007). The 
present subliminal priming task consisted of a simple computer task presented to the 
participants as a reaction time task. For each trial of the task, a fixation cross with a 
random duration of 500-1000 ms, appeared in the center of the screen. Students were 
then exposed to the prime word (33 ms), and immediately after a string of XXX’s that 
served as a backward mask for the prime word. The prime word and mask appeared on 
either the right or left side of the screen, in the parafoveal region [at a ˚2 degree 
visual angle (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000)]. Participants indicated with the arrow keys 
what the position was of the XXX’s. Each trial was separated by a 500 ms interval in 
which the screen was blank. Stimuli were presented on a personal computer using the 
E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
Lexical decision task (LDT) 
The LDT (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) took place after participants were exposed to 
all the subliminal primes. Participants were told to identify, as quickly as possible, 
whether or not each character string is an actual Dutch word by pressing the arrow 
keys. Prior to the task, participants had ten practice trials (five words and five 
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non-words), in which all word stimuli were neutral. Subsequently, 28 different words 
and 28 non-words were randomly shown. The non-words were neutral words of which 
several letters were mixed up. The words consisted of seven illness words (e.g. ‘infec-
tion’, ‘coughing’), seven negative valence words (‘coward’, ‘vulgar’) and 14 neutral 
words (e.g. ‘art’, ‘child’). The words were matched on syllable, length and frequency. 
The onset of each trial was marked by a cross (+), which served as a fixation point. 
After 500 ms latency, the fixation point was replaced by a character string. The 
stimulus item disappeared after the participant responds. 
Neutralizing priming task 
For ethical reasons, the last task of the experiment contains a subliminal priming task 
with originally neutral prime words. This priming was done to avoid a long-term impact 
of the subliminal priming task with illness related words.  
Awareness checks 
To see if participants during the experiment were aware of the fact that they were 
subliminally primed, two different methods were used to check whether participants 
were able to detect prime words. After participants were primed and had done the 
LDT, they had to fill in a questionnaire with increasingly specific questions about the 
research purpose and suspicions. The questionnaire contained the following questions: 
‘What do you think what the purpose was of this study?’ ‘Have you noticed something 
special in the computer tasks?’ ‘Do you think something has influenced your perfor-
mance on the computer tasks?’ When the answers of the participants do not contain 
information about subliminal priming it can be assumed that the participants were not 
aware of the fact that they were subliminally primed. After this questionnaire the 
participant is explained that he/she is subliminally primed and that in the next com-
puter task the same is going to happen. The participant is told that words are being 
represented and that he/she must try to guess what they are. If the participant is not 
able to guess any of the words, it is safe to say that the subliminal presentation has 
been achieved (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  
Procedure 
Participants were recruited personally by the researcher (E.E.M) at the Leiden Univer-
sity. Before they actually participated in the study they were informed that the exper-
iment consisted of different computer tasks, but they were not informed about the 
subliminal priming. After the introduction and screening, participants signed an in-
formed consent. This informed the student that the purpose of the study is to get 
information about study skills (which served as a cover story) and reaction times. 
Participants were tested by an experimenter who was kept blind about the random 
assignment of the participants.  
The participants completed four different computer tasks. The first computer task 
consisted of different questionnaires. The second computer task consisted of a ques-
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tionnaire about study skills (cover story), followed by the subliminal priming task. The 
third computer task consisted of the LDT were participants had to decide as quickly as 
possible if it was an existing word or a nonsense word. The participants then complet-
ed the awareness checks, followed by the neutralizing priming task. After the experi-
ment, participants were informed about the subliminal priming tasks and the true 
purpose of the study and received money or credits for participating in the experi-
ment. 
Data analyses 
We used a repeated measures ANOVA with priming condition as the between-subjects 
factors (neutral, and illness) as the independent variables. The LDT reaction time 
measures for the illness words and for the negative control words were the dependent 
variables. We report the two-tailed p value.  
Results 
Participants that were excluded were: with disease (n = 3), medication use (n = 3), 
used alcohol on day of experiment (n =1). A total of 36 participants remained for the 
analyses. Reaction times of correct answers to the illness words and negative control 
words were analyzed. Data was checked for outliers (also within subject), homogeneity 
of variance and normality. 
Participants reacted in general quicker on the illness related words (M RT = 606.00, 
SE = 15.06) compared to the other negative control words (M RT = 694.16, SE = 22.81), 
F(1,33) = 21.951, p = .000,  p
  = .399 (see Figure 5-1). However, participants in the illness 
priming condition did not significantly react quicker to the illness words (M RT = 
592.86, SE = 21.61) compared to the negative control words (M RT = 619.13, SE = 
21.00), F(1,33) =.151, p = .701,  p
  = .005. In addition, the illness priming did not influ-
ence the reaction times in general, F(1,33) = .989, p = .327,  p
  
 = .029. 
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Several of the demographic variables were associated with reaction times (RTs) in 
the LDT. However, even adjusting for these covariates, still no effect of priming was 
found on the RT’s, F(1,31) = .489, p = .489,  p
  
 = .016. 
Discussion 
The result of this part of our study do not yield support for our hypothesis that sublim-
inal priming with illness words causes a significant quicker reaction time for illness 
words on a subsequent lexical decision task. This seems to indicate that the subliminal 
priming paradigm used in this and our previous studies was not effective in activating 
illness-related cognitive memory networks, at least not for the time frame used in this 




Twenty-eight healthy students from the Leiden University participated in this study in 
return for either course credits or a small fee (five euros). Participants criteria were: 
be a student, at least 16 years old, native language Dutch, no medical illness, anxiety 
or depression. The following requirements were added to have the same conditions as 
to our previous study: no coffee or painkillers intake on the day of the experiment, 
and no smoking one hour before participation (Meerman et al.,2013). 
Figure 5-1. Average reaction time per word category and priming group 
 
 




Demographics and bio-behavioral variables. The same variables were measured as in 
study 1. 
Experimental manipulation: Subliminal evaluative conditioning (SEC) task  
We used the exact same task as our previous SEC study (Meerman et al., 2013). In the 
present study the subliminal evaluative conditioning consists of a simple computer task 
during which words were shown for a short duration (33 ms), followed by a ‘mask’ to 
abolish any afterimage. For each trial of the task, a row of Xs, with a random duration 
of 500 ms, appeared in the center of the screen. Because in our previous study 
(Meerman et al., 2013) some of the primes were shown for 33 ms and some were 
shown for 17 ms, in this study we made sure that all primes were shown for 33 ms. 
Participants were subliminally exposed to either a self-referring word “I” or a nonself-
referring word “X” paired with illness words. Illness words were similar to the words in 
Study 1 and our previous studies (Appendix A). A string of random letters served as a 
backward mask for the prime words, and the participants were asked to decide as 
quickly as possible whether the letter string started with a vowel or consonant. The 
trials were presented in random order, the ten prime word pairings were shown 
randomly ten times, thus a total of 100 trials. The prime words and masks appeared in 
black in the center of the white screen. Each trial was separated by a 1000 ms interval 
in which the screen was blank. Participants were randomly assigned over the two 
different conditions (I+illness or X+illness). Stimuli were presented on a personal 
computer using the E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
Implicit Association task (IAT) 
In the implicit association task the participants were asked to sort words according to 
their category. The categories were either self vs. others, or healthy vs. sick. The 
target labels were ‘self’ and ‘other’, and the attribute labels were “healthy” and 
“sick”. Each category consisted of five stimuli (see Appendix B). Words appeared in 
random order in the middle of a computer screen and participants were instructed to 
sort them with a left response or right response key (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 
2003; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). In the instructions participants were told 
that the words only belonged to one category. Participants were also told they had to 
work as quickly and as accurately as possible and if they were too slow or made too 
many mistakes, it would result in non-interpretable scores. Participants were instruct-
ed to keep their fingers on the response keys, in order to react as quickly as possible. 
In addition, after each block they received feedback whether their average reaction 
speed was fast enough (below 5000 ms), or if they had to increase their speed. A 
fixation cross (+) appeared in the middle of the screen for 150 ms. The words were 
shown either in white or green, corresponding to the color that the associated label 
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was shown in. The stimulus word remained on the screen until a categorization had 
been made. If the participants made a wrong response a red X would appear, and the 
participants had to make the correct response in order to continue. Trials were sepa-
rated by blank screens of 150 ms. The IAT procedure uses five blocks, and in each 
block the stimuli are shown in random order. First, participants discriminate between 
self (left) and other (right) with each item shown twice and in random order, thus in 
total twenty trials (block 1). Then participants were asked to discriminate between 
sick (left) and (health), also in twenty random trials (block 2). In blocks 3 and 4, 
participants were shown the combined two categories. Block 3 consisted of twenty 
practice trials and Block 4 consisted of forty critical trials. In block 5 participants were 
asked to discriminate again between health (left) and sick (right), but this time the 
categories switched sides (20 trials). In block 6 and 7, participants were shown the 
combined two categories again, with the self and health on the left, and other and 
sick on the right. Block 6 were 20 practice trials and block 7 were 40 critical trials. 
Category labels were displayed on the left and right sides of the window (and re-
mained there during the complete block). Half of the participants followed the speci-
fied order described above (block 1 through block 7). The other half of the participants 
started with block 1, then block 5 through 7, followed by block 2 through 4. Thus, they 
first started with the self and healthy on the left side, and later switched to self and 
sick on the left side. 
Positive evaluative conditioning task 
This task was used, out of ethical considerations, at the end of the procedure to 
cancel out any possible negative effects of the first evaluative conditioning task, in 
which the self was paired with health complaints. In this task only the word “I” was 
paired with positive health words. 
Procedure  
Participants read the information sheet and began with the questionnaires, followed 
by a ten minute questionnaire about their study skills, to mask the goal of the experi-
ment. Next, they moved on to the subliminal evaluative conditioning task. During the 
subliminal evaluative conditioning task, participants were asked to react as quickly as 
possible to the question whether a string of random letters starts with a vowel or not 
(the backward mask). The IAT began immediately after the conditioning task. The 
participants finished with the positive subliminal evaluative conditioning task where 
“I” was paired with good health words like vital, healthy and fit. In the end, the true 
nature of the experiment was revealed through a debriefing.  
Results 
Participants that were excluded were: with disease (n = 1), computer crashed during 
IAT (n = 1). A total of 26 participants remained for the analyses, with 14 participants in 
the “I”+illness group and 12 participants in the “X”+illness group. We used the im-
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proved scoring algorithm of the D-measure as proposed by Greenwald et al., (2003) 
that uses the reaction times of the practice blocks 3 and 6 as well to analyze the IAT 
data. We used the D1 measure in which trials with reaction times above 10,000 ms are 
discarded. This D measure also uses the reaction times of erroneous responses by 
adding the reaction time of the duration of correcting the response to the duration of 
the initial erroneous response (Greenwald et al., 2003; Nosek et al., 2005). The D-
measure divides the difference between average reaction times between two blocks by 
the standard deviation of all the reaction times in the two test blocks and therefore 
adjusts for differences between means because of underlying variability (Greenwald et 
al., 2003). Data was checked for outliers (also within subject), homogeneity of vari-
ance and normality. 
The average of the D1-measure over the whole group was negative, which means 
that most participants seemed to have stronger associations of the self with healthy 
words compared to sickness related words (M =-.39, SE = .06). However, no significant 
difference was found between the “I” + illness group (M = -.43, SE = .08) and the “X” + 
illness group (M =-.35, SE = .09), F(1,24) = .52, p = .48,  p
   = .02. As with study 1, we 
used stepwise regression analyses to select the two strongest predictors for the d’-
measure to examine the difference of the adjusted means for the two groups. Howev-
er, the adjusted means between the groups did not differ, F(1,22) = 1.11, p = .30,  p
   = 
.05. 
Discussion 
The results of the second study did not support our second hypothesis that subliminal 
evaluative conditioning of illness with self-referent stimuli causes quicker reaction 
times of words related to illness and self on a subsequent implicit association task. 
This means that the subliminal evaluative conditioning technique used in our previous 
study did not create a stronger association between the self and illness. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
The current studies were carried out to test the validity of two priming methods to 
temporarily increase illness memory. These tests are important for at least two rea-
sons. First, the outcome will help to determine whether our previous negative findings 
with these methods (Meerman et al., 2013) represent a true disconfirmation of the 
hypotheses that activated illness memory causes increased symptom reporting 
(Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004), or method failure instead. Second, the outcome can 
potentially have consequences for understanding prolonged behavioral effects of 
subliminal priming that have repeatedly been found in other areas, especially in social 
psychology (for example, Refs. Kiefer, 2002; Levy, 1996; Pierce & Lydon, 1998; Lowery 
et al., 2007). Thus, we examined whether subliminal priming with illness stimuli did 
indeed activate illness memory, using a lexical decision task (LDT). We also examined 
whether subliminal evaluative conditioning technique in which ‘self’ is associated with 
‘illness’ actually showed the supposed manipulation effect, which is increased implicit 
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association between self-schema and illness-related schema using an implicit associa-
tion task (IAT). The results of the first study showed that the subliminal priming 
technique did not result in significantly quicker responses on illness words on a LDT 
compared to neutral words. The second study showed that the subliminal evaluative 
conditioning technique did also not result in quicker reaction times for the word “I” in 
combination with illness related words in an IAT. Given that these tasks are standard 
tasks within psychological research to examine the cognitive phenomena in question; 
these findings lead us to conclude that these priming methods are unfit to increase 
illness memory or increase associations between the self and illness. This implies that 
our previous studies failed to find effects of these methods on symptom reporting (i.e. 
pain tolerance) do not falsify the hypothesis that activated illness memory can in-
crease symptom reporting, since we it is unlikely that we have actually activated 
illness memory in the first place.  
We set out using these widely used methods in our previous studies trusting that 
they would induce the supposed memory activation. That they do not do so is surpris-
ing given their broad use in psychology and the vast range of behavioral findings. This 
brings us to the second implication of our finding. Does the failure of these methods 
mean that the broadly published behavioral findings are not caused by activated 
memory? Is it possible that they lead to triggering behavioral programs on a lower, 
motoric level without having substantial effect on memory? It is perhaps too early to 
ask these questions. First, it is theoretically possible, though not likely, that the 
supposed memory effects may still be found for other content than illness related 
content. Second, it should be noted that this study was conducted in a small group 
sample. Nonetheless, these priming techniques should have a large and stable effect, 
and as mentioned, many studies have used the same techniques for manipulating 
various schemata and affect. Thus, again, the conclusion seems warranted that the use 
of the priming techniques as used in our studies as ell s these other studies was not, 
contrary to our expectations, manipulating illness-related schemata at all, at least not 
during the time frame in which the found behavioral effects are usually found.  
In conclusion, our finding that subliminal priming and evaluative conditioning con-
cerning illness information did not activate illness memory may reflect a more general 
failure to support priming as a basic phenomenon. We would like to stress that future 
studies using a priming technique, whether it is subliminal or supraliminal priming, 
should always include a manipulation check to ensure that the technique indeed 
resulted in the expected manipulation of memory.  
Finally, and in a way sadly, the results of this current study imply that we have not 
yet adequately tested yet whether the hypothesis that illness-related cognitive 
memory network causes increased symptom reporting because the subliminal priming 
techniques did not temporarily activate the illness-related schemata. We derive some 
solace though from the fact that our studies contributes at least to a better under-
standing of the phenomena priming.  
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Appendix B: Words used in the IAT 
Self: eigen (“self”), ik (“I”), mezelf (“myself”), mijn (“mine”), zelf (“self”). 
Other: ander (“other”), hun (“them”), jullie (“you”), zij (“they”), zijzelf (“them-
selves”). 
Healthy: fit (“physically fit”), vitaal (“vigorous”) , blakend (“healthy”), energiek 
(“energetic”), sterk (“strong”). 
Sick: onwel (“unwell”), beroerd (“nauseous”), kwaal (“ailment”), aandoening 
(“illness”), pijn (“pain”). 
Appendix A. Prime words used in current study. English words are translated from Dutch prime words. 
Neutral Health Complaints 
 “bear”  “allergy” 
 “butterfly”   “asthma” 
 “seal”  “vomiting” 
 “giraffe”  “diarrhea” 
 “gorilla”  “flu” 
 “rhino”  “headache” 
 “panda”  “fever” 
 “turtle”  “heartburn” 
 “chimpanzee”  “inflammation” 
 “squirrel”  “wound” 
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ABSTRACT 
Somatic complaints are common and form a major burden. Previous studies suggested 
that such complaints might be increased by ‘illness-related memory’, for example due 
to worries about health. In this ambulatory study we tested whether we could de-
crease somatic complaints through enhancing the activation of health-related memory 
by a ‘positive health’-priming intervention. Forty-three students were randomly 
assigned to the ‘positive health’-group or a control group. Using online measures, 
participants reported negative affect (NA) and somatic complaints for a period of six 
days, while each morning performing the priming task. The intervention caused a 
decrease in somatic complaints but only for participants with low trait NA or low 
somatosensory amplification. 
These findings seem to suggest that priming or other interventions directed at acti-
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OBJECTIVE 
Medically unexplained somatic complaints are complaints that cannot be attributed to 
organic pathology. They represent a common category of complaints in health care 
(Brown, 2004). At least one third of complaints in primary care are medically unex-
plained (e.g. 37% in Khan et al., 2003). In a survey from 2002, 96% of the individuals 
reported to have experienced at least one complaint in the last 30 days, with musculo-
skeletal pain, pseudo-neurological and gastrointestinal problems as the most reported 
complaints (Ihlebaek et al., 2002). Although many of these complaints are not serious 
and most people do not seek medical help for them, they are the most frequent reason 
for doctor visits and they account for a large number of long-term sickness compensa-
tion and permanent inability to work (Eriksen et al., 1998). Moreover, these somatic 
complaints and self-rated health (SRH) significantly predict mortality better compared 
to objective measurements of health (Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Sha et al., 2005). 
Importantly, MUS also occur in some people with medically ‘explained’ conditions, if 
the complaints are more severe than regarded as reasonable (Eriksen et al., 1998). In 
conclusion, it follows that if we could reduce the number of somatic complaints, it 
would not only benefit the individual’s well-being, but it could also reduce our health 
care costs significantly because the number of unnecessary doctor visits would de-
crease.  
Numerous theoretical models exist that try to explain the cause of somatic com-
plaints without any organic pathology. Some have suggested that cognitive processes 
such as illness-related attention and illness-related memory networks can cause 
normal bodily signals to be perceived as a somatic complaint (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 
2004; Pennebaker, 1982b). Normally, people remain unaware of most bodily processes 
and signals. However, periodically some bodily signals and sensations are brought to 
our awareness due to changes in these cognitive processes (Pennebaker, 1982b).  
With regard to attentional processes, several studies have linked reporting of so-
matic complaints to increased attention to bodily sensations or external cues related 
to illness (see, e.g. Barsky et al., 1988; Cioffi, 1991; Pennebaker, 1982b). Generally, 
people appear to report more somatic complaints when internal cues or bodily signals 
get more attention compared to external cues (Pennebaker, 1982b). Some people 
seem to report more complaints because they tend to amplify benign somatic sensa-
tions, and misattribute those to a serious illness (Somatosensory amplification theory, 
see Barsky et al., 1988). Attentional processes might on their turn be influenced by 
negative affect (NA). People with high NA tend to have more somatic complaints 
because they might focus more on internal physical sensations (Watson et al., 1988), 
possibly in conjunction with a heightened self-focus (the so called “joint impact 
hypothesis” see Gendolla, Abele, Andrei, Spurk, & Richter, 2005). This increased 
attention to bodily signals and illness information has been suggested to be caused by 
the (over-) activation of illness-related thoughts or (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004; Rief 
& Barsky, 2005; Skelton & Strohmetz, 1990). Illness-related memory networks would 
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cause increased detection of and selective attention towards bodily signals, and 
increased interpretation and reporting of them as somatic complaints. The more 
trained and consolidated this memory network becomes, possibly because people keep 
on worrying about their health, the easier and more frequently it will be triggered by 
associated stimuli. In turn, it becomes more likely that bodily sensations are misinter-
preted as signs of illness (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004; Pincus & Morley, 2001).  
While numerous studies have demonstrated an association of somatic complaints 
with selective attention (e.g. see studies in Kolk et al., 2002), only few studies have 
tested the association with illness related memory, or more specifically whether 
activation of an illness or pain related network in memory actually causes somatic 
complaints. A recent study found the expected association between severity of somat-
ic complaints and SRH with a better memory for health-related information (Verkuil et 
al., 2007). In addition, a few studies that used a method called ‘priming’ to activate 
implicit memory networks, found indirect support for the theory that illness-related 
memory might cause participants to report more health complaints. Priming tasks are 
designed to investigate the influence of implicit (or unconscious) memory, without 
necessitating conscious retrieval processes as opposed to conventional memory 
measures (Crano & Brewer, 2002). Priming produces, for a certain amount of time, a 
level of activation or accessibility of a memory representation comparable to a chron-
ic, long-term process (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). For example, Skelton, and Strohmetz 
(1990) showed earlier that participants reported more (general) somatic complaints on 
a complaint checklist after they had performed a task in which they had to make 
comparative judgments about the meaning of health related words (Skelton & 
Strohmetz, 1990). This task presumably activated their illness memory. Others found 
that pictures illustrating physical suffering, which also presumably activate pain or 
illness memory, cause people to report lower pain tolerance and pain intensity (De 
Wied & Verbaten, 2001; Godinho et al., 2006). These effects could have been due to 
experimental demands created by a too evident presentation of illness information. 
However, in a recent study, this possibility was circumvented by presenting illness 
related words using subliminal priming, which is a common technique to activate 
cognitive memory networks without conscious awareness, by using stimuli that were 
not consciously perceived by the participants. This study found that subliminal priming 
with illness related words resulted in lower pain tolerance as well (Meerman et al., 
2011).  
Taken together, although most research has focused on increased attention and 
reporting of somatic complaints, it seems there is also evidence for activated illness 
memory being involved in the reporting of somatic complaints. As argued above, an 
activated illness memory might be crucial in the production of somatic complaints in 
that it determines attentional and interpretational processes. Two important questions 
arise: can an activated illness memory influence symptom complaints over the course 
of several days outside the laboratory? And can the effects of activated illness memo-
ries on health complaints be reversed by using a positive health priming intervention? 
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(In real life negatively influencing illness memory is unethical). In contrast to activated 
illness memory, activated positive health-related memory could hypothetically reduce 
complaints. Thus, our goal was to attempt to cause the positive health memory net-
work to become more activated, which would result in less somatic complaints. We 
therefore, designed an intervention in which the memory networks of positive health 
were repeatedly primed during six days, and we tested whether it improved subjective 
health using a daily diary method. This study is thus an extension of the previous 
experimental study that found that subliminal illness-related words caused lower pain 
tolerance (Meerman et al., 2011), but the current study uses ‘positive’ priming in-
stead, and real life measurements, to investigate the effect of changing illness-related 
memory networks on the reporting of somatic complaints. The intervention was deliv-
ered via internet. Our hypothesis was those participants who were primed with posi-
tive health words would report less, and less severe, somatic complaints and would 
have a higher SRH compared to participants that were primed with neutral words.  
Because of the established role of negative affectivity, somatic amplification, and 
possibly health worry on the reporting of somatic complaints, we measured whether 
the intervention would be more effective in subgroups scoring high on these traits. 
DESIGN 
Participants 
Students of Leiden University participated in this online study for either course credits 
or money (5 euro). The students could participate if they had a good internet connec-
tion at home, and if they were at least 16 years of age, native Dutch-speaking, and did 
not have any somatic illness, anxiety or depression. The ethics committee of the 
Psychology Department of Leiden University approved this study. The number of 
participants that agreed to participate in this study was 55. Participants who only 
filled in the baseline measures but did not complete at least one diary measure (n = 8) 
and participants that did not complete the baseline questionnaires (n = 4) were ex-
cluded from the analyses. So, a total of 43 participants remained for analyses. 
Procedure 
The study was registered over the internet. Participants were asked to read the 
informed consent and agree to participate. To mask the primary goal of the study 
(reducing somatic complaints via a priming task), we presented this study as having 
two different goals; the first goal was ‘to examine the effect of sleep on certain 
cognitive tasks’ (fake) and the second goal was ‘to study the effect of worrying on 
health’ (true). We did not explain the true primary goal of the experiment to prevent 
socially desirable responses. On the first day of the experiment, participants filled in 
the baseline measures and were randomly assigned to either the neutral or positive 
priming group. The next morning, just after waking up, the participants were request-
ed to complete the morning measures (SRH see below) and they ended with the prim-
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ing task. Then in the evening, before bedtime they filled in the first set of evening 
measures, which included our primary outcome measures (Somatic measures & PANAS, 
see below). After the evening measure on day 6, the participants received the link 
with an ‘awareness questionnaire’ (see below) and the debriefing. During the debrief-
ing the actual goal of this study was explained and the participants were again asked 
for their permission to use their data. 
Materials 
Experimental manipulation: Positive health priming task 
Positive versus neutral health priming was done in two ways: in the first four days by a 
scrambled sentence task, and in the last two days, another task was presented – 
reading newspaper stories – to prevent the subjects from getting weary or bored by the 
first task and to prevent the participants figuring out the purpose of the study. We 
presented the priming tasks to the participants as a cognitive task in order to prevent 
awareness of the priming.  
Scrambled sentence task 
A frequently used task to assess the influence of implicit memory processes is the 
scrambled sentence task. In this task, participants are fully aware of the priming 
stimuli, but they are unaware of the underlying concept that the experimenters are 
trying to investigate (which is also referred to as supraliminal priming). During the 
task, participants are told to make grammatically correct sentences out of a random 
string of words, and meanwhile they are being exposed to words related to the con-
cept that the experimenter is trying to investigate. Afterwards, the effect of this 
implicit memory construct activated by the scrambled sentence task is assessed on a 
subsequent task (Crano & Brewer, 2002).  
Our scrambled sentence task was an adapted version of a task used in a well-known 
study and has been used in many studies since (Srull & Wyer, 1979). The scrambled 
sentence task consisted of 15 sentences each, and each sentence consisted of five 
words in a scrambled order (Srull & Wyer, 1979). In the positive priming group, 10 out 
of the 15 sentences contained positive health words (‘[physically] fit’, ‘healthy’, ‘in 
good health’, ‘lusty’, ‘energetic’, ‘still keen’, ‘strong’, ‘well’, ‘lively/ brisk’, ‘vigor-
ous’). In the neutral priming group we used different words each day, for example 
‘computer’, ‘bicycle’, ‘important’. Every day a new version of the scrambled sentence 
task was given, however the 10 positive words remained the same across the different 
versions for the positive group. The participants were instructed to make a grammati-
cally correct sentence with four of the five words.  
News story task 
During the last two days, participants were asked to read two stories that were used to 
prime them. For the positive health group, one of the two newspaper stories was 
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related to some positive health aspect (e.g. a new hotel focusing on health, or a story 
about wellness). The other newspaper stories were of a neutral content (such as 
finances). The participants were asked to read the newspaper stories and they were 
told that at the end of the study some questions would be asked about the stories. 
Stories have been used before in other studies to accomplish priming (see, e.g. 
Charash & McKay, 2002). 
Awareness checks 
In order to check whether the participants were indeed unaware of the priming proce-
dure, we checked just before the debriefing whether the participants could accurately 
describe the goal of the experiment with a funneled debriefing questionnaire, which 
consisted of increasingly specific questions that were designed to probe for any suspi-
cions regarding the scrambled sentence task and the newspaper stories and their 
purposes (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  
Daily measures 
Somatic health measures 
Perceived health during our experiment was measured in two different ways; with a 
general question about perceived health and with a questionnaire about specific 
health complaints. Every evening the participants were asked to fill in the subjective 
health complaint (SHC) questionnaire (see below for a detailed description of the SHC 
questionnaire) concerning their complaints of that day (resulting in the variables: 
Number of SHC, SHC Severity). In addition, every morning and evening we measured 
general SRH at that moment (SRH morning/SRH evening) (Idler & Benyamini, 1997). 
Participants were asked to rate their current health with a number from 0–10, very 
poor to excellent.  
State NA 
We used both state and trait measures of NA. For the state daily measures, feelings ‘of 
that day’ were reported on the PANAS in the evening (see below for a description of 
the questionnaire). 
Baseline measures 
The following questionnaires were used to assess any imbalances in baseline character-
istics across the two intervention groups. 
Sociodemographics 
We measured gender, age, body mass index, ethnicity, physical activities, usage of 
sleeping medication, pain killers or tranquilizers in the last 30 days, number of doctor 
visits in the last six months, smoking and drinking habits, drug use, medication use, 
illnesses, history of and current psychological problems. 
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Somatic health before the intervention 
Specific SHCs were measured with the SHC Questionnaire (Eriksen et al., 1999). The 
SHC Questionnaire is a 29- item self-report questionnaire that reliably measures the 
number and severity of SHCs experienced in the normal population. Severity of each 
complaint is rated on a four-point scale (0–3). In this study, we used a slightly adapted 
version of the SHC that assessed complaints experienced during the last three days 
(baseline measure) or during the past day (daily measure) (Brosschot & Van der Doef, 
2006). To create a baseline assessment of somatic complaints, we created the follow-
ing variable: the sum of the number of health complaints experienced in the last three 
days (Number of SHC-3). The items about depression and anxiety were disregarded for 
our analyses, just like in our previous studies (Brosschot & Van der Doef, 2006; Verkuil, 
Brosschot, Meerman, & Thayer, 2012). 
Health worry before the intervention 
Complaint-specific worry was assessed by asking to what extent participants had been 
worrying about a complaint for each of the 29 complaints on the SHC Questionnaire. 
They indicated on four-point scale (0–3) how much they had worried about that specif-
ic complaint during the last three days. The sum of the number of complaints that 
participants had worried about (Number of SHC-3 Worries) was used as an index of the 
amount of health worry experienced before the intervention. 
Trait NA 
We assessed trait NA at baseline. The Dutch trait version of the Positive Affect and NA 
Schedule (PANAS) consists of 10 positive (positive affectivity) and 10 negative adjec-
tives (NA). Participants indicate on a 5-point scale (1–5) the extent to which the items 
apply to how they generally feel in normal daily life. The reliability and construct 
validity of the PANAS have been documented (Engelen et al., 2006, Dutch translation; 
Watson et al., 1988). Cronbach’s α in the present study for this entire questionnaire 
was 0.76, and for the subscales NA and PA it was 0.88 and 0.72, respectively. 
Somatosensory Amplification 
We used the Somatosensory Amplification Scale (SSAS) to measure the extent to which 
an individual is likely to report enhanced perception of physical signals (Barsky et al., 
1988; Speckens, Spinhoven, Sloekers, Bolk, & Van Hemert, 1996). This scale comprises 




Variables with skewed distributions were transformed, including the dependent varia-
ble Number of SHC, which was log transformed. If none of the transformations worked 
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to normalize the distributions of a variable, we used the transformed version, which 
were non-normal albeit, ‘more normal’ than the untransformed versions. Univariate 
outliers were identified as lower of higher than z-scores at the p < 0.001 value. 
Data analyses 
Baseline data were compared across the intervention and control group by using 
chisquare tests for binary data and simple t-tests for the continuous data. A two-level 
multilevel model using maximum likelihood technique assessed the effects of the 
intervention on somatic complaints, with the repeated measures nested within partici-
pants (the above described daily measures) as the first level and the between subject 
measures (the above described baseline measures) as the second level (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). The variable coding of the two experimental groups was considered a 
fixed predictor at the second level too rather than specifying it at an additional third 
level (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The intra-class correlation (ICC) for Number of SHC 
was 0.61, showing that 61% of the variance was due to individual differences between 
participants, relative to differences within the participants, thereby providing evi-
dence for a two-level hierarchical structure of the data. The ICC for the other depend-
ent variables ranged from 0.26 to 0.71. We used a diagonal covariance structure for 
the repeated measures, since it resulted in the best fit. Next, we checked the random 
coefficients for the variable time of the following models: random intercept, random 
slope and random intercept and slope. We chose to work with the random intercept 
model, since this model showed the lowest Akaike Information Criterion (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). All independent variables were centered around their grand mean to 
make interpretation of the results easier. To test whether the positive priming inter-
vention reduced health complaints, we looked at the intervention effects on both the 
number and severity of somatic complaints (Number of SHC and SHC Severity) and SRH. 
All analyses were performed with SPSS, version 17 (PASW). Two-tailed probability tests 
are reported with α = 0.05. 
Model building 
The first step was to estimate fixed effects for the intervention groups on the 
measures of health (Hypothesis 1). We started with the model that included the terms 
for intervention group (2nd level), time (1st level) and group-by-time interaction. If 
the time effect or group-by-time interaction was significant, the response (linear 
trend) was more precisely examined by including the quadratic or cubic trend. If these 
were non-significant, they were removed again. The terms of interest were the main 
effect of intervention group and the group-by-time interaction. Because the factor 
type of priming (i.e. the embedded task in the first four days versus newspaper text in 
the last two days, see above) and the factor time highly correlated (r = .81), we 
decided to exclude priming type from the analyses to prevent multicollinearity 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
 
 




The mean age of the participants was 22.27 years (SD = 5.66; range 18–50) and 88.8% 
was female. All baseline characteristics did not differ between the two groups, except 
for ethnicity. The intervention group had a significantly lower rate of Dutch ethnicity 
participants (80%) compared to the control group (100%) (Fisher’s exact test, p =.031).  
The diary method yielded 214 measurement occasions in the 43 participants. Par-
ticipants experienced on average 2.82 complaints per day (SD = 2.77) with a mean of 
1.03 (SD = 0.50) severity per complaint. The average health rating in the morning was 
7.38 (SD = 1.32) and in the evening was 7.43 (SD = 1.26). The average level of experi-
enced NA was 2.97 (SD = 4.01).  
Awareness checks  
None of the participants showed awareness of the priming procedure on the funneled 
awareness questionnaire.  
Intervention effects on somatic complaints  
The number of somatic complaints (Number of SHC) sharply decreased over the first 
three days and then slowly increased again (linear trend was significant originally, 
however became non significant after adding quadratic and cubic time trends; time 
quadratic trend, β = 0.138, p =.002, 95% CI: 0.053 to 0.222; time cubic trend, β = -
0.261, p =.024, 95% CI: -0.487 to -0.035), but this was similar for both the intervention 
and the control group. Overall, the intervention group did not report less somatic 
complaints than the control group. The same results were found for SHC Severity. 
Controlling for the imbalance of ethnicity across the groups did not change these 
results. No significant changes over time or group differences were found for SRH in 
the evening.  
Negative affectivity, somatic amplification and baseline complaints  
We examined whether the intervention was effective for people scoring high on one of 
the following baseline variables; on SHC in the three days preceding the study (Number 
of SHC-3, M = 5.67, SD = 3.04), worries about these complaints (Number of SHC-3 
Worries, M = 2.42, SD = 2.88), trait NA (M = 16.47, SD = 5.06) or on SSAS (M = 22.84, SD 
= 6.08). For simplicity, we checked for each of these factors one by one in different 
models by adding the main effect and interactions with group and time to the previ-
ously described models. These factors correlated only moderately (range of correla-
tions 0.07–0.41), and were thus reasonably independent. As expected, the intervention 
effect on Number of SHC, but not SHC Severity or SRH, was affected by trait NA, SSAS 
and Number of SHC at baseline. More in detail, trait NA interacted significantly with 
intervention group (F(1, 44.875) = 5.832, p = .020), and it interacted significantly with the 
change over time per group (trait NA   time   group effect, F(1, 102.236) = 4.851, p = 
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.030). We used simple slope tests as illustration of the direction of this interaction. We 
found that for the participants with low trait NA scores ≤ 12 (n = 10) a difference 
started to show, with the intervention group having on average a lower number of 
health complaints compared to the control group (trait NA = 12, β = -0.063, p = .086, 
95% CI: -0.136 to 0.009). This difference between intervention and control group got 
lower significance values with lower trait NA scores. For participants with high trait NA 
≥ 21 (n = 5), the opposite effect started to show, with the intervention group showing 
more SHC compared to the control group (trait NA = 21, β = 0.066, p = .088, 95% CI: -
0.010 to 0.141).  
However, taking the factor time into account, we found differences for partici-
pants with a little less extreme trait NA scores (trait NA ≤ 13 and trait NA ≥ 19 versus 
the above mentioned trait NA ≤ 12 and trait NA ≥ 21). The interaction effect between 
NA and group was not found at the first couple of days, but started to first show at day 
5. We found that at day 5 and day 6, the low trait NA group (trait NA ≤ 13, n = 14) 
showed (marginally) significantly less health complaints in the intervention versus 
control group (trait NA = 13, day 5, β = -0.065, p = .058, 95% CI: -0.002 to 0.132; day 6, 
β = -0.076, p = .039, 95% CI: 0.004 to 0.149). While the high trait NA group (trait NA ≥ 
19, n = 14) started to show a marginal trend at the last day, which was the opposite: 
they showed marginally more health complaints in the intervention versus control 
group (trait NA = 19, day 6, β = 0.060, p = .091, 95% CI: -0.010 to 0.130). Figure 6-1 
shows the intervention effect over days using a median split to create two groups 
based on NA (high and low). It should be noted that in this figure, using all partici-
pants, the differences seem to diminish at day 5. This was not the case for the simple 
slope analyses using the high and low scores. 
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A similar interaction was also found between SSAS with group, albeit marginally 
significant (F(1, 41.386) = 3.769, p = .059). Although these interaction effects were 
significant with the continuous scale of SSAS over the whole group, we used simple 
slope tests with high and low values as illustration of the direction of this interaction. 
Further exploration revealed that the difference between the intervention and control 
group started to marginally show at SSAS ≤ 17 (n = 7) but this difference between 
intervention and control group got lower significance values with lower SSAS scores. 
Again contrary to the hypothesis – these participants with the lowest SSAS scores in the 
intervention group did show a marginal significant lower Number of SHC compared to 
the control group (β = -0.692, p = .092, 95% CI: -1.506 to 0.118). No difference in 
Figure 6-1. Group effects on the average daily number of subjective health 
complaints (SHC) for the lowest and highest 50% on trait negative affect (NA) 
Error bars: +/- 1 SE 
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pants with higher SSAS scores. Figure 6-2 shows the intervention effect over days using 
a median split to create two groups based on SSAS (high and low).  
Finally, interactions were found between the variable Number of SHC-3 at baseline 
with group (marginally significant) and group   time (respectively, F(1, 39.568) = 4.005, p 
= .052 and F(1, 88.033) = 5.978, p = .016). Only in the intervention group, a significant 
effect of Number of SHC-3 at baseline on Number of SHC was found, starting at day 1: 
the higher Number of SHC-3 at baseline, the higher Number of SHC during the study (β 
= 1.556, p =.000, 95% CI: 0.816 to 2.296). The control group started to show the same 
effect of Number of SHC at day 3 (β = 0.969, p = .014, 95% CI: 0.198 to 1.741). This 
effect seemed to gradually become stronger.  
Adjusting for the imbalance of ethnicity across the groups did not affect the above 
results with NA, SSAS and SHC-3.  
Positive bias reporting or positive mood? 
In order to determine whether the intervention effect found for the low trait NA group 
and low SSAS group was perhaps due to a general positive reporting bias or to positive 
mood induction, we also examined the effect of the intervention on the reported 
positive affect (PA) scores per day. No main effect of the intervention, or for the 
subgroups of SSAS were found on the PA scores. However, the intervention did show 
differences in the PA changes over time for the trait NA subgroups (group   time  
 trait NA, F(1, 83.819) = 4.107, p = .046). Yet, further exploration of this interaction using 
Figure 6-2. Group effects on the average daily number of subjective health 
complaints (SHC) per day for the lowest and highest 50% on the trait 
somatosensory amplification (SSAS) Error bars : +/- 1 SE 
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simple slope tests of the highest and lowest NA scores revealed no significant interven-
tion effect for each day separately (thus the three-way interaction). Even if we used 
more the maximum and minimum NA scores, we could not find any significant differ-
ences, which suggest that this three-way interaction is likely due to chance.  
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examined whether a positive health priming intervention has a 
beneficial effect on somatic complaints in daily life, supposedly by making positive 
health memory networks more active (Brown, 2004). We did not find an effect of the 
intervention on somatic complaints or SRH for the whole group, but analyses showed 
that participants with low negative affectivity had significantly less complaints over 
time in the intervention group compared to the control group. This effect appeared to 
diminish in the last two days of the study, during which the newspaper text task was 
used. The same effect seemed to appear for participants with low SSAS, although only 
marginally significant, but this effect was not significantly affected by time (or the 
second task). These results seem to suggest that for these ‘less vulnerable’ groups, the 
intervention – at least the embedded word type – might have had a beneficial effect. 
In participants high in trait NA, the intervention appeared to increase the number of 
complaints instead. No such difference was found for the high SSAS group, though. A 
possible explanation for this difference could be that high NA people associate any, 
even positive health-related primes with illness, because their illness memory network 
might be negatively biased. Thus, priming them with positive primes could, ironically, 
also activate negative memory instead, and even swing the balance in favour of the 
latter, or even prevent activation of a positive health memory network.  
Another explanation for the increase in somatic complaints for the high NA people 
could be that repeatedly asking them about their somatic complaints actually served 
as a prime itself. As noted in the introduction, people with high NA generally report 
more somatic complaints and thus might have stronger illness-memory networks. 
Priming them with a health complaint questionnaire might make them more aware of 
symptoms, and therefore report more. This effect could have been more powerful 
than the positive health priming intervention. Taken together, the results seem to 
suggest that a ‘positive health priming’ intervention might work but only for people 
who do not automatically thwart the spread of activation of positive health infor-
mation that is expected from the positive health primes, even when they are repeated 
during six morning sessions. Unfortunately, since low NA and low SASS have not gener-
ally been associated with increased somatic complaints, the beneficial intervention 
effect will be somewhat limited in practice. However, our study does show that with a 
simple priming intervention administered in daily life, we can influence how many 
somatic complaints people report, but only for people with low NA. A modified, more 
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On a critical note, our intervention study is based on the assumption that the prim-
ing task indeed caused an activation of positive health-related memory in the positive 
health group. However, we did not measure whether the priming task indeed showed 
such an effect on positive health-related memory. This priming method, which can be 
considered common practice in priming research, still leaves open the possibility that 
another mechanism was responsible for the decrease in somatic complaints. Future 
studies should therefore consider including (an ambulatory version of) a test of the 
activation of illness-related memory, such as a lexical decision task, although there is 
a danger that such a task may interfere with the priming itself. 
A possible explanation for the reduction of health complaints found for the less 
vulnerable groups is that the positive priming might have caused a general positive 
reporting bias or an induction of positive mood, which caused the participants to 
report less somatic complaints. However, when we investigated whether these less 
vulnerable groups also showed higher positive mood ratings during the intervention, 
we could not find support for this alternative explanation.  
In conclusion, this study found that an intervention based on enhancing the activa-
tion of health-related memory by a positive health priming task, did reduce somatic 
complaints but only in participants with low NA or with low SSAS. Although these 
findings generally correspond with the current theory concerning the role of activated 
illness memory, their practical use may still be somewhat limited since MUS is particu-
larly prevalent among the very people for which the priming intervention does not 
seem to work (high NA and SSAS), and even has an reversed, unwanted effect for those 
high in NA. It seems important to address this problem before preventive and thera-
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ABSTRACT 
Objective We investigated the role of illness-memory in symptom reporting in patients 
with medically unexplained symptoms (MUS). One hypothesis is that chronically acti-
vated memory networks of illness may lead to increased selective attention towards 
bodily signals, which causes increased detection and reporting of these signals as 
symptoms. We hypothesized that patients with MUS would show persistent (i.e. trait) 
activation of illness-related memory compared to healthy individuals. Moreover, we 
hypothesized that state illness-related memory predicts symptom reporting during the 
subsequent week. 
Methods Seventy participants were included in this online unmatched case-control 
study. We administered a lexical decision task (LDT) to measure implicit illness-related 
memory bias over three non-consecutive days, during two weeks, in patients (n = 49) 
diagnosed with fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome and/or chronic fatigue syn-
drome. We compared the results with a control group (n = 31). 
Results We found that patients showed an implicit memory bias for illness stimuli 
compared to the healthy controls. However, this bias was not more stable in the 
patient group. We also did not find that illness-related memory was associated with 
the concurrent number of health complaints or health complaints in the next week. 
Conclusions People with MUS have an implicit memory bias for illness stimuli, but we 
could not find support for the hypothesis that this memory bias is associated with 
heightened reporting of symptoms. Possibly, the trait variance of this bias will predict 
symptoms on the longer term. Implications of these findings for the cognitive model of 
symptom reporting are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
High levels of symptom reporting have been associated with sensitization, on the 
somatic perception level as well as the cognitive level. For example, there is evidence 
that people with fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS), irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) or 
chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) report more symptoms during painful stimulation 
compared to healthy individuals. Several studies have found a lower pain tolerance in 
fibromyalgia (Diers et al., 2008; Staud et al., 2003), in IBS (Rodrigues et al., 2005) and 
in CFS after exercise (Whiteside, Hansen, & Chaudhuri, 2004). These findings have 
made some researchers to speculate that these pain reports in CFS, FMS and IBS might 
be the result of one common mechanism (Jackson, George, & Hinchey, 2009). In 
addition, lower pain tolerance has also been found in people with high numbers of 
common health complaints like headache (Verkuil et al., 2007), which might indicate 
that this is a common mechanism for the reporting of multiple health complaints in 
general. 
Not only do patients with FMS, IBS or CFS report a lower pain tolerance, they also 
show increased cognitive processing of external information related to their health 
complaints, including pain (Afzal et al., 2006; González et al., 2010; Hou, Moss-Morris, 
Bradley, Peveler, & Mogg, 2008; Pincus & Morley, 2001). For example, several studies 
have linked the reporting of complaints in patients with MUS with increased cognitive 
processing of bodily sensations (Barsky et al., 1988; Cioffi, 1991; Kolk et al., 2002; L. 
C. Miller et al., 1981; Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980). Again, increased attention to 
illness-related stimuli and enhanced memory of such stimuli has not only been found in 
patients but also in healthy people with several common health complaints (Brown, 
2004; Pincus & Morley, 2001; Verkuil et al., 2007). 
In the past decade, a theoretical symptom perception model has been proposed 
that specifically describes how increased cognitive processing of illness-related infor-
mation is related to enhanced symptom reporting (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004). This 
model assumes that cognitive top-down processes change the relation between physio-
logical bodily signals and the perception of physical symptoms. Chronic unconsciously 
activated memory networks of illness may lead to increased selective attention to-
wards bodily signals, which causes increased detection of these signals and increased 
reporting of these signals as symptoms (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004; Rief & Barsky, 
2005). Brown (2004) has hypothesized that activation of such an illness-related 
memory network produces a vicious cycle, by increasing attention towards bodily 
sensations and increasing the perception of these signals as symptoms, which in turn 
reactivates this memory network. The more trained and consolidated this memory 
becomes the easier and more frequently it will be triggered by associated stimuli 
(Brown, 2004; Pincus & Morley, 2001). We (Meerman et al., 2011) have experimentally 
tested this cognitive model of symptom perception in healthy people and found that 
pain tolerance was involuntarily decreased by activating illness-related memory, but 
we could not confirm this finding in a subsequent replication study (Meerman et al., 
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2012). Due to these inconsistent findings there is no evidence yet that illness memory 
increases symptom reporting, at least not in healthy people. There were, however, 
several limitations to these studies. First, the laboratory manipulation to activate 
illness-memory (subliminal semantic priming) might have been too subtle and not 
naturalistic enough. Second, the subjects in the studies were healthy, while it is 
possible that the expected memory effect is only manifested in people with excessive 
subjective health complaints. Therefore in the present study, instead of manipulating 
illness-memory, we measured it, using a standard technique, namely a lexical decision 
task (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971), on three different days, with a week in between. 
Moreover, we tested people with excessive subjective heath complaints, and did so in 
their natural surroundings in daily life. We believe that by increasing the ecological 
validity of the study, and by using a high risk group as well repeated measurements 
with a standardized technique we provided a more stringent test of the hypothesis 
than in our laboratory studies. 
Most studies assessing reaction times to measure a cognitive bias, such as interpre-
tation bias, attention bias or -in the case of this study- a memory bias, use group 
means of single assessments to identify differences between groups. However, reac-
tion times (RTs) are not highly reliable. That is, they may fluctuate over time, reflect-
ing state variance as well as trait variance in responses. Single measurements there-
fore might not be sufficient to capture the stable (i.e. trait) performance that is 
thought to be characteristic of specific psychopathological patient groups (as discussed 
in: Kindt & Brosschot, 1998; Nosek & Banaji, 2005; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007; 
Stuss, Pogue, Buckle, & Bondar, 1994; Uhlmann et al., 2012). In order to be a risk 
factor for excessive health complaints, the implicit memory bias should be stable, i.e. 
trait-like, since the theory predicts that people suffering from MUS have a chronic 
activation of illness memory networks compared to the healthy people. Thus, although 
the activation of implicit memory networks for illness may fluctuate greatly over time, 
we tested whether this fluctuation is less for a MUS patient group, that is, whether 
they showed greater performance stability for the illness-LDT. At the same time, it is 
possible that the fluctuation in activated illness memory is associated with fluctuations 
in complaints and even predicts them, supporting the hypothesized notion of a causal 
relation. 
Our main hypothesis was that CFS, IBS and FMS patients, who experience excessive 
symptoms in general, would show (a) higher activation of illness-related memory, 
manifested as faster reactions to categorizing illness words in a LDT, as compared to 
categorizing neutral control words. We also expected that (b) these patients would 
show high activation of illness memory with less fluctuation (i.e. more stable or 
chronic) compared to healthy individuals. This means that they were expected to show 
heightened activation of the illness-related memory network (or memory bias) at all 
three test days. In addition, we explored the following two hypotheses: namely, 
whether (c) in both groups the activation of illness-related memory network at a given 
day (i.e. short term activation), would be associated with increased reporting of 
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symptoms that same day. Finally, we expected that (d) an activated illness memory 
network could predict symptom reporting on subsequent days, one or two weeks later. 




Eighty subjects agreed to participate in this study. Participants for the patient group 
were diagnosed (self-reported) with either fibromyalgia (FMS), irritable bowel syn-
drome (IBS) and/or chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). They were recruited via interest 
groups on social internet pages. The largest group consisted of patients with both FMS 
and IBS (n = 19), the next largest group consisted of patients only diagnosed with FMS 
(n = 16), then patients diagnosed with all three syndromes (n = 8), then patients with 
IBS and CFS (n = 3), then FMS and CFS (n = 2), then finally a patient diagnosed with IBS 
(n = 1). Participants for the control group had to be healthy and were recruited 
through student groups and their relatives. The participants did not receive money as a 
reward but we explained that with their participation, they would help us in under-
standing symptom reporting in FM, CFS and IBS. The medical ethics committee of the 




Specific subjective health complaints (SHCs) were measured with the SHC Question-
naire (Eriksen et al., 1999). The SHC Questionnaire is a 29-item self-report question-
naire that reliably measures the number and severity of SHCs experienced during the 
last 24 hours. It has five different areas of complaints as subscales; musculoskeletal 
pain, pseudoneurology, gastrointestinal problems, allergy, and flu. Severity of each 
complaint is rated on a 4-point scale (0-3). The total number of SHCs was used, abbre-
viated here SHC-1, -2 and -3 for the respective measurements. The internal consisten-
cy of the SHC questionnaire has been proved sufficient (Eriksen et al., 1999). 
Memory task: Lexical decision task 
A frequently used task to measure implicit memory is the Lexical Decision Task (LDT; 
Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). This task is used to measure the implicit activation of 
cognitive schemata or memory networks (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999; Förster, 
Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; 
Verkuil, Brosschot, de Beurs, & Thayer, 2009). The idea is that people are likely to 
recognize words belonging to a certain category faster if this category is more active in 
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memory compared to other categories. Participants were told that 80 words would 
appear on the screen, of which 40 words would be existing Dutch words and the other 
40 would be nonsense words. For every word appearing on the screen they were asked 
to decide as fast and as accurately as possible whether the word was a meaningful 
word or a nonsense word. Responses were collected from the PC's keyboard. Partici-
pants were asked to press the key “q” for word and “p” for non-word. The participants 
were instructed to keep their fingers above the keys throughout the entire task to 
obtain maximum speed. The stimuli appeared at the same location on the screen, 
preceded by a row of asterisks for 200 ms, which served as a fixation point. The words 
remained on the screen until the participant had responded. Response latencies were 
measured in milliseconds from the onset of the word to until a button was pressed. 
The words were presented in random order, and were preceded by ten practice trials, 
so the participants could get used to the task.  
We used 10 illness words related to CFS, IBS and FMS, 10 control words which are 
not related to illness, but also negatively charged (see Appendix) and 20 neutral words 
for distraction (e.g. eyes, art). The word categories did not differ in word frequency, 
word length and syllables. Faster reaction times (RTs) to illness words compared to 
negative control words were taken as evidence of higher activity of the memory 
network for illness. 
The participants were instructed before every LDT to make sure nothing could dis-
tract them and to close any unnecessary computer programs, because that might 
influence the measurements of the reaction time tasks. The LDT was designed using 
the program called WebExp 2, version 1.1, which is a JAVA-based applet specifically 
designed by the University of Edinburgh to measure reaction times reliably over the 
internet (Keller, Gunasekharan, Mayo, & Corley, 2009). 
The internal consistency of the average RTs (including all trials to calculate mini-
mum reliability) to the illness words on the three individual LDTs was high, ranging 
from α = .833 to .927). 
Distraction Task 
The SHC was filled in after the LDT, to prevent priming participants’ illness memory by 
the reporting of symptoms. However, earlier research has showed that self-reports of 
physical symptom frequency also increased after making abstract decisions about 
health connotations of common words (Skelton & Strohmetz, 1990). This means that it 
was crucial in our study that we prevented any effects of the LDT on the symptom 
reports. Therefore we designed a distraction task, in which participants were shown 
fragments of number sequences, consisting of three to four numbers that were ar-
ranged in a logical order. Participants were asked to complete these fragments. This 
task kept the participants occupied and distracted them for several minutes, before 
they continued to fill in the symptom reports. 
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Procedure 
Potential participants received an email with a link to the Informed consent form. 
After the participants agreed to the informed consent (online form with a checkbox), 
they could continue with the tasks and questionnaires. To ensure the privacy of the 
respondent, they were asked not to use their name but to use a personal code that 
they had to generate themselves, which was also used as a participant number. In this 
way, we remained unaware of the actual identity of the participants but we were still 
able to link the data of the various measurements with each other. 
In order to see whether FMS, CFS, or IBS patients have a higher stable (i.e. trait) 
activity of their illness-related memory networks, we administered the LDT three 
times. To prevent any learning effects on this task, we employed a between test 
interval of seven days. Thus, the total study duration was two weeks. Every test day 
the participants completed the LDT, distraction task, the health complaint measures 
which were then followed by several trait and state questionnaires that were not used 
in the results of this paper. After the measurements on the last day, the participants 
were sent a debriefing and they were asked to answer some general questions about 
the study itself.  
Data analyses 
Data manipulation 
Following previous LDT studies we removed the error latencies (Aarts et al., 1999; 
Förster et al., 2005; Koole et al., 1999). Error responses were minimal, with only 3.28% 
of the trials performed erroneously. We also excluded correct response latencies that 
were three standard deviations greater or less than the mean for each stimulus in each 
group (2.2%) (Förster et al., 2005). We used a log transformation for the RT’s calculat-
ed within stimulus categories (illness vs control) as well as experimental groups (pa-
tients vs healthy controls). Homogeneity of variance was achieved. To transform the 
data back to its original scale for interpretation with it’s appropriate confidence 
interval, we calculated the corresponding standard error for the untransformed data 
based on the standard error for the transformed data (Jørgensen & Pedersen, 1998). 
We also calculated an index for the difference in reaction time (LDTdiff) by subtract-
ing the reaction times (RTs) of the negative control words from the illness words. 
Thus, the quicker the participants reacted to illness words (i.e lower RTs) in compari-
son to the control words (indexing higher illness-related memory activation), the more 
negative the LDTdiff. To correct for nonnormality this index was log transformed. 
Hypotheses a, and b: To test the difference between the groups in activation of 
illness-related memory, we performed a multilevel analysis on the reaction times 
(RTs). Random intercepts were estimated for each subject and for the effects of word 
category (nested within-subjects) and measurement day (nested within-subjects). 
Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) estimation (which is the recommended type, 
especially for small data sets, when not testing pairs of nested models, see Tabachnick 
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& Fidell, 2007) and an unstructured covariance type were used. As recommended by 
Koole et al. (1999) we used both the RT for control words and the RT for illness words, 
in order to have a within-subject baseline to control for the great variability in speed 
of responding.  
Hypotheses b, c and d: To examine the stability of illness-related memory and its 
temporal associations with SHC scores, we applied structural equation modeling (SEM). 
A cross-lagged panel design was employed based on the difference score between the 
RT for the control and illness words (LDTdiff). The SEM analyses were conducted with 
EQS 6.1 (Bentler & Wu, 2005). We used a cross-lagged analysis procedure which in-
volved an iterative and subtractive procedure of model comparison (Martens & Haase, 
2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
First, a target model was specified that included (1) Autoregressive or stability 
paths (i.e., relations between repeated measures of the same variable at adjacent 
assessments, e.g., LDTdiff1→LDTdiff2. These paths provided information pertaining to 
the stability of illness memory; hypothesis b). The covariance between the error terms 
of the repeated measures of the same variable at adjacent assessments was not 
included otherwise the model would not converge. This target model also included (2) 
concurrent paths, specified as the covariance between the error terms of LDTdiff and 
SHC at the same assessment (e.g., LDTdiff2→SHC2; relevant for hypothesis c). The 
second step was to add the lagged or “antecedent-consequent” paths from LDTdiff at 
one assessment to SHC at the subsequent assessment (e.g., LDTdiff1→SHC2; hypothe-
sis d) to examine whether this significantly improved the target model. The next step 
was to add the cross-lagged paths from SHC at one assessment to LDTdiff at the 
subsequent assessment (e.g.,SHC1→LDTdiff2) to the target model and examine 
whether this improved the model significantly. The final step was to add both lagged 
and cross-lagged paths and see whether this was a significant improvement compared 
to the previous model. Besides fitting an appropriate model for the effects of the 
previous measurements on its subsequent measurement, we also examined the second 
order effects of first wave measurements on the third wave measurements (e.g. 
LDT1→SHC3) to test whether illness memory predicted SHC after two weeks. To 
examine whether the groups differed with respect to the stability of illness-memory 
(hypothesis b), models were analyzed in a multigroup format, which allowed separate 
estimates of all paths in the patient and control group. After having determined the 
best-fitting model, we evaluated whether the groups differed on the stability paths 
with La Grange Multiplier constraints of group invariance.  
Yuan Bentler chi-square tests were used to compare differences between the sub-
sequent models (Bentler & Wu, 2005). In doing so, we used a scaling correction to 
calculate the differences between two scaled Yuan Bentler chi-square tests (Bentler & 
Wu, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). However, because the chi-square difference 
test has difficulty detecting differences when sample sizes are small, we selected the 
final model by also inspecting the Comparative Fit Index (CFI; cut-off >.95), the 
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR, cut-off< .08) and the root mean square 
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error of approximation (RMSEA; cut-off< .01). The parameters were estimated by full 
information maximum likelihood, which uses all of the observed data and is superior to 
traditional methods in handling missing data (Bentler & Wu, 2005) and we used robust 
estimation to deal with non-normal data because a Bonett-Woodward-Randall test 
indicated multivariate non-normality. Because of our explicit directional hypotheses 
we used one-tailed significance tests with an α of 5%.  
RESULTS 
Descriptives 
Eighty subjects agreed to participate in this study, with 31 healthy subjects and 49 
subjects diagnosed with either FM, and/or IBS and/or CFS (see methods). However, 
after we removed the participants that only filled in the baseline questionnaires, 78 
participants remained for analyses, with 48 participants in the patient and 30 partici-
pants in the control group. The patient group scored significantly higher on the number 
of SHCs on day 1 (n = 48, M = 13.48, SD = 4.65) compared to the healthy control group 
(n = 30, M = 3.53, SD = 1.93, t(68.00) = 13.119, p < .001). The patient group also scored 
significantly higher on the number of SHCs on day 2 (n = 40, M = 12.05, SD = 5.33) 
compared to the healthy control group (n = 27, M = 2.81, SD = 2.83, t(62.12) = 9.205, p < 
.001). Finally, the patient group also scored significantly higher on the number of SHCs 
on day 3 (n = 37, M = 12.59, SD = 5.17) compared to the healthy control group (n = 26, 
M = 2.81, SD = 2.42, t(54.33) = 10.062, p < .001). 
Difference in activated illness-memory between the patient and control group 
There was significant variance in intercepts of RTs across participants and across 
different measurement days within participants (respectively, var(u0j) = .003, Wald Z = 
5.06, p < .001 & var(u0j) = .001, Wald Z = 5.85, p < .001). There was no significant 
variance in RTs across the two different word categories within participants (var(u0j) = 
.000, Wald Z = .395, p = ns. 
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Means and 95% confidence intervals of the RTs are presented in Fig. 1. Results of the 
MLA on these data showed that the participants’ RTs decreased over time. The patient 
group (RT; M = 870.96, 95% CI = 836-907) was significantly slower compared to the 
healthy controls (M = 716.14, 95% CI = 681-753, see Table 7-1). Participants showed 
significantly faster reaction times for illness words (M = 772.68, 95% CI = 749-798) 
compared to the control words (M = 807.24, 95% CI = 782-833, see Table 7-1), and the 
interaction Word category × Group showed that this acceleration difference was larger 
for the patient group (M illness = 843,33, 95% CI = 810-862, M control = 897.43, 95% CI 
= 862-935, t(75.224) = 7.11, p < .001, r = .63) compared to the control group (M illness = 
706.32, 95% CI = 672-742, M control = 724.44, 95% CI = 689-761, t(74.544)=2.28, p = .03, r 
= .26, see Table 7-1; Figure 7-1). This is in congruence with our hypothesis a. In addi-
tion, we examined the average LDTdiff score per patient and control group using an 
independent t-test. This showed the same result: The patient group had a bigger 
LDTdiff score (M = -56.70, 95% CI = -39.10- -74.30) compared to the control group (M = 
-16.78, 95% CI = -2.70- -30.85, t(78) = -2.99, p = .004, r = .32). 
Figure 7-1. The estimated means of reaction times per group and per word 
category. (error bars display 95% confidence interval, data has been trans-
formed back to original scale)  
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Stability of illness memory bias and the prediction of the number of health 
complaints  
A common way to examine stability of a test is to inspect the test-retest reliabilities. 
In this case the test-retest reliability of the mean response latencies to the illness 
category words (log transformed) was considerable, LDT1-LDT2, r = .62 & LDT2-LDT3, r 
= .79. However, test-retest reliability of the difference in mean latencies of the two 
word categories was low, LDTdiff1-LDTdiff2, r = -.05 & LDTdiff2-LDTdiff3, r = .20, even 
if we calculated the test-retest reliabilities separately for the patient group (LDTdiff1-
LDTdiff2, r = .19 & LDTdiff2-LDTdiff3, r = -.24) and the health control group (LDTdiff1-
LDTdiff2, r = .20 & LDTdiff2-LDTdiff3, r = .26). However, the low test-retest reliabili-
ties are confounded with error, and the best way to look at stability is with a latent 
variable approach in which measurement error is separated from stability measure-
ments as done below (as discussed in Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). To 
examine the stability of the memory bias for illness words in the patient and control 
group and its relationship between the number of health complaints we used structural 
equation modeling.  
Model comparisons 
Stability of the LDTdiff index, and its associations with the number of SHCs of the 
three days (square root transformed) were examined using cross-lagged panel analysis. 
The results of the model comparison tests are presented in Table 7-2.  
The Y-Bχ2 test of overall model fit was not significant for all models; however, as 
this test is highly influenced by sample size, preference is typically given to the CFI, 
RMSEA and SRMR in characterizing model fit (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Using the 
previously described cut-off scores on these indices, we selected the fully cross lagged 
Table 7-1. Type III Tests of Fixed Effects of reaction times (log transformed) 
Source Num df Den df F p r 
Intercept 1 79.826 178309.702 .000  
Day 2 132.408 9.750 .000***  
Word category 1 74.815 39.176 .000*** .586 
Group 1 79.826 38.458 .000*** .570 
Day × Group 2 132.408 .601 .550   
Day × Word category 2 141.351 .080 .923   
Word category × Group 1 74.815 7.438 .008** .301 
Day × Word category × Group 2 141.351 .062 .940  
***p < .001, **p < .01 
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model (model 4) as our final model to examine whether LTDdiff predicted SHCs one 
week later (e.g, LDT1SHC2, or SHC2LDT3). The RMSEA was not below .10 but this 
might be because the RMSEA has been found to have larger values in small samples 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). We then continued with examining the second order 
effects (i.e. whether LTDdiff predicted SHCs two week later; Table 7-2). Adding the 
predicting path of LDT1SHC3 in model 5 seemed to change the values of our selec-
tion criteria, so that all three criteria were satisfied. The same applies to model 7. 
However, we chose model 5 to continue with our analysis, since this model was the 
more parsimonious compared to model 7 (higher number of degrees of freedom). Next, 
we examined whether the path parameters in the model were significantly different 
among the patient versus control group by setting constraints on the parameters. We 
tested these paths in five stages: (a) stability coefficients, (b) concurrent paths, (c) 
cross lagged path coefficients, (d) lagged paths, and (e) cross lagged second order 
path. At every stage, significant constraints were freed before proceeding to the next 
stage. Tests of the constraints are provided in Table 7-3. Figure 7-2 shows the final 
model, with the parameters that did not significantly differ among the two groups set 
to be similar. 




















First order models 
1. Autoregressive 
(LDT1LDT2, and 
SHC1SHC2 etc;  
21.31 16 .167 .125 .921 .122 160.47 14 < .001 
2. Cross-lagged (LDT SHC) 14.37 12 .278 .107 .957 .112 8.03 4  < .1 
3. Lagged (SHC  LDT) 17.13 12 .145 .133 .933 .088 3.70 4 ns 
4. Fully cross-lagged 
(LDTSHC & SHCLDT) 
9.84 8 .277 .111 .969 .062 12.21 8 ns 
Second order models 
5. Fully cross-lagged + second 
order crosslag (LDT1 SHC3) 
5.33 6 .502 .058 .994 .054 17.94 10 < .1 
6. Fully cross-lagged + second 
order lag (SHC1  LDT3) 
7.99 6 .239 .121 .972 .059 13.32 10 ns 
7. Fully cross-lagged second 
order 
3.80 4 .433 .068 .994 .050 19.32 12 < .1 
Model with added constraints (see table 7-3) 
8. Model 5 with constraints of 
path parameters equality 
between groups 
11.78 14 .624 .014 .999 .113 25.57 2 < .001 
SHC=Subjective health complaints; LDT=Lexical Decision Task; RMSEA= root mean square error of approxima-
tion; CFI= Comparative Fit Index; SMR= standardized root mean square residual 
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Stability of memory bias 
There was a moderately significant positive association between LDTdiff1 and LDTdiff2 
in both the patient and control group. However, the association between LDTdiff2 and 
LDTdiff3 differed significantly between the patient and control group when controlling 
for all other variables in the model. The control group showed a moderately significant 
positive association between LDTdiff2 and LDTdiff3. On the other hand, the patient 
group showed a significantly negative association between LDTdiff2 and LDTdiff3. 
Overall, this seems to indicate that the patient group has less stability in the accessi-
bility of illness-related memory networks compared to the healthy group, which is 
contrary to our hypothesis.  
Table 7-3. LaGrange constraints and tests of group invariance.  
Constraint LaGrange χ2 (df=1 for all) p 
1. Stability paths   
LDTdiff1LDTdiff2 0.022 .881 
LDTdiff2LDTdiff3 12.102 .001*** 
SHC1SHC2 1.798 .180a 
SHC2SHC3 0.083 .773a 
2. Concurrent paths   
LDTdiff1SHC1  5.624 .018* 
LDTdiff2SHC2 1.528 .216 
LDTdiff3SHC3 0.424  .515 
3. Cross-lagged paths   
LDTdiff1SHC2 5.806  .016*a 
LDTdiff2SHC3 0.008  .927a 
4. Lagged paths   
SHC1LDTdiff2 8.710  .003** 
SHC2LDTdiff3 0.761  .383 
5. Cross-lagged second order   
LDTdiff1SHC3 2.683  .101a 
aBased on non-robust La grange multiplier test, since robust test could not be computed due to numerical 
error. **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
118| Chapter 7 
7 
Associations between illness-memory and somatic health complaints 
We first examined the relations between LDTdiff and concurrent SHCs (hypothesis c). A 
marginal significant negative association was found between LDTdiff and SHC, but only 
during measurement 2. This association indicated that larger illness-memory bias was 
associated with more SHCs. Yet, this association was not apparent at the other two 
time points. What’s more, the association between LDTdiff and SHCs differed between 
the groups at measurement 1 (see Table 7-3).The control group showed a marginal 
significant positive association between LDTdiff1 and SHC1, such that greater illness-
related memory activation for illness words was related to less SHC at measurement 1. 
Next, the temporal associations (hypothesis d) were explored. In both groups SHCs 
were most strongly predicted by SHCs at the previous assessment. A group difference 
was apparent for the association between LDTdiff1 and SHC2. Only in the control group 
there was a marginal positive association, which is in contrast with our hypothesis, i.e, 
greater illness-related memory activation for illness words was related to less SHC at 
measurement 2. Furthermore, a marginal significant positive association was found 
between the LDTdiff1 and SHC3 for both groups. Contrary to the hypothesis, a greater 
implicit memory bias for illness words on measurement 1 seemed to be related with 
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Figure 7-2. Model 8 with path parameters for each group (control versus patient) and non-significant parameters 
set to be similar among the two groups. The path parameters that are in a box with a dashed line are significantly 
differed between the patient and control group. †p < .05 (one-tailed), *p < .05(two-tailed), ***p < .001 (two-tailed). 
No change scores between the different days were used in the model, only the observed scores per day. γp=path 
parameter of patient group, γc=path parameter of control group. Shaded box is the path parameter from LDT diff 1  
SHC 3. LDTdiff was log transformed and SHC was square root transformed 
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DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether FM, IBS and CFS patients showed a 
high chronic activation of illness memory compared to healthy controls. In addition, 
we explored whether an implicit memory bias was predictive of the reporting of 
somatic symptoms.  
We indeed found that patients showed a stronger implicit memory bias for illness 
stimuli compared to the healthy controls. This result complements studies that found 
enhanced attentional bias for illness information in these patients (Afzal et al., 2006; 
Hou et al., 2008; Pincus & Morley, 2001) and supports the idea that increased activity 
of illness memory networks underlies these findings. The healthy controls in our study 
also showed an implicit memory bias for illness stimuli, although this bias was less 
strong than in the patient group. Thus, this study is the first to find clear evidence of 
enhanced illness-related memory activation in patients suffering from medically 
unexplained syndromes. However, contrary to our expectations, we did not find that 
this memory bias was more stable in the patients when compared to the healthy 
control group. Although we found that the internal consistency and retest reliability of 
illness RT latencies was high on each assessment, the test-retest correlations between 
the successive assessments of the difference in LDT (LDTdiff) scores for the illness 
versus neutral words was low. Thus, although MUS patients – as a group - showed a 
larger illness-memory bias than controls on each of the measurement days, the pa-
tients still showed considerable individual variation in illness-memory from week to 
week. This seems to indicate that this measure of activation of illness memory might 
for a considerable part tap state variance rather than trait variance (as discussed in: 
Kindt & Brosschot, 1998; Nosek et al., 2005, 2007; Stuss et al., 1994; Uhlmann et al., 
2012).  
Interestingly, although the proposed cognitive factor of the theoretical model that 
was tested did not show much stability, the health complaints showed great stability. 
Using cross-lagged panel analysis we examined whether these health complaints were 
associated with the implicit memory bias for illness. However, we found no support for 
this hypothesis which forms a crucial aspect of the cognitive model of symptom report-
ing. Although the predicted concurrent relation between illness memory and SHC was 
found, this was only on the second day. Moreover, we only found evidence for predic-
tive associations in the opposite direction. Thus, a greater implicit illness memory bias 
was related to less number of health complaints in the control group a week later, and 
even two weeks later in both groups. It is an interesting finding that only the first 
implicit memory measurement showed any significant predictions and not the second 
measurement. This might suggest that the first measurement of implicit memory is the 
most valid one, and later measurements might be more influenced by learning effects 
and thus less reliable. Although this seems questionable since we did find the predict-
ed concurrent relation between SHC and LDT measurement on measurement 2. Anoth-
er possibility is that we simply used an inadequate time window frame. Perhaps, an 
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implicit illness-related memory bias has a phasic (state) effect on symptom reporting 
that acts sooner than a one-week time frame. Future studies might more specifically 
examine the temporal association between illness-related memory and SHC using more 
measurements, for example every day, or multiple times per week, to see which time 
frame window is best suited. However, this has also more practical implications 
compared to the current study, such as much stronger learning effects. An alternative 
possibility is that the time frame is in fact too brief, and that the effects of overac-
tivated illness memory take longer and act in a more tonic, trait-like fashion over 
many months, to produce medically unexplained symptoms.  
There are some other limitations of the study. One is that there might have been a 
selection bias in the healthy controls since they were aware that we were investigating 
health complaints (although not the relation between the reaction time tasks and 
SHC). Furthermore, we relied on the self-reported illnesses of fibromyalgia, irritable 
bowel syndrome and chronic fatigue syndrome, which could be less reliable than if we 
have used official doctor’s records. In addition, one obvious limitation of conducting 
this study online is that the circumstances under which the LDT was being adminis-
tered were not standardized and this could have introduced noise in the data. For 
example, when doing the LDT participants have to remember which keys on the 
keyboard correspond to a yes (‘word’) answer and which key corresponds to a no 
(‘non-word) answer. Although these key instructions were continuously presented on 
the screen, it still could have influenced the reaction times if participants had to look 
at these instructions every time they made a response. Although error rates were low, 
we might have gotten different results if we have used a simpler version of the lexical 
decision task, which is adapted after the go/no go task (pushing a button after words 
only). Preliminary work suggests that this version yields more reliable results compared 
to the version that we used (as discussed in Borkenau, Paelecke, & Yu, 2009).  
In short, this study suggests that people with chronic health complaints, like fi-
bromyalgia, chronic fatigue and irritable bowel symptoms, have a stronger implicit 
memory bias for illness-related information. This finding offers support for the notion 
of role of illness-memory networks in symptom reporting as proposed by cognitive 
models on symptom perception (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004). However, we could 
not find support for the idea that single-moment measures of memory bias causes 
people to report more symptoms during the brief time period (3 weeks) of this study, 
or that MUS patients show a more chronic memory bias for illness. Therefore, the 
alternative explanation for the enhanced illness memory bias in MUS patients remains 
possible, namely that MUS-sufferers’ illness memory is activated because they feel ill. 
Future studies should try to further explore the distinctions between the state and 
trait variance of implicit memory bias measures, since this might lead to important 
new insights into the temporal aspect of the possible effect of illness-related cognitive 
memory networks on the reporting of symptoms. 
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Appendix. Overview of words used per category for the lexical decision task. English words are translated 
from Dutch words. 




“Stomach pain” “Coward” 
“Cramp” “Heartless” 
“Nauseous” “Fake” 
“Muscle pain” “Tactless” 
“Stiff” “Impertinent” 
“Joint pain” “Antisocial” 
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Medically unexplained symptoms (MUSs) are a humanitarian and economic burden. 
Among them, pain complaints without organic pathology are the most prevalent. For 
many years, researchers have tried to answer the question how it is possible that 
people can have somatic complaints without any medical explanation. Early theoreti-
cal models on dissociation, conversion and somatization have contributed to the 
understanding of MUS (Brown, 2004). But their assumption that psychological distress 
like anxiety or depression, is the cause of unexplained symptoms is often not true 
(Brown, 2004). Later theoretical models on MUS were influenced by principles of 
cognitive psychology. The earliest cognitive models on this topic focused on increased 
self-focused attention to bodily signals (Barsky & Wyshak, 1990; Cioffi & Holloway, 
1993; Cioffi, 1991; Kolk et al., 2002; L. C. Miller et al., 1981; Pennebaker, 1982b), 
while later models focused more on activated illness-related cognitive networks that 
causes this increase in attention (Brown, 2004; Leventhal et al., 1992; Skelton & 
Strohmetz, 1990). Furthermore, it has been suggested that increased attention and 
memory bias towards bodily sensations and other illness information, could result in 
increased symptom reporting by causing normal bodily sensations to become intolera-
ble (referred to as physiological sensitization) (Brosschot, 2002).  
The main aim of this thesis was to examine the possible causal role of illness-
related memory or schemata in increased symptom reporting. Several studies have 
found that increased accessibility of health-related cognitive networks are related to 
increased symptom reporting. However, only a few studies have examined this rela-
tionship experimentally to determine its causality. Of those studies, most used ‘explic-
it’ techniques to manipulate the accessibility of cognitive networks, that is, tech-
niques in which the stimuli were salient and noticeable to the participants. This may 
have caused them to guess the goal of the study and caused them to behave in unin-
tended ways, for example in a cooperative or otherwise socially desirable way, which 
may have biased the results, often in favor of the hypothesis that increased cognitive 
accessibility of illness-related networks causes increased symptom reporting. In this 
thesis, I have used different manipulation techniques to manipulate the cognitive 
schemata related to illness more directly by leaving the participants unaware of the 
study’s aim, and thus allowing an unbiased way of testing of this hypothesis. In the 
following section, I will provide an overview of the findings and conclusions of our 
studies described in chapter 2 to chapter 7.  
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
In the first part of this thesis, the hypothesized effect of implicit illness-related 
memory on symptom reporting was examined in the laboratory. We used subliminal 
priming techniques in which stimuli (“primes”) are shown under the awareness thresh-
old, and this assumingly activates the implicit memory of the associated category. We 
then looked at whether an activated implicit memory network of illness would indeed 
cause more symptom reporting. In the first three studies we used low pain tolerance as 
a measure of symptom reporting since pain complaints are the most common.  
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In Chapter 2, we found that participants who were subliminally primed with health 
complaint words reported lower pain tolerance compared to participants who were 
primed with neutral words. This implies evidence for our hypothesis that activated 
illness-related memory causes, at least partly, increased symptom reporting. In Chap-
ter 3, we attempted to replicate these results with some improvements to the re-
search design. More in detail, we left out specific prime words concerning serious 
medical conditions that were judged less than optimally representative of common 
illness. We also tested whether administering health-related questionnaires before 
priming with health-complaint words (as was done in the first study) could account for 
the effect found, because it might have acted as an unintended prime. No interaction-
effect was found between the timing of the health-related questionnaires and prime 
type. In addition, we could not replicate the priming effect of health words on pain 
tolerance. Therefore the results either did not support the activated illness-related 
memory model or suggest that illness memory networks only affect symptom reporting 
if seriously threatening primes are used. Because we found two conflicting results in 
the first two studies, in the next study we tried a somewhat different approach in 
manipulating illness-related memory networks. In Chapter 4, the relationship between 
implicit illness-related memory and self-schemata was experimentally manipulated in 
order to induce a stronger association between the two (using subliminal evaluative 
conditioning), and then examined the effect of this manipulation on pain tolerance. 
The rationale was that illness-related memory would be more likely to influence 
reporting of complaints when its activation is enmeshed with that of self-related 
memory. In addition, we examined whether habitual self-focused attention (trait-SFA) 
acted as a moderator of this effect. However, participants primed with the self-
referent “I” and health complaint words did not demonstrate the expected lower pain 
tolerance. Unexpectedly, trait-SFA acted as a moderator of the main effect of the self-
prime: priming with “I” resulted in increased pain tolerance in participants with low 
trait-SFA. This study again did not support the hypothesis that associations between 
activated self-related memory and illness-related memory cause increased reporting of 
complaints. Instead, activating self-related memory increased pain tolerance in partic-
ipants with low trait-SFA. One interesting possible interpretation was that the self-
prime causes a temporal increase in state-SFA, or perhaps self-confidence, in those for 
whom trait-SFA was low, which in fact suggests possible new ways to promote adaptive 
coping with pain.  
Because we could not find hard evidence for the hypothesized role of illness 
memory in causing an increase in symptom reporting, we concluded that this could 
mean two things: 1) the hypothesized effect of illness memory on symptom reporting 
does not exist, at least not in the laboratory, or 2) the methods used in part 1 were 
not effective in manipulating illness-related memory network in the way that we 
wanted to. To rule out the second alternative explanation, we conducted a study in 
which we investigated whether the priming methods were indeed sufficiently adequate 
in manipulating the illness memory networks. Because, if our methods were insuffi-
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cient, this would mean that we were not able to draw strong conclusions about the 
tenability of the illness memory activation model. Chapter 5 presents the results of 
this study in which we looked at whether the subliminal priming techniques in the first 
three studies actually did increase the accessibility of illness-related cognitive net-
works, that is, after priming with illness related words. This was done using a lexical 
decision task, which is a standard test to measure spreading of activation across 
specified memory content. We found that subliminal illness primes did not cause a 
significantly quicker reaction time for illness words on the subsequent lexical decision 
task. This seems to indicate that the subliminal priming paradigm used in this and our 
previous studies was not effective in activating illness-related cognitive memory 
networks, at least not for the time frame of several minutes used in this study and our 
earlier studies. In the second part of the study we attempted to validate whether the 
subliminal evaluative conditioning (used in chapter 4) was effective in creating an 
increased association between the self and another concept. The results of this part of 
the study were also negative and showed that the subliminal evaluative conditioning 
was not effective in creating stronger associations between illness and the self-
schema. The overall result of this study shows that we did not effectively manipulate 
illness memory networks in the way we assumed we did in the first three studies, and 
thus not yet employed an appropriate test to examine the hypothesis that illness-
related memory causes increased symptom reporting. 
In the second part of the thesis, I took on a different approach in examining the 
association between illness memory and symptom reporting. First, because of our 
previous study that showed that the subliminal (unconscious) manipulations of illness-
schemata were ineffective, we examined directly the association between the illness-
related memory and symptom reporting in normal daily life, by manipulating and 
measuring illness-related memory in a conscious way instead of using subliminal 
priming techniques. In Chapter 6, the effects of a randomized controlled trial using an 
online intervention focused on activating a positive health memory network and 
determining its effect on symptom reporting was examined in healthy students. The 
intervention caused a decrease in somatic complaints but only for participants with 
low trait NA or low somatosensory amplification. These findings suggest that priming or 
other interventions directed at activating positive health memory might reduce health 
complaints, but only in certain subgroups. It lead us to speculate that participants with 
high NA or somatosensory amplification might perceive even positive health-related 
information in a negative way that fits their illness-related memory network, with the 
result that it did not decrease their health complaints.  
Using yet another approach to test the illness memory activation hypothesis, Chap-
ter 7 presents the results of a study that examined the cross-sectional and temporal 
relationships between implicit illness-related memory and symptom reporting among 
patients with fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome and/or chronic fatigue syndrome. 
The rationale was that if any population would show activated illness memory, and 
even persistently so, it would be patients with relatively severe medically unexplained 
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symptoms (MUS). We found that patients showed a stronger implicit memory bias for 
illness stimuli compared to the healthy controls, although the latter showed a similar 
memory bias. However, this bias was not more stable in the patient group. We also did 
not find that illness-related memory was associated with the concurrent number of 
health complaints or health complaints in the next week. Thus, people with MUS have 
an implicit memory bias for illness stimuli, but we could not find support for the 
hypothesis that this memory bias is temporally associated with heightened reporting of 
symptoms, at least not across a time span of one week. Possibly, the trait variance of 
this bias will predict symptoms on the longer term.  
IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
Theory of increased accessibility of illness memory causing increased symptom 
reporting  
We found little evidence for the causal role of illness-related schemata in symptom 
reporting. Even though our laboratory-based priming studies, using pain tolerance as a 
model for symptom reporting, were not successful in examining the causality of an 
illness-schemata – symptom reporting association, our real life studies that used 
different methods and also tested cross-sectional relationships, found some modest 
but still partial support for the model. We found that MUS patients show a stronger 
implicit memory bias, but our findings – albeit limited to a one-week interval - did not 
provide any evidence for causality. Obviously, the result found in chapter 7 that 
patients showed a bigger or stronger implicit memory bias for illness stimuli compared 
to the healthy controls, could be the result of having more symptoms which increases 
the accessibility of illness-related information in cognitive schemata, which then 
causes them to detect illness-related words quicker compared to healthy controls. 
However, it is still possible that illness-related cognitive constructs might cause 
increased symptom reporting, which eventually leads to the development of MUS. This 
would be a possible effect on the long term, since we did not find any support of short 
term (i.e. one-week) increased accessibility preceding more symptom reporting. 
Another possibility is that this effect is only present on the short term, for example 
within several hours or a couple of days, instead of a week.  
On the other hand, the results from our fourth study (chapter 6) seem to imply that 
it is possible that illness-related schemata might play a causal role in symptom report-
ing, since we found that a ‘positive health priming’ intervention reduced symptoms, 
but only for people with low trait negative affect or low somatosensory amplification, 
and thus perhaps for all people who might not automatically link the spread of activa-
tion of positive health information to negative health information. Although of poten-
tial interest, this finding is not yet of immediate clinical importance, since people that 
score low on these traits are not the ones showing the highest symptom reporting. It is 
possible that more intense positive priming may also decrease symptom reporting in 
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high NA and somatosensory amplification groups. First, however, replication studies 
are clearly needed to examine whether this effect holds strong in future studies. 
On a side note, it is important to realize that both healthy controls and patients 
with MUS showed increased implicit memory for illness-related stimuli (although the 
MUS groups showed the largest effect). A recent meta-analysis found a similar result 
for attentional bias to pain-related information in chronic pain patients versus healthy 
volunteers. Interestingly, they found that overall both groups showed an attentional 
bias for pain-related information and the groups did not differ in the strength of this 
bias (Crombez, Van Ryckeghem, Eccleston, & Van Damme, 2013) This might be due to 
people showing an implicit memory bias to negative information in general. Humans 
give more priority to signals indicating danger, which is a results of our evolution in 
which, it was of great importance to be aware of immediate surrounding danger. This 
has resulted in a tendency to have a greater accessibility of possible threat in cogni-
tive constructs. This could therefore serve as an explanation for why both healthy 
populations as MUS patients showed an implicit memory bias to illness-related infor-
mation. An alternative explanation is that our study was focused on health, which 
involved multiple administering symptom inventory questionnaires, which on them-
selves could have made the illness-construct more accessible as well. Thus, future 
studies with a large number of participants should try to replicate our findings to see 
whether our result holds. 
Implications for priming research in general 
During carrying out the validation study testing the effectiveness of subliminal priming 
and evaluative conditioning, it became slowly clear - because of concurrent publica-
tions - that we were not the first to discredit the effects of subliminal priming. Re-
cently, the journal Nature posted a letter of the psychologist and Nobel-prize winner 
Daniel Kahneman that he wrote to his colleagues in the field of psychology that have 
used priming in their studies (Yong, 2012). In this letter, he urges his colleagues to 
replicate classic priming studies in the social psychology. Although Kahneman is a 
‘strong believer’ of the priming effect (he wrote a book about the importance of 
priming research in the study of associative memory), he started to seriously worry 
when it came out that well known researchers have simulated data (such as the Dutch 
ex-professor Diederik Stapel), and when failed attempts to replicate classic priming 
studies (Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012) and concerns about replicability in 
psychology in general started to be uttered in the literature. 
Our finding that subliminal priming and evaluative conditioning concerning illness 
information did not activate illness memory may reflect a more general failure to 
support priming as a basic psychological technique to subliminally activate memory 
and influence behavior. We would like to stress that future studies using a priming 
technique, whether it is subliminal or supraliminal priming, should always include a 
manipulation check to ensure that the technique indeed resulted in the expected 
manipulation of memory.  
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Treatment of MUS 
Cognitive-behavioral treatment (CBT) is the best established therapy for treating MUS, 
however, other kinds of therapies such as antidepressants and providing a psychiatric 
consultation letter to the primary care provider, have also shown to be beneficial 
(Deary et al., 2007; Kroenke, 2007). In addition, it is uncertain what the key working 
elements are in CBT. There are types of therapy that are based on the main concept of 
this dissertation, namely activated memory networks or schemata. For example, 
schema-focused therapy is a more recently developed type of cognitive therapy in 
which maladaptive cognitive schema’s of the patient are being challenged (Young, 
Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). This type of therapy is currently being used in personality 
disorders. However, if future studies do find evidence for a causal relationship be-
tween illness-related memory networks or schemata and symptom reporting, MUS-
specific schema-focused therapy might be a possible effective therapy for reducing 
symptoms.  
STRENGTHS OF THE STUDIES 
One of the strengths of this thesis is that I have attempted, in several ways, to answer 
the cause-and-effect question of implicit illness memory and symptom reporting. Most 
of the studies that have examined this relationship have used correlational designs 
that cannot answer the causality. The theoretical models discussed in the introduction 
of this thesis all assume that it is either increased hypervigilance or attention for 
bodily signals or increased accessibility of health constructs in the mind that causes 
increased symptom reporting, both in populations with medically unexplained symp-
toms as well as in the relatively healthy populations with common subjective health 
complaints. For an obvious reason, these models easily invoke the classic chicken or 
the egg problem: it is possible that because these people have more symptoms, their 
illness and health cognitive constructs become more accessible; just as the opposite - 
the main tenet of these models - is possible (see also Skelton & Strohmetz, 1990). Two 
decades ago, Skelton and Strohmetz (1990) already suggested that to examine the 
causal role of illness-related schemata in symptom reporting, not only evidence for 
correlations between dispositional symptom reporting and individual measures of 
construct accessibility is needed, but also studies that vary the degree of accessibility 
of illness-related constructs or schemata and examine its influence on subsequent 
symptom reports (Skelton & Strohmetz, 1990). Indeed many studies have shown that 
MUS patients exhibit a cognitive bias, whether attentional or a memory bias. However, 
as said, this could simply be the result of having symptoms, and not a causal factor in 
the etiology of symptoms. Individuals for who a particular category is more accessible 
because of their complaints recognize category-congruent content more quickly 
(Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). Thus, people that report symptoms frequently may 
have better memory accessibility for health related constructs or prominent self-
schema (for refs see Skelton & Strohmetz, 1990). Again, it is never clear whether 
 
 
130| Chapter 8 
8 
increased memory accessibility causes more symptom reporting, because increased 
symptom reporting can also increase the accessibility. This is why it is important to 
conduct studies that manipulate the core phenomenon, i.e. accessibility of illness-
schemata, or studies that measure the relationship of illness-schemata and symptom 
reporting prospectively. 
Another strength of this thesis is that we have attempted - even though we failed - 
to replicate our own study. As discussed above, studies in social priming have been 
under attack, and it has been suggested that replication studies are necessary and that 
researchers need to submit their manuscripts for publication with their non-findings as 
well, in order to reduce the file-drawer effect (Lieberman, 2012).  
A third strength of the studies in this thesis, is that we examined the role of acti-
vated illness memory on symptom reporting while also controlling for two alternative 
hypotheses; namely that increased symptom reporting would already be observed with 
the semantic activation of sensations or negativity in general. We controlled for these 
alternative hypotheses because it has been hypothesized that people who experience 
more negative feelings (i.e. negative affect), pay more attention to internal cues in 
general (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989) and also to have increased scanning of their 
body for symptoms. 
Finally, a fourth strength of the studies in this thesis is that we used several differ-
ent techniques to examine the role of activated illness memory on symptom reporting. 
Not only did we examine the relationship between illness memory and symptom using 
experimental manipulations in the laboratory, we also examined this in real life. In 
addition, we used several different priming techniques to manipulate illness memory; 
from subliminal priming, and subliminal priming in combination with priming of self-
related schema, and supraliminal priming. Furthermore, we examined this relationship 
in both healthy controls and patients with medically unexplained symptoms. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDIES  
One obvious limitation is that we only learned in the end of a series of studies that the 
methods used to manipulate the subject of interest, activation of illness memory, 
turned out to be of questionable validity. However, this finding corresponds to other's 
recent negative findings of priming studies (as discussed above) and hopefully will 
ultimately lead to better methods to manipulate memory networks or schemata. 
Because our experimental manipulations turned out to be ineffective, the hypothesis 
that illness memory activation causes MUS remains untested, at least under rigorous 
laboratory conditions.  
A related limitation is that we did not check whether our intervention study using 
supraliminal priming with positive health words, did actually increase activation of 
positive health memory networks. Just as we found out in the validation study of 
subliminal priming that it was ineffective in activating the illness memory, the same 
could apply to our supraliminal study. Therefore in order to truly know whether the 
effect of the positive health intervention was indeed reducing health complaints in 
 
 
|131 Summary and General Discussion 
8 
some subgroups by increasing positive health memory networks, a subsequent study 
should examine whether the intervention is effectively activating positive health 
memory networks. 
A second limitation is that we only used two consecutive weeks for the study that 
examined whether the association between symptom reporting and implicit illness 
memory bias was prospective. We found that while MUS patients indeed showed the 
hypothesized implicit memory bias for illness words, we did not find that the strength 
of this implicit memory bias was associated with reporting of symptoms a week later or 
two weeks later. Perhaps if we had used a longer (or much shorter, for that matter) 
period of assessment, we could have found evidence for this prospective role. Future 
studies that measure implicit memory bias and symptom reporting over longer periods 
of time with shorter intervals between measurements could shed more light on the 
hypothesized association.  
A third limitation of our research is that we only used semantic priming techniques 
using words in our studies: it is possible that if we would have used pictures or other 
objects, we might have found a different effect. For example, most of the few studies 
examining the effect of explicit ('conscious') priming with illness stimuli on pain toler-
ance, that were done before we started with the studies of this thesis, used pictures 
as stimuli and not words. Interestingly, recently a study has showed that a placebo 
effect (more or less the opposite of 'increasing symptoms') can be created merely by 
looking at a bottle of pain medication instead (Rutchick & Slepian, 2013). This study 
found that participants who were judging the design of a bottle of ibuprofen later on 
had higher pain tolerance compared to participants who judged the packaging of 
noodles (Rutchick & Slepian, 2013). However, it is unclear whether this placebo effect 
is due to decreased activation of illness memory networks or something else entirely. 
Future studies are necessary to examine which part of our cognition is responsible for 
this placebo effect. 
POSSIBLE FUTURE STUDIES 
In chapter 6 we found that priming participants with positive health information 
caused lower symptom reporting in certain subgroups. Because we did not examine 
whether positive health priming indeed activated positive health memory networks, or 
deactivated illness memory networks, it is plausible that this effect is perhaps not 
caused by illness memory networks but by some other construct. For example, it is 
possible that the participants in the positive health priming group, were having less 
negative affect (NA) and therefore reported less complaints. Although we found that 
these subgroups did not report higher positive affect because of the intervention, we 
did not examine whether they reported less NA because of the intervention. It could 
be that these two opposite constructs are not one-to-one related. Future studies 
examining the causal role of illness-memory networks in symptom reporting should 
account for the possible role of NA, as we did in our first two studies, unfortunately 
with ineffective manipulation techniques. Previous studies have found that partici-
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pants with high NA indeed show a stronger attentional bias toward internal sensations 
(Stegen, Diest, Van De Woestijne, & De Bergh, 2001), and perhaps people with high NA 
also show increased activation of illness-memory activation. In conclusion, there is a 
possibility that NA is the underlying causal factor in increased symptom reporting and 
future studies should carefully examine its role within illness memory networks. 
One recent study found that patients with somatoform disorders have implicit self-
concepts that are significantly more associated with illness than the self-concepts of 
healthy individuals, which are more strongly associated with positive health (Riebel, 
Egloff, & Witthöft, 2013). Similar to our view, they suggest for future studies to 
examine whether this change in self-concept in somatoform disorders is the result of 
having many health complaints, or whether they are actually the cause for having 
many health complaints. In addition they suggest that subliminal evaluative condition-
ing could be used to examine the causality of self-concept related to illness in symp-
tom reporting. However, as our study in chapter 5 showed, careful consideration 
should be administered before using subliminal evaluative conditioning and it should 
always be used with a manipulation check. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our studies did not find conclusive, that is, laboratory-based, evidence for the notion 
that the reporting of health complaints, especially pain, is increased by illness-related 
memory, as suggested by the symptom perception model (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 
2004; Rief & Barsky, 2005). This is possibly because of the techniques used to manipu-
late illness memory in this thesis turned out to be insufficient. Future studies should 
use (or invent) new techniques that are more valid to activate illness-related implicit 
memory networks, so that the hypothesized causal effect of illness memory on in-
creased symptom reporting can be adequately examined. However, in ambulatory 
studies we showed some evidence in support of the hypothesis, including one priming 
intervention study that had the expected effects, at least in a subgroup, and a cross-
sectional study. These findings still support the idea, that illness memory might play a 
role in symptom reporting. However, longitudinal studies in larger sample groups are 
necessary to provide real evidence of the possible causal role of illness memory in 
symptom reporting. Future studies examining MUS should examine whether activated 
illness-memory networks indeed causes increased attention towards bodily signals, or 
if this increased attention is caused by some other factors. We believe that our results 
offer several promising routes for future studies to examine the role of illness memory 
in the etiology of somatic complaints. The suffering of many patients with medically 
unexplained symptoms or subjective health complaints and their impact on our health 
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Samenvatting             
(Dutch summary)  
 144| Samenvatting 
De rol van ziekte-gerelateerd geheugen (ziekteschema) in het rapporteren van 
lichamelijke klachten 
Het doel van dit proefschrift was om meer inzicht te krijgen in de factoren die een rol 
spelen bij het rapporteren van lichamelijke klachten. Mensen hebben vaak last van 
gewone gezondheidsklachten zoals hoofdpijn, rugpijn, of vermoeidheid zonder dat zij 
daarvoor naar de huisarts gaan. Deze zogenoemde ‘subjectieve gezondheidsklachten’ 
komen veelvuldig voor. Ihlebaek, Eriksen, en Ursin (2002) vonden dat in de maand 
voorafgaand aan een onderzoek, 96% van de ondervraagden in hun studie minstens één 
lichamelijke klacht had zoals hoofdpijn, nekpijn of verkoudheid. Vaak gaan deze 
klachten na een aantal dagen vanzelf weer over, en niet iedereen gaat voor deze 
klachten naar de huisarts. Bij de huisarts kan vervolgens voor een deel van de 
lichamelijke klachten een medische oorzaak gevonden worden, maar voor een 
substantieel deel niet, uiteenlopend van 32% (Marple, Kroenke, Lucey, Wilder en 
Lucas, 1997) tot 60.6% (Fink, Sørensen, Engberg, Holm, & Munk-Jørgensen, 1999). De 
term die voor deze klachten gebruikt wordt is somatisch onverklaarde lichamelijke 
klachten (SOLK) en deze klachten worden zowel in de huisartsenpraktijk als bij de 
verschillende medische specialismen in het ziekenhuis gevonden. Ieder specialisme 
heeft zo een eigen benaming voor een ziektebeeld waar geen medische verklaring voor 
is, zoals fibromyalgie bij reumatologie en chronisch vermoeidheidssyndroom bij 
infectieziekten (Hall, 2011).  
Veel mensen hebben dus regelmatig last van een subjectieve lichamelijke klacht 
zoals hoofdpijn, waarvoor een substantieel deel van de mensen op bezoek gaat bij de 
huisarts (Eriksen, Svendsrød, Ursin, & Ursin, 1998; Eriksen & Ursin, 2004). Bovendien 
zijn deze klachten vaak de oorzaak van langdurig ziekteverlof en 
arbeidsongeschiktheid (Eriksen et al., 1998). Slechts een klein deel van deze mensen 
blijft langdurig last houden van een somatisch onverklaarde lichamelijke klacht of 
heeft last van meerdere klachten. Echter, omdat deze lichamelijke klachten - zonder 
aantoonbare medische oorzaak  - wel van grote invloed zijn op de ziektekosten en op 
de kwaliteit van leven van diegene met deze klachten, is het van belang om deze 
klachten te reduceren (Brown, 2004; Eriksen et al., 1998).  
In dit proefschrift is een theoretisch model getoetst dat een verklaring biedt voor 
hoe mensen een lichamelijke klacht kunnen hebben zonder dat daar een medische 
oorzaak voor is. Dit model (Brosschot, 2002; Brown, 2004; Rief & Barsky, 2005), dat 
het meest gedetailleerd is uitgewerkt door Brown (2004) suggereert dat cognitieve 
processen zoals aandacht en geheugen een rol spelen in de waarneming van 
lichamelijke signalen. Eerdere theoretische modellen gaven aan dat mensen meer 
lichamelijke klachten rapporteren doordat men onbewust meer aandacht heeft voor 
lichamelijke signalen en men daardoor deze lichamelijke signalen eerder waarneemt 
en voelt (Barsky & Wyshak,1990; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). Deze signalen worden 
eveneens eerder geïnterpreteerd als een symptoom van een ziekte en daardoor 
gerapporteerd als klacht. Het model van Brown (2004) suggereert dat deze verhoogde 
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aandacht voor lichamelijke processen komt door een meer geactiveerd impliciet 
('automatisch', 'onbewust') geheugennetwerk voor ziekte-gerelateerde informatie, ook 
wel ziekteschema genoemd. En doordat dit uiteindelijk leidt tot meer klachten, wordt 
het geheugennetwerk voor ziekte steeds meer geactiveerd en bevat het steeds meer 
informatie, wat uiteindelijk weer leidt tot het meer waarnemen van lichamelijke 
signalen, en zo ontstaat er een vicieuze circel. Het grootste gedeelte van deze 
vicieuze circel bestaat uit impliciete processen, dit wil zeggen dat dit onbewust 
gebeurt. Tevens is het zo dat dit proces is gebaseerd op de interpretatie van echte 
lichamelijke signalen en het dus niet zo is dat men een dergelijke klacht verbeeld 
heeft. Brosschot (2002) heeft gesuggereerd dat een verhoogde aandacht en geheugen 
voor ziekte-gerelateerde informatie (cognitieve bias) uiteindelijk mogelijk leidt tot 
een sneller en versterkt doorgeven van lichamelijke signalen (sensitisatie). Of 
andersom: het lichamelijk versneld en versterkt doorgeven van lichamelijke signalen 
(sensitisatie) leidt uiteindelijk tot het meer gevoelig worden in de aandacht en het 
geheugen voor ziekte-gerelateerde informatie (cognitieve bias). 
In dit proefschrift is de validiteit getoetst van dit theoretische model waarin een 
geactiveerd ziektegerelateerd geheugen leidt tot het rapporteren van lichamelijke 
klachten. Onderzocht is of manipulaties van het impliciete geheugen voor 
ziektegerelateerde informatie leiden tot veranderingen in het rapporteren van 
lichamelijke klachten. Tevens is onderzocht of dit impliciete geheugen voor ziekte 
informatie een voorspellende waarde heeft voor het rapporteren van lichamelijke 
klachten. 
Het activeren van ziekte-gerelateerd impliciet geheugen en het rapporteren van 
pijn 
Om een causaal verband te kunnen aantonen tussen een meer geactiveerd impliciet 
geheugen voor ziekten en het rapporteren van klachten, hebben wij getracht om in 
gezonde proefpersonen een impliciet geheugen voor ziekte te activeren en vervolgens 
te kijken of zij eerder klachten rapporteren (Hoofdstuk 2). Dit hebben wij gedaan door 
middel van ‘subliminal priming’, dat wil zeggen het aanbieden van stimuli voor een 
zeer korte periode, waardoor men zich niet bewust is van het zien van deze stimuli. In 
onze eerste studie lieten wij verschillende woorden zien die te maken hadden met 
ziekte of neutrale woorden. Wij deden dat extreem kort (sneller dan 1/20 seconde) 
zodat proefpersonen zich niet bewust waren dat zij deze woorden hadden gezien. 
Daaropvolgend werden proefpersonen gevraagd om hun hand zo lang mogelijk in 
ijskoud water te houden, totdat zij het niet meer konden volhouden (maximum van 4 
minuten). Als het model klopt zouden proefpersonen die onbewust ziekte-woorden te 
zien kregen, eerder pijn voelen en hun hand eerder uit het water halen in vergelijking 
met proefpersonen die neutrale woorden te zien kregen. In onze eerste studie werd dit 
inderdaad gevonden. Echter, omdat dit effect niet heel erg sterk was, de gebruikte 
vragenlijsten misschien van invloed waren op de priming, en omdat de gebruikte 
woorden misschien niet helemaal de juiste representatie waren van het concept 
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‘ziek’, hebben wij een tweede studie (Hoofdstuk 3) gedaan waarin wij de resultaten 
van onze eerste studie trachten te repliceren, dit keer met verbeterde methoden. In 
deze studie konden wij ons gevonden effect van de eerste studie echter niet 
repliceren en vonden wij dus geen verschil van het onbewust aanbieden van ziekte-
gerelateerde woorden op pijntolerantie in vergelijking met het aanbieden van neutrale 
woorden. 
Omdat wij in de eerste twee studies tegenstrijdige resultaten vonden, hebben wij 
in onze derde studie (Hoofdstuk 4) getracht om het impliciete geheugen voor ziekte 
sterker te manipuleren dan in onze eerste twee studies. Hiertoe hebben wij de 
methode ‘subliminale evaluatieve conditionering’ gebruikt, waarin een impliciet 
concept sterker wordt gekoppeld aan het impliciete 'zelfconcept'. Hiervoor lieten wij 
gezonde proefpersonen woorden zien die te maken hadden met ziekte in combinatie 
met het woordje ‘ik’, beide steeds subliminaal. Er wordt gedacht dat hoe sterker 
iemands geactiveerde impliciete zelfconcept overlapt met het geactiveerde impliciete 
schema voor ziekte en/of pijn, hoe meer diegene klachten zal rapporteren door een 
verhoogde aandacht voor lichamelijke signalen (Pincus & Morley, 2001). Echter, we 
vonden niet dat proefpersonen die onbewust woorden te zien kregen die te maken 
hadden met ziekte in combinatie met het woordje ‘ik’ een lagere pijntolerantie 
hadden dan proefpersonen die neutrale woorden te zien kregen of een ‘X’ in plaats 
van ‘ik’. Er werd wel gevonden dat mensen die gekenmerkt worden door in het 
algemeen weinig gefocust te zijn op zichzelf ('laag zelfbewustzijn'), in combinatie met 
het meer activeren van het zelf-schema, dat die een hogere pijntolerantie hadden dan 
mensen met een hogere zelf-bewustzijn. Een mogelijke verklaring voor het gevonden 
effect zou kunnen zijn dat mensen die het woordje ‘ik’ onbewust te zien kregen meer 
tijdelijk zelfvertrouwen kregen en zo langer de pijntaak konden volhouden. 
Vervolgstudies zijn echter nodig om de precieze werking uit te zoeken.  
Omdat de eerste drie studies tegenstrijdige resultaten lieten zien, kon dat twee 
dingen betekenen: 1) de hypothese dat een geactiveerd geheugenschema voor ziekten 
van invloed is op het rapporteren van klachten is niet juist of 2) de technieken 
gebruikt in de eerste drie studies zijn niet effectief in het activeren van 
geheugenschema voor ziekte. De methoden van de eerste drie studies zijn veel 
gebruikt in eerdere studies die effectief bleken om gedrag onbewust te veranderen 
(bijvoorbeeld Kiefer, 2002; Levy, 1996; Pierce & Lydon, 1998; Lowery, Eisenberger, 
Hardin, & Sinclair, 2007). Dus we gingen ervan uit dat deze methoden goed zouden 
werken en het desgewenste effect zouden hebben. Echter, om de tweede verklaring 
uit te sluiten hebben we in de vierde studie (Hoofdstuk 5) onderzocht of subliminale 
priming die in de eerste twee studies gebruikt zijn inderdaad leidt tot een meer 
geactiveerd ziekteschema. Tevens onderzochten we of de subliminale evaluatieve 
conditioneringsmethode inderdaad leidde tot een meer geactiveerde link tussen 
ziekteschema en het zelfconcept. In het eerste gedeelte kreeg de helft van de 
proefpersonen onbewust ziekte woorden te zien en daarna werd gekeken of zij sneller 
ziektewoorden herkenden dan andere woorden op een zogenaamde lexicale decision 
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taak. Dit was niet het geval. In het tweede onderdeel van deze studie werd gekeken of 
de andere helft van de proefpersonen een impliciete associatie lieten zien voor ziekte 
en zichzelf, als zij vantevoren onbewust ziektewoorden te zien kregen in combinate 
met het woordje “ik”. Dit was ook niet het geval. Beide methoden bleken dus niet het 
desgewenste effect te hebben, en dus niet te voldoen aan het effectief manipuleren 
van het ziekteschema. Dit betekent dat we in de eerste drie studies niet hebben 
kunnen onderzoeken of de hypothese dat een geactiveerd ziekteschema leidt tot meer 
klachten klopt. 
In het tweede gedeelte van dit proefschrift hebben wij op een andere manier de 
associatie tussen ziekteschema en het rapporteren van lichamelijke klachten 
onderzocht. Omdat manipulatie op onbewuste wijze van het ziekte schema niet 
effectief bleek, besloten wij in de vijfde studie (Hoofdstuk 6) om het ziekte-schema te 
manipuleren met bewust waargenomen stimuli (supraliminale priming). Ook besloten 
wij ditmaal het in het dagelijks leven te onderzoeken, met daadwerkelijk 
gerapporteerde klachten. Gezonde proefpersonen werden in twee groepen gedeeld. De 
ene groep kreeg een aantal dagen positieve gezondheidswoorden te zien terwijl zij 
een online computertaak deden. De andere groep kreeg neutrale woorden te zien. Alle 
proefpersonen werden gevraagd om aan het einde van de dag een vragenlijst in te 
vullen die lichamelijke klachten inventariseerde. Er werd gevonden dat de 
proefpersonen die de taak deden waarbij zij positieve gezondheidswoorden te zien 
kregen een significant lager aantal klachten hadden dan de proefpersonen die neutrale 
woorden te zien kregen. Echter, dit gold alleen voor de proefpersonen met de 
kenmerken laag 'negatieve affect' (de tendens om veel negatieve emoties te ervaren) 
of lage somatosensorische versterking ('somatosensory amplification', de neiging om 
lichamelijke signalen versterkt waar te nemen). Deze resultaten suggereren dat het 
direct activeren van een positief gezondheidsschema lichamelijke klachten kan 
reduceren in bepaalde subgroepen. Misschien dat de proefpersonen bij wie het niet 
werkte, namelijk zij die geneigd zijn om meer negatief affect te rapporteren of 
lichamelijke signalen versterkt waar te nemen, ook eerder geneigd zijn positieve 
gezondheidsinformatie te interpreteren als negatief. Dit zodat het past in hun 
ziekteschema, en dit zou tot gevolg hebben dat positieve 'gezondheids-priming' niet 
tot een klachtenreductie leidt zoals in de andere subgroepen. 
In het laatste onderzoek (Hoofdstuk 7) is de hypothese dat activatie van een 
ziekteschema leidt tot meer gezondheidsklachten op nog een andere manier 
onderzocht, en dit keer bij zowel gezonde proefpersonen als bij proefpersonen met 
somatisch onverklaarde lichamelijke klachten (SOLK). In deze studie is gebruik 
gemaakt van een cross-sectioneel design om zo de temporele relatie tussen activatie 
van een ziekteschema en lichamelijke klachten te onderzoeken. De hypothese was dat 
proefpersonen met een chronisch geactiveerd ziekteschema ook meer lichamelijke 
klachten zouden hebben, en dat dit geactiveerde ziekteschema stabieler zou zijn 
(d.w.z. een sterke samenhang tussen de twee metingen) en de mate van lichamelijke 
klachten op een later moment zou kunnen voorspellen. Er werd inderdaad gevonden 
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dat proefpersonen met SOLK een sterker impliciet geheugen bias hadden voor woorden 
die met ziekte te maken hadden, en dus een sterker geactiveerd ziekte schema, in 
vergelijking met de groep gezonde proefpersonen. De gezonde proefpersonen lieten 
ook een impliciete geheugenbias zien voor ziektewoorden, deze bias was alleen minder 
sterk in vergelijking met de SOLK proefpersonen. Echter, deze bias was niet stabieler 
voor de proefpersonen met SOLK, en was niet gerelateerd aan meer lichamelijke 
klachten op hetzelfde meetmoment en het voorspelde ook niet het aantal lichamelijke 
klachten op een later meetmoment. Er werd in deze studie dus wel bewijs gevonden 
voor de hypothese dat SOLK samenhangt met een meer geactiveerd ziekte schema, 
maar geen bewijs gevonden voor de hypothese dat een meer geactiveerd ziekte 
schema is gerelateerd aan het rapporteren van een verhoogd aantal lichamelijke 
klachten op hetzelfde moment of een week later. Een mogelijke verklaring voor dit 
gevonden resultaat is dat de meetmomenten te kort na elkaar kwamen, waardoor er 
meer ‘state’ variantie is gemeten in plaats van ‘trait’ variantie. Misschien dat deze 
associatie wel gevonden zou kunnen worden als er een langere tijdsspanne tussen de 
meetmomenten zou zitten waardoor meer de samenhang tussen ‘trait’ variantie 
gemeten zou kunnen worden in plaats van de ‘state’ variantie. 
Sterke punten en beperkingen van de onderzoeken 
Één van de sterke punten van dit onderzoek is dat we hebben getracht om door middel 
van experimentele studies en met verschillende methoden het causale verband tussen 
impliciete geheugen voor ziekte-informatie en het rapporteren van lichamelijke 
klachten aan te tonen. Dit wordt al jarenlang gespeculeerd, maar er zijn tot nu toe 
maar weinig experimentele studies geweest die geprobeerd hebben om het causale 
verband aan te tonen. Het is lastig om een oorzaak- en gevolg-verband te onderzoeken 
omdat het omgekeerde ook plausibel is, namelijk dat het hebben van lichamelijke 
klachten automatisch leidt tot het hebben van een sterker impliciet geheugennetwerk 
voor ziekte-informatie. Veel studies hebben inderdaad gevonden dat mensen met SOLK 
een cognitieve bias hebben voor ziekte-informatie, maar het is onduidelijk of die bias 
een oorzaak of een gevolg is van het hebben van lichamelijke klachten.  
Een ander sterk punt van dit onderzoek is dat we ons eigen onderzoek hebben 
geprobeerd te repliceren. In een replicatiestudie hebben wij niet hetzelfde resultaat 
kunnen repliceren, maar dit hebben wij wel gepubliceerd. Het is gesuggereerd dat 
veel meer onderzoekers dan tot nu toe hun studies waarin negatieve resultaten 
gevonden worden ter publicatie zouden moeten aan bieden, om het “file-drawer”-
effect - het laten liggen 'in de la' van onwelgevallige resultaten - te reduceren 
(Lieberman, 2012).  
In dit onderzoek hebben wij tevens rekening gehouden met twee alternatieve 
hypotheses: dat mensen meer lichamelijke klachten rapporteren omdat er sprake is 
van een meer geactiveerd schema voor sensaties of negatieve informatie in het 
algemeen. Deze alternatieve hypotheses zijn onderzocht omdat er gesuggereerd is dat 
mensen met meer negatieve gevoelens en gedachten ook meer aandacht hebben voor 
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interne stimuli en daardoor meer lichamelijke klachten rapporteren (Watson & 
Pennebaker, 1989). 
Een ander sterk punt van dit onderzoek is dat er gebruik is gemaakt van 
verschillende methoden om de rol van impliciet geheugennetwerk voor ziekte-
informatie op het rapporteren van lichamelijke klachten te onderzoeken. Deze relatie 
is niet alleen in de gecontroleerde setting van het laboratorium onderzocht, maar ook 
in het dagelijks leven. Bovendien zijn er verschillende priming-technieken gebruikt om 
het impliciete geheugennetwerk te manipuleren. En er is zowel in gezonde 
proefpersonen als proefpersonen met SOLK onderzoek gedaan naar deze relatie.  
Tenslotte hebben we onderzocht of de methoden die gebruikt werden om het 
geheugennetwerk voor ziekte activeren inderdaad werkten. Een beperking van dit 
onderzoek is echter dat we dit laatste pas aan het einde van een serie experimenten 
hebben onderzocht. Het zijn weliswaar veel gebruikte methoden in de psychologie, en 
worden om die reden geloofwaardig geacht, maar ons vertrouwen bleek onterecht. Het 
was achteraf gezien beter geweest om meteen een manipulatiecheck te doen, zodat 
wij niet onnodig langer doorgingen met een ondeugdelijke methode. Hopelijk draagt 
ons onderzoek naar de werking van deze methode bij aan het ontwikkelen van een 
betere methode om het impliciete ziekteschema te manipuleren. In het onderzoek 
waarbij gebruik werd gemaakt van het manipuleren van een ziekteschema met behulp 
van bewust waargenomen stimuli (supraliminal priming) is er ook geen 
manipulatiecheck gedaan. Alhoewel we wel vonden dat er een bepaald effect was van 
deze methode op de uitkomstmaat, weten we nu niet zeker of dat inderdaad komt 
door onze manipulatie. Verder is ook een beperking dat we alleen twee opeenvolgende 
weken hebben gebruikt als meetperiode om de prospectieve, voorspellende rol van 
impliciete geheugennetwerk voor ziekte op het rapporteren van klachten te meten. 
Een andere beperking is dat we alleen priming met behulp van woorden hebben 
gebruikt. Het kan zijn dat er misschien andere resultaten waren gevonden als we 
andere stimuli zoals bijvoorbeeld plaatjes, hadden gebruikt. 
Conclusies 
Onze onderzoeken vonden geen sluitend bewijs voor de hypothese dat meer 
geactiveerde impliciete geheugennetwerken of schema’s voor ziekte-informatie zorgen 
voor verhoogde rapportage van lichamelijke klachten. Dit komt met name omdat de 
technieken die gebruikt zijn om deze impliciet geheugennetwerken of schema’s te 
manipuleren achteraf niet goed bleken te werken. Toekomstige studies zouden betere 
methoden moeten ontwikkelen om zo het daadwerkelijke causale verband tussen deze 
geheugennetwerken en rapportage van lichamelijke klachten te kunnen onderzoeken. 
In onze studies in het dagelijks leven vonden we wel enig bewijs die deze hypothese 
ondersteunt. Echter, longitudinale studies met grotere groepen proefpersonen zijn 
nodig om sterker bewijs te kunnen leveren voor deze hypothese. De resultaten van 
deze onderzoeken geven wel richting aan de stappen die nodig zijn om de rol van 
ziekteschema’s in het rapporteren van lichamelijke klachten te onderzoeken. Het 
 150| Samenvatting 
verder onderzoeken van deze rol is belangrijk vanwege de slechte kwaliteit van leven 
in SOLK patiënten en is eveneens van maatschappelijk belang vanwege de impact van 
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